Cartwright v. Oklahoma, 497 U.S. 1015

Cartwright v. Oklahoma

497 U.S. 1015

SCOTUS

1990

Check Treatment

CARTWRIGHT v. OKLAHOMA

No. 89-5934

Ct. Crim. App. Okla.

June 25, 1990

496 U. S. 1015

496 U. S., at 299. The type of coercive environment described by the Court in Perkins was present in this case. First, the questioning occurred in prison, undoubtedly a ““police-dominated atmosphere.“” . And when the guards rounded up the inmates and strip-searched them, the sense of police domination was increased. Second, the prison officials were openly acting as agents of the State, and petitioner knew that they were responsible for determining the extent of his freedom. See (“Questioning by captors, who appear to control the suspect‘s fate, may create mutually reinforcing pressures that the Court has assumed will weaken the suspect‘s will“). Given the virtually complete control that prison officials exercise over prisoners’ lives, petitioner surely felt compelled to answer questions “by the fear of reprisal for remaining silent or in the hope of more lenient treatment should he confess.”

Thus, petitioner was in custody, was interrogated by prison officials, and was subjected to police coercion. Because the guards did not inform him of his Miranda rights before interrogating him, his responses to their direct questioning could not be used against him at trial. This case represents more than an opportunity to correct an erroneous decision, however; it provides the Court a chance to clarify what constitutes “custody” for Miranda purposes in the prison setting. I would therefore grant the petition for certiorari. Even if I did not believe that this case otherwise merited review, I would grant the petition and vacate petitioner‘s death sentence on the ground that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.

Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 231 (1976) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting).

No. 89-5934. CARTWRIGHT v. OKLAHOMA. Ct. Crim. App. Okla. Certiorari denied.

JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom JUSTICE MARSHALL joins, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

I join the Court‘s decision except insofar as the judgment, which is without prejudice to further sentencing proceedings, does not expressly preclude the reimposition of the death penalty. Adhering to my view that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments,

Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 227 (1976) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting), I would direct that the resentencing proceed-ings be circumscribed such that the State may not reimpose the death sentence.

DOUGHTY ET AL. v. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS FOR THE COUNTY OF WELD ET AL.

No. 89-7387

C. A. 10th Cir.

June 25, 1990

496 U. S. 1016

Certiorari before judgment denied.

Petitions for rehearing denied June 25, 1990

No. 89-81.

WILSON ET AL. v. LANE, DIRECTOR, ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, 495 U. S. 923;

No. 89-1465.

KOZAK v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, 495 U. S. 905;

No. 89-6914.

MEYERS v. INDIANA, 495 U. S. 921;

No. 89-6954.

MAGWOOD v. ALABAMA, 495 U. S. 923; and

No. 89-7028.

FRYHOVER v. UNITED STATES, 495 U. S. 922.

Petitions for rehearing denied.

HAMILTON, AS NATURAL MOTHER AND NEXT FRIEND TO SMITH v. TEXAS; HAMILTON, AS NATURAL MOTHER AND NEXT FRIEND TO SMITH v. COLLINS

No. A-917 (89-7838); No. A-921 (89-7842)

C. A. 5th Cir.

JUNE 26, 1990

No. A-917 (89-7838). HAMILTON, AS NATURAL MOTHER AND NEXT FRIEND TO SMITH v. TEXAS. Ct. Crim. App. Tex.; and No. A-921 (89-7842). HAMILTON, AS NATURAL MOTHER AND NEXT FRIEND TO SMITH v. COLLINS, DIRECTOR, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, INSTITUTIONAL DIVISION. C. A. 5th Cir. Applications for stay of execution of sentence of death, presented to JUSTICE WHITE, and by him referred to the Court, denied. JUSTICE BLACKMUN and JUSTICE STEVENS dissent and would grant the applications.

JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom JUSTICE MARSHALL joins, dissenting.

Tonight, for the second time within a month, see

Demosthenes v. Baal, 495 U. S. 731 (1990), this Court permits a State to execute a prisoner who has waived further appeals on his behalf when serious doubts remain concerning his mental competence. I believe that we shirk our responsibility if we do not articulate standards by which the adequacy of procedures in state competency hearings may be judged. I would grant the petitions for certiorari and the corresponding applications for stay of execution. Indeed, four Members of this Court have voted to grant certiorari in this case, but because a stay cannot be entered without five votes,