OPINION
¶ 1 Plаintiffs Raymond E. Casaday and Ellen C. Casaday (the Casadays) appeal the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendant Allstate Insurance Company (Allstate). We reverse and remand. 2
BACKGROUND
¶ 2 In March 2006, the Casadays, husband and wife, were seriously injured in an automobile accident when a sixteen-year-old driver made an illegal left turn in front of them. The Casadays, in their eighties at the time, suffered extensive injuries and incurred over $200,000 in medical bills. They settled with the teenage driver for $60,000 — -the maximum amount of liability coverage provided by his insurance policy. The Casadays then filed a claim for underinsured motorist (UIM) benefits from their insurer, Allstate, with which they had been insured since 1966. Allstate informed them that their insurance policy provided UIM coverage of only $10,000 per person and $20,000 per accident, although their liability coverage provided $100,000 per person and $300,000 per accident.
¶3 Utah Code section 31A-22-305.3 mandates that the presumptive limit of UIM coverage be equal to the limits of an insured’s liability coverage.
See
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305.3(2) (2009);
3
see generally General Sec. Indem. Co. v. Tipton,
¶4 When Allstate refused to afford the Casadays UIM coverage equal to their liability coverage, the Casadays filed suit. In their complaint, they cited to section 31A-22-305.3 and referred to subsection (2)(b) but not to subsection (2)(h). 4 The Casadays’ complaint reads as follows:
4. On March 18, 2006, [the Casadays] were insured by [Allstate] under an automobile insurance policy which was issued by [Allstate] after January 1, 2001.
5. The aforesaid automobile insurance policy provided liability coverage of $100,000 per person, up to $300,000 per occurrence.
6. Pursuant to [subsection (2)(b) ], the limits of [UIM] coverage required to be provided to [the Casadays] was an amount equal to the lesser of the limits of their liability coverage or the maximum [UIM] coverage limits available by the insurer under the insured’s automobile insurance policy, unless the insured purchased coverage in a lesser amount by signing an acknowledgment form meeting certain statutory requirements.
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8. [The Casadays] never signed any acknowledgment meeting the statutory requirements whereby [UIM] limits less than those required by law were purchased.
9. On March 18, 2006, [the Casadays] were involved in an automobile collision in which they were each seriously injured and each sustained damages that exceeded the liability insurance limits of the person responsible for the collision by more than $100,000 each.
10. [The Casadays] should have been entitled to the protection of the [UIM] coverage issued by [Allstate] in a minimum amount of $100,000 per person, up to $300,000 per occurrence.
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12. In violation of Utah law and contrary to the facts, [Allstate] advised [the Casa-days] that their policy of insurance only provided [UIM] coverage in the amount of $10,000, up to $20,000 per occurrence....
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15. [Allstate] has refused to pay the limits of [UIM] coverage required by the policy and by law.
Allstate answered the Casadays’ complaint, alleging that subsection (2)(b) for new policies was inapplicable to the Casadays’ claims. Allstate asserted that subsection (2)(h) for existing policies “applies in lieu of’ subsection (2)(b). Allstate also pleaded subsection (2)(h) as an affirmative defense, asserting that it had complied with its requirements:
Utah Code [subsection (2)(h) ] directly governs the [UIM] coverage limits of [the Casadays’] automobile policy with Allstate, and ... Allstate fully complied with the requirements and provisions of that statute in establishing and continuing the pоlicy limits of [the Casadays’] coverage, including but not limited to sending [the Casa-days] the required statutory notices in 2001.
¶ 5 The parties conducted extensive discovery, a significant portion of which was dedicated to the issue of whether Allstate provided the Casadays with the two notices required by subsection (2)(h). Specifically, discovery included expert testimony on the matter as well as attempts to recovеr the two notices. The evidence discovered indicated either that the Casadays had not received both notices or that the notices produced were in some way inadequate.
¶ 6 Allstate moved for summary judgment. In support of its summary judgment motion, Allstate characterized the Casadays’ complaint as asserting only a claim for equal coverage as a new policy. Allstate argued that it was entitled to summary judgment on the Casadays’ claim for equal coverage as a new policy because the uncontested facts showed that the Casadays have an existing policy, having been insured by Allstate since 1966. The Casadays “concedefd] that their [insurance] policy would likely be considered ... an existing policy, rather than a new policy,” and argued that their complaint could reаsonably be read as asserting a claim for equal coverage as an existing policy. Allstate responded that the Casadays’ alleged claim for equal coverage as an existing policy must fail because any such claim was inadequately pleaded in their complaint.
¶ 7 The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Allstate, concluding that the Casadays’ complaint pleaded only a сlaim for equal coverage as a new policy, which claim failed as a matter of law because the undisputed facts showed that the Casadays have an existing policy. The district court further concluded that the Casadays’ com
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶ 8 The Casadays challenge the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Allstate. The appropriateness of a district court’s grant of summary judgment is a question of law reviewed for correctness.
