Case Information
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FINAL COPY
S14A0273, S14X0274. CARTERSVILLE RANCH, LLC v. DELLINGER et
al.; and vice versa.
THOMPSON, Chief Justice.
This appeal and cross-appeal involve a dispute over the legal ownership of mineral rights to land located in Bartow County, Georgia. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court determined that appellee, James R. Dellinger, Jr. (Dellinger) held a legally enforceable interest in the mineral rights and granted summary judgment in his favor on claims filed by appellant, Cartersville Ranch, LLC (Cartersville Ranch). For the reasons that follow, we affirm the decision in the main appeal and dismiss the cross-appeal as moot.
“On appeal from the grant of summary judgment, this Court conducts a
de novo review of the evidence to determine whether there is a genuine issue of
material fact and whether the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party, warrant judgment as a matter of law.”
Shekhawat v. Jones, 293 Ga. 468, 469 (746 SE2d 89) (2013) (quoting
Youngblood v. Gwinnett Rockdale Newton Community Svc. Bd.,
Cartersville Ranch owns the surface rights to approximately 211 acres of land in Bartow County, Georgia. Cartersville Ranch’s predecessor-in-title, L. L. Cline, acquired the surface rights to this property from W. C. Satterfield pursuant to a 1918 deed in which Satterfield, as grantor, sought to convey all the property he owned in Land Lot 270 of the 5 th District and 3 rd Section of Bartow County to grantee, Cline, while reserving the mineral rights. [1] The 1918 deed identifies this property as consisting of all of Land Lot 270 with the exception of a small portion of land owned by M. G. Dobbins. [2] The language of the reservation of rights in the deed reads as follows:
. . . and also excepting and reserving all ores, minerals, and mineral substances upon and in said lot of land, along with the right to mine and remove same; Provided, however, that should said first party, *3 or his assigns, desire to make and Maintain Mud dams, dumps, ponds or ditches upon the west half of said lot 270, and in that event said party of the first part, his heirs or assigns, shall pay second party, his heirs or assigns for the land so used for dumps, and dams, ponds or ditches at the rate of Thirty-five ($35.00) Dollars per acre. W. C. Satterfield died in 1923 leaving his entire estate, including the reserved mineral rights, to his wife, Mary Cobb Satterfield. Through testamentary succession, evidenced in part by an Executor’s Deed of Distribution dated April 30, 1983, the reserved mineral rights eventually passed to Dellinger as sole surviving heir of W. C. and Mary Cobb Satterfield’s daughter, Evelyn Satterfield Dellinger. Along with other property, the 1983 Executor’s Deed conveyed to Dellinger “the mineral interest and mining privileges in 155 acres, more or less, of Lot