336 F.3d 487 | 6th Cir. | 2003
Before: SUHRHEINRICH and COLE, Circuit Judges;
CARR, District Judge. [*] UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS _________________ FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT COUNSEL _________________ ARGUED: Julie O’Connor, O’CONNOR, DeGRAZIA & TAMM, Bloomfield Hills, Michigan, for Appellant. Wolfgang Mueller, OLSMAN, MUELLER & JAMES,
D INNELL C. C ARTWRIGHT , as (cid:88) Berkley, Michigan, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Julie (cid:45) Personal Representative of the O’Connor, O’CONNOR, DeGRAZIA & TAMM, Bloomfield (cid:45) Estate of T ERRY L. Hills, Michigan, for Appellant. Wolfgang Mueller, (cid:45) No. 02-1728 C ARTWRIGHT , Deceased, OLSMAN, MUELLER & JAMES, Berkley, Michigan, for (cid:45) > Appellee. Plaintiff-Appellee, (cid:44) (cid:45)
_________________ v. (cid:45) (cid:45)
OPINION (cid:45) C ITY OF M ARINE C ITY ; J AMES _________________ (cid:45) V ANDERMEULEN and (cid:45) JAMES G. CARR, District Judge. Dinnell C. Cartwright, T IMOTHY R OCK , Marine City (cid:45) as personal representative of the estate of the late Terry L. Police Officers, (cid:45) Cartwright, sued the City of Marine City, Michigan (“City”), Defendants-Appellants. (cid:45) and two of its police officers for failing to prevent the death (cid:45) of Terry Cartwright, a pedestrian who was struck and killed (cid:78) by a truck. The district court denied the defendants’ motion
for summary judgment and claim of qualified immunity. We Appeal from the United States District Court hold that the plaintiff has not made out a constitutional for the Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit. violation against the City or the officers. We therefore No. 00-73730—Julian A. Cook, Jr., District Judge. REVERSE the district court’s denial of qualified immunity, and REMAND the case for dismissal.
Argued: May 7, 2003 Decided and Filed: July 21, 2003 level at the time of his death was .27 percent. A forensic Clair County, Michigan. Defendants James Vandermeulen pathologist determined that Cartwright’s blood alcohol level and Timothy Rock, police officers for Marine City, Michigan, at about 12:15 a.m. would have been in excess of .30 percent. saw him on the side of the road while they were riding in their At that level, Cartwright’s speech would have been slurred, patrol car to the Speedy-Q convenience store for a prisoner his eyes would have been red, and he would have had trouble pickup. The officers stopped and asked Cartwright where he standing. was going. Cartwright said he was traveling to Yale, Michigan. The officers offered him a ride to Port Huron, Cartwright’s wife, Dinnell Cartwright, representing his Michigan, and Cartwright accepted. He got into the back of estate, initiated this action against the City of Marine City, the patrol car, and the three drove for eight or nine minutes to Rock, and Vandermeulen. She alleges that the police officers reach the store. violated Terry Cartwright’s substantive due process rights
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and that the City is liable for failure During the trip, the officers asked Cartwright for to train and supervise its police officers. Plaintiff also asserted identification. Cartwright produced an identification card. a claim of gross negligence and a violation of Mich. Comp. The officers noticed that Cartwright smelled of alcohol, but Laws § 333.6501 (2003). The district court denied summary did not notice other signs of intoxication, such as bloodshot judgment on the constitutional claim, and also denied eyes or slurred speech. summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. The
defendants appeal. At the convenience store, the officers took custody of their prisoner. The officers then told Cartwright that they could not II. ANALYSIS put the prisoner in the back seat with Cartwright unless Cartwright consented to a pat-down search. Cartwright A. Jurisdiction refused to allow the pat-down search, and told the officers
The district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C § 1331. that he did not want a ride. The officers left Cartwright at the This Court has jurisdiction over the defendants’ appeal of the store, and drove away. district court’s denial of qualified immunity pursuant to 28 According to store clerk John Beaufait, Cartwright entered U.S.C. § 1291 and Mitchell v. Forsyth , 472 U.S. 511, 530 the store sometime between midnight and 12:30 a.m., bought (1985) (holding that a district court’s denial of a claim of a soft drink, and left. Cartwright returned sometime between qualified immunity, to the extent that it turns on an issue of 1 a.m. and 1:30 a.m. and tried to buy a beer. Beaufait refused law, is appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, though not a final to sell him the beer because he looked haggard and confused, judgment). and slurred his speech. Beaufait gave Cartwright a cup of The district court denied the defendants’ motion for coffee, and Cartwright stayed in the store for about twenty or
summary judgment based on its conclusion that there were thirty minutes, drinking the coffee and talking to Beaufait. genuine issues of material fact for trial, never mentioning Cartwright then left the store. No. 02-1728 Cartwright v. City of Marine City, et al. 5 6 Cartwright v. City of Marine City, et al. No. 02-1728 qualified immunity. The order still is appealable, however, plaintiff has the burden of establishing that a defendant is not because “[e]ven when the district court denies summary entitled to qualified immunity. Rich v. City of Mayfield Hts. , judgment without stating its reasons for doing so, a court of 955 F.2d 1092, 1095 (6th Cir. 1992). appeals may decide the legal question underlying the
The qualified-immunity inquiry has two principal parts. qualified immunity defense.” Christophel v. Kukulinsky , 61 First, the court must determine “whether the plaintiff has F.3d 479, 485 (6th Cir. 1995) ( citing Johnson v. Jones , 515 shown a violation of a constitutionally protected right.” Davis U.S. 304, 318-19 (1995); see also Klein v. Long , 275 F.3d v. Brady , 143 F.3d 1021, 1024 (6th Cir. 1998). Then, the 544, 549 (6th Cir. 2001) ( quoting Shehee v. Luttrell , 199 F.3d court must discern whether the right is so “clearly 295, 299 (6th cir. 1999) (noting that as long as “a defendant established” that a “reasonable official would understand that seeking qualified immunity [is] willing to concede to the facts what he is doing violates that right.” Anderson v. Creighton , as alleged by the plaintiff and discuss only the legal issues 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). We start with the question of raised by the case” the defendant is entitled to an
whether the officers violated Terry Cartwright’s due-process interlocutory appeal to show that “the undisputed facts or the rights at all. Because there was no violation, we do not reach evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff the clearly-established prong. fail to establish a prima facie violation of clear constitutional law”).
D. Section 1983 B. Standard of Review Plaintiff seeks to hold the government officials responsible, under § 1983, for the act of private violence that Cartwright We review de novo a district court’s denial of qualified suffered when he was struck and killed by a motorist. To immunity. Klein , 275 F.3d at 550 (citation omitted). succeed on a § 1983 claim, plaintiff must show defendants: C. Qualified Immunity 1) acted under color of state law; and 2) deprived plaintiff’s decedent of his rights under the United States Constitution. The plaintiff asserts that the defendant officers and the City Upsher v. Grosse Pointe Pub. Sch. Sys. , 285 F.3d 448, 452 violated Terry Cartwright’s substantive due process rights. (6th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted). Because a constitutional violation against a city requires, but is not made out by, an antecedent violation on the part of its 1. Color of State Law officials, see Bukowski v. City of Akron , 326 F.3d 702, 708
Defendants do not contest that they were acting under state (6th Cir. 2003), we start with the roles played by defendants law. Rock and Vandermeulen. 2. Deprivation of Rights As governmental officials acting within the scope of their duty, Rock and Vandermeulen can claim qualified immunity. Plaintiff alleges that defendants violated Cartwright’s Id. Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense shielding constitutional right to substantive due process by failing to governmental officials from liability as long as their conduct take him into custody. In DeShaney v. Winnebago County does “not violate clearly established statutory or Department of Social Services , 489 U.S. 189, 197 (1989), the constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have Supreme Court noted that “a State’s failure to protect an known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald , 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The No. 02-1728 Cartwright v. City of Marine City, et al. 7 8 Cartwright v. City of Marine City, et al. No. 02-1728 individual against private violence simply does not constitute under custodial exception to DeShaney where her argument a violation of the Due Process Clause.” The Court in is that the city harmed her by failing to take her into custody). DeShaney held that the defendant social services department Plaintiff argues that a special relationship existed between was not liable for the injuries a father inflicted on his son,
Cartwright and the officers, because the officers had an even though the department had a responsibility to prevent affirmative duty to help plaintiff, and because such duty was child abuse, and had taken temporary custody of the child created by state statute. before returning him to his father. While the Court in DeShaney denied relief, it explained that it was not
i. Relationship Through Custody considering a case where a person suffered injuries either while in state custody or because of state acts that made him
The state has a duty to protect a citizen “when the State by more vulnerable to private violence. Id. at 201. Instead, the affirmative exercise of its power so restrains an DeShaney involved a situation where a state’s involvement individual’s liberty that it renders him unable to care for placed the victim “in no worse position than that in which he himself, and at the same time fails to provide for his basic would have been had it not acted at all.” Id. human needs.” DeShaney , 489 U.S. at 200. This Court has recognized both of these exceptions to the The relationship only arises “when the state restrains an general rule announced in DeShaney . Sargi v. Kent City Bd. individual,” Sargi , 70 F.3d at 911, and in this case, decedent of Educ. , 70 F.3d 907, 910 (6th Cir. 1995). See Stemler v. City was never in custody. The defendants did not suspect of Florence , 126 F.3d 856, 867-68 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding Cartwright was guilty of wrongdoing; they merely offered to that an injury suffered while in state custody may be violation give him a ride. When Cartwright refused to consent to a pat- of Due Process Clause); Kallstrom v. City of Columbus , 136 down search, which the officers requested only when the F.3d 1055, 1066 (6th Cir. 1998) (holding that there may be transfer prisoner was ready to join him in the back seat of the liability under Due Process Clause where state’s affirmative patrol car, the officers and Cartwright parted company. acts either create or increase risk of private violence). Plaintiff asserts that both of these exceptions apply to create liability
Also, Cartwright’s inebriation was not “imposed or under the Due Process Clause. created” by the state. This Court has held that this fact alone requires a finding that the defendants did not owe the
a. Special Relationship decedent an affirmative duty, because there was no special relationship. Sargi , 70 F.3d at 911 (holding that no special
Plaintiff argues that her claim should be treated under the relationship existed between the state and a child who died of custodial exception to DeShaney . This Court recently defined heart failure on a school bus who was not in custody, and “custody” as the “intentional application of physical force and whose condition was not imposed or created by the state); see show of authority made with the intent of acquiring physical also Weeks v. Portgate County Executive Offices , 235 F.3d control.” Ewolski v. City of Brunswick , 287 F.3d 492, 506 275, 277-78 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that deputy sheriff had (6th Cir. 2002). Under that standard, the defendant officers no special relationship with an assault victim who approached did not take Cartwright into custody. In fact, as in Bukowski , him, bleeding and staggering, and asked for help; though Plaintiff’s grievance is that the officers should have taken victim subsequently was beaten to death; officer had no Cartwright into custody, but did not. See Bukowski , 326 F.3d at 709 n.1 (noting that the plaintiff cannot argue liability No. 02-1728 Cartwright v. City of Marine City, et al. 9 10 Cartwright v. City of Marine City, et al. No. 02-1728 affirmative duty to take decedent into protective custody or To show a state-created danger, plaintiff must show: 1) an call for medical assistance). affirmative act by the state which either created or increased
the risk that the plaintiff would be exposed to an act of ii. Relationship Through Statute violence by a third party; 2) a special danger to the plaintiff wherein the state’s actions placed the plaintiff specifically at Plaintiff argues that defendants’ alleged violation of risk, as distinguished from a risk that affects the public at Section 333.6501 of the Michigan Compiled Laws constitutes large; and 3) the state knew or should have known that its proof of a special relationship. actions specifically endangered the plaintiff. Kallstrom , 136 F.3d at 1066.
The statute provides, in pertinent part: i. Affirmative Act An individual who appears to be incapacitated in a public place shall be taken into protective custody by a law
In Kallstrom , this court held that releasing private enforcement officer and taken to an approved service information in police officers’ personnel files constituted an program, or to an emergency medical service, or to a affirmative act under the state-created danger theory. 136 F.3d transfer facility pursuant to subsection (4) for subsequent at 1067. By contrast, failure to act is not an affirmative act transportation to an approved service program or under the state-created danger theory. See, e.g. , Sargi , 70 F.3d emergency medical service. at 912-13 (failing to provide bus drivers with a plan for managing emergencies, taking seizure victim home without
M ICH . C OMP . L AWS § 333.6501(1) (2001). medical intervention, failing to maintain communication devices on a bus, and failing to tell the bus driver of the
This argument fails in light of this Court’s opinion in Jones student’s medical condition were not affirmative acts); v. Union County, Tennessee , 296 F.3d 417, 430 (6th Cir. Gazette , 41 F.3d at 1065 (failing to rescue kidnap victim and 2002), in which we held that a violation of a state statute does lying about the case to the victim’s family were not not create a liberty interest or property right under the Due affirmative acts); Reed v. Knox County Dep’t of Human Process Clause. Even if the defendants should have taken Servs. , 968 F. Supp. 1212, 1220-22 (S.D. Ohio 1997) (failing decedent into custody under state law, their failure to do so to inform family of foster child’s violent history, placing child does not transform that error into a constitutional wrong. in home, and failing to remove child were not affirmative acts).
b. State-Created Danger The facts of this case indicate, at most, a failure to act; they Plaintiff argues, alternatively, that defendants are liable do not rise to the level of affirmative acts which created or under the state-created danger exception, under which state increased the risk that the plaintiff would be exposed to an act officials may be found to have violated the substantive due of violence by a third party. Defendant officers took plaintiff process rights of people not within their custody “when their from a place of great danger: the shoulder of a dark, foggy, affirmative actions directly increase the vulnerability of two-lane highway. They placed him in a place of lesser citizens to danger or otherwise place citizens in harm’s way.” danger: the parking lot of an open convenience store, where Ewolski , 287 F.3d at 509; see also Kallstrom , 136 F.3d at telephones, restrooms, and food and drink were available to 1066. him. No. 02-1728 Cartwright v. City of Marine City, et al. 11 12 Cartwright v. City of Marine City, et al. No. 02-1728 Plaintiff argues that the convenience store was a place of traveled to Akron, Ohio, to meet a man with whom she had greater danger, because, she alleges, there was more traffic talked online. 326 F.3d at 705. That man raped her. Id. Akron near the store. No reasonable jury could find that the parking police found the woman and brought her to the station, where lot was more dangerous than the shoulder of 26 Mile Road. she told the police and a victim’s advocate that the man was Plaintiff also argues that the police invited Cartwright to a her “boyfriend” and asked to be returned to his home. She did safe place – the back seat of the patrol car – and then released not tell anyone that he had harmed her. Id. at 706. The him at a more dangerous place – the convenience store officials perceived her mental disability but did not believe parking lot. This is not the proper comparison. The question she was incapacitated, because she had traveled by bus and is not whether the victim was safer during the state action, but taxi to Akron and had the ability to read and write well whether he was safer before the state action than he was after enough to conduct online conversations. Id. After an Akron it. See DeShaney , 489 U.S. at 201 (“That the State once took police legal advisor told the police that they had no legal temporary custody of Joshua does not alter the analysis, for authority to detain her as a juvenile or as a person with a when it returned him to his father’s custody, it placed him in mental illness, the police told her that she could wait for her no worse position than that in which he would have been in parents at the police station or at a shelter. Id. When she asked had it not acted at all.”). to be returned to the man, the police complied, returning her
to his home, where he raped her. Id. He was convicted of his Plaintiff cannot show that defendant officers created or crimes and imprisoned. Id. at 708. increased the risk that Cartwright would be struck by a vehicle. Defendants did not commit an affirmative act under This court found that the police did not violate the victim’s the state-created danger theory. substantive due process rights. Id. at 711. We also noted that
if the Akron police had decided to detain her at the police Because plaintiff has failed to allege facts from which a station instead of returning her to Hall’s residence, “they may jury could find that defendants violated Cartwright’s due have faced another lawsuit based on charges of false process rights, under both the theory of an affirmative duty to
imprisonment.” Id. at 711-12 ( citing Adams v. Metiva , 31 protect him and the theory of a state-created danger, F.3d 375, 383 (6th Cir. 1994) (“[I]f there is no reason to defendants Vandermeulen and Rock, and, by extension, the further detain a person, he cannot lawfully be detained against City, are entitled to qualified immunity. Consequently, his will.”)). plaintiff’s claims under § 1983, as well as her state-law claims, must fail. The facts of this case presented a similar Catch-22 for
officers Vandermeulen and Rock. If they had decided to take E. Unavoidable Liability Cartwright into protective custody under § 333.6501 of Michigan Compiled Laws, they, too, may have faced another This Court, in Bukowski , recently described the lawsuit based on charges of false imprisonment, on the theory “unavoidable liability” problem confronting state officers that Cartwright was not really “incapacitated” and the officers when it is alleged that they should have taken someone into protective custody. In that case, a woman and her parents sued defendant City of Akron and its officials for failing to take the woman, who had a mental disability, into protective custody. The woman had disappeared from her home and had No. 02-1728 Cartwright v. City of Marine City, et al. 13 14 Cartwright v. City of Marine City, et al. No. 02-1728 had no legal authority to detain him under the statute. [1]
liability on the part of its officials, the determination that the Plaintiff has not proposed any other grounds on which the officers did not violate Cartwright’s constitutional rights officers could have taken Cartwright into custody. Public resolves plaintiff’s claim against the City as well. See Scott v. intoxication is not a civil or criminal offense in Michigan. Clay County , 205 F.3d 867, 879 (6th Cir. 2000) (noting that M ICH . C OMP . L AWS § 333.6523(1) (2001). the “conclusion that no officer-defendant had deprived the
plaintiff of any constitutional right a fortiori defeats the claim Cartwright refused to allow a pat-down search when the against the County as well”). officers asked him if he would permit it. The state statute gives officers the right to conduct a “pat-down” search of a III. CONCLUSION person taken into protective custody. M ICH . C OMP . L AWS In summary, we hold that plaintiff cannot show any § 333.6501(2) (2001). If, however, the officers had done so, constitutional violation by City of Marine City police officers Cartwright also could have claimed that the officers had no or by the City itself. As a result, we REVERSE the district legal authority to search him. Plaintiff has not proposed any court’s denial of qualified immunity. We REMAND the case other grounds upon which the officers could have conducted to the district court so that it may dismiss the case. a pat-down search over Cartwright’s objection before allowing him to ride in the back seat of the patrol car with the prisoner.
Defendants Vandermeulen and Rock were not aware of facts suggesting that a substantial risk of serious harm existed, given the knowledge they had at the time they decided to let Cartwright go. Also, as a matter of public policy, if this Court were to deny defendants’ claim of qualified immunity, it would discourage police officers from trying to aid citizens in need. An officer’s decision to stop and pick up a citizen walking along a dark highway should not result in liability, unless an exception to the doctrine of qualified immunity applies.
For these reasons, we hold that officers Vandermeulen and Rock should have been granted qualified immunity. Because the City can only be held liable if there is a showing of
NOTES
[*] The Ho norable Ja mes G . Carr, United States District Judge for the No rthern D istrict of O hio, sitting by designation. 1 No. 02-1728 Cartwright v. City of Marine City, et al. 3 4 Cartwright v. City of Marine City, et al. No. 02-1728 I. BACKGROUND Approximately one hour later, at about 2:25 a.m., Cartwright was run over by a truck and killed as he lay in the The tragic facts of this case are not in dispute. On middle of 26 Mile Road, about two miles from the store. The October 27, 1998, at around midnight, Terry Cartwright was autopsy report determined that Cartwright’s blood alcohol walking on the foggy, unlit shoulder of 26 Mile Road in St.
[1] For purposes of § 333.6501, “incapacitated” means that “an individual, as a result of the use of alcohol, is unconscious or has his or her mental or physical functioning so impaired that he or she either poses an immediate and sub stantial da nger to his or her own health and safety or is endangering the health and safety of the public.” M ICH . C O M P . L A W S § 33 3.61 04(3) (2001 ).
