479 S.E.2d 735 | Ga. | 1997
Concurrence Opinion
concurring specially.
Although I agree that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed, it is my opinion that this case does not meet the criteria for affirmance pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 59. After reviewing the case law and issues raised in this appeal, I think that an opinion would benefit the Bench and the Bar and, thus, would have precedential value. Therefore, I write to state why I believe that the trial court correctly granted summary judgment in this case.
Lamar Carver and Clyde Carver (Carvers) brought suit against' the City of Moultrie (City), seeking specific performance of, or, in the alternative, damages for the breach of, an agreement for the conveyance of part of an old airfield owned by the City. The Carvers alleged that the City found another purchaser, refused to accept a tender of the purchase price and refused to convey the property. The City moved for summary judgment on the basis that there was no agreement satisfying the requirements of the Statute of Frauds. OCGA § 13-5-30 (4). The trial court granted the City’s motion, and the Carvers appeal.
To prove an agreement which satisfies the Statute of Frauds, the Carvers rely on two writings. The first is a letter from Sherrod McCall, President of the Colquitt County Economic Development Corporation, to Lamar Carver indicating that McCall had met with the City Council’s airfield committee and presented a request for a site for the Carvers’ proposed project. The letter states that the airfield committee approved a recommendation to the full City Council
Any contract for the sale of lands “must be in writing and signed by the party to be charged therewith or some person lawfully authorized by him.” OCGA § 13-5-30 (4). However, it is not necessary that a single signed writing contain the parties’ whole agreement. If the writings are signed and contemporaneous and contain all of the necessary terms, “the statutory requirements and purpose of the Statute of Frauds have been met, whether or not the writings are cross-referenced.” Baker v. Jellibeans, Inc., 252 Ga. 458, 460 (1) (314 SE2d 874) (1984). Furthermore, as is clear in North & Co. v. Mendel & Brother, 73 Ga. 400 (1884), cited in Baker v. Jellibeans, Inc., supra at 460 (1), the parties’ agreement may satisfy the Statute of Frauds even if it consists of both a signed writing and a writing which is not signed by either the party to be charged or his agent.
If, however, it be necessary to adduce parol evidence, in order to connect a signed paper with others unsigned, by reason of the absence of any internal evidence in the signed paper to show a reference to, or connection with, the unsigned papers, then the several papers taken together do not constitute a memorandum in writing of the bargain, so as to satisfy the statute.
North & Co. v. Mendel & Brother, supra at 404. Parol evidence is not necessary to connect the writings in the instant case, however, because their common parties, common quantum of acreage, common sales price, and common general location of the property “demonstrate a sufficient interconnection among the writings for them to stand together as memoranda.” Beckworth v. Beckworth, 255 Ga. 241, 245 (3) (a) (336 SE2d 782) (1985).
The City contends that the minutes show a mere offer to the Carvers of an option to purchase, and not the Carvers’ assent. While the party relying on a written memorandum must show that he assented, it is not necessary to show that he assented in writing. Borum v. Swift & Co., 125 Ga. 198, 202 (53 SE 608) (1906). The minutes show that the Carvers assented to the option to purchase by requesting it and that the City approved it.
Nevertheless, the writings here still would not satisfy the Statute of Frauds if they fail to show exactly what property formed the
Lead Opinion
The judgment of the court below is affirmed without opinion pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 59.