See Holmes Dev., LLC v. Cook,
¶ 9 In granting summary judgment in favor of Alstate, the district court concluded that the Casadаys’ claim for equal coverage as a new policy failed as a matter of law and that the Casadays’ complaint inadequately pleaded a claim for equal coverage as an existing policy. On appeal, the Casadays do not challenge the district court’s decision as it relates to their claim for equal coverage as a new policy. Accordingly, the narrow quеstion presented for our review is whether the district court correctly granted summary judgment to Alstate in concluding that the Casadays’ complaint inadequately pleaded a claim for equal coverage as an existing policy-
ANALYSIS
¶ 10 The Casadays contend that their complaint alleges that Alstate failed to provide them with the equal coverage mandated by Utah law and, thus, can reasonably bе read as stating a claim for equal coverage as an existing policy. Alstate responds that the Casadays’ complaint states only a claim for equal coverage as a new policy, arguing that the complaint is legally insufficient to plead a claim for equal coverage as an existing policy. In so arguing, Alstate emphasizes the Casadays’ specific citation to the statutory subsection for new policies without citing the subsection for existing policies. The district court similarly emphasized the Casadays’ specific citation to the incorrect statutory subsection in concluding that their complaint inadequately pleaded a claim for equal coverage as an existing policy.
¶ 11 Under Utah’s liberal notice pleading, “[t]he plaintiff must only give the defendant ‘fair notice of the nature and basis or grounds of the claim and a general indication of the type of litigation involved.’ ”
Canfield v. Layton City,
¶ 12 It is undisputed that the Casa-days cited the wrong statutory subsection for existing policies. But failure to specify the correct statutory subsection is not necessarily fatal to a plaintiff’s claims, so long as the complaint can reasonably be read as supporting the particular claim for relief, giving the defendant notice of that claim.
See generally Youngblood v. Auto-Oivners Ins. Co.,
¶ 13 In their complaint, the Casadays alleged that they were seriously injured in a cаr accident while insured by Allstate and that the at-fault driver’s liability coverage was insufficient to cover their medical bills. They further alleged that when they attempted to collect the UIM coverage provided by their insurance policy, Allstate informed them that their UIM coverage would only cover up to $20,000 although their liability coverage would cover up to $300,000. The Casadays also alleged that their UIM сoverage should have been up to $300,000— an amount equal to their liability coverage— and that Allstate’s refusal to pay this amount violated Utah law. Thus, the substance of their complaint is that they are entitled to UIM coverage equal to their liability coverage.
¶ 14 In concluding that the Casadays’ complaint did not state a claim for equal coverage as an existing policy, the district court relied solely on
Asael Farr & Sons Co. v. Truck Insurance Exchange,
¶ 16 We further disagree with the district court that any claim for equal сoverage as an existing policy in the Casadays’ complaint was vague and did not give notice to Allstate of such a claim. Even if a complaint is “vague,” “inartfully drafted,” “a bare-bones outline,”
see Canfield v. Layton City,
¶ 17 Applying Utah’s notice pleading standards “with great liberality,”
see Williams v. State Farm Ins. Co.,
¶ 18 We conclude that the district court incorrectly granted summary judgment in favor of Allstate by concluding that the Casa-days’ complaint inadequately pleaded a claim for equal coverage as an existing policy. The Casadays’ complaint states a claim for UIM coverage equal to their liability coverage, regardless of whether their policy is new or existing. Accordingly, Allstate had adequate notice that the Casadays were seeking equal coverage as an existing policy.
¶ 19 We therefore reverse the summary judgment and remand the case for further proceedings.
Notes
. Because we conclude that the district court incorrectly granted summary judgment in favor of Allstate, we do not reach the other issues raised on appeal.
. Utah Code section 31A-22-305.3 was originally enacted as part of section 31A-22-305, see Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305 (2001), until renumbered, see id. § 31A-22-305.3 (2006); id. § 31A-22-305 (2009) (amend, notes). For convenience to the reader, we cite to the current version of the Utah Code throughout this opinion.
.The Casadays later "concede[d] that their [insurance] policy would likely be considered ... an existing policy, rather than a new policy.” It appears that their reliance on subsection (2)(b) arose out of the mistaken belief that a policy may be considered new after certain changes are made to a policy, such as the addition of new vehicles.
. The district court also noted that the Casadays had not moved to amend their complaint. When asked at oral argument before this court why they did not move to amend their complaint when it became apparent that their claim should have been brought for equal coverage as an existing policy, the Casadays responded that they did not think they needed to amend because they thought their complaint would be sufficient to also support a claim for equal coverage as an existing policy — especially given Allstate’s answer to their complaint as well as the substance of the parties’ discovery. Consistent with that belief, the record shows that the Casadays contemplated amending their complaint but never actually moved to amend until after the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Allstate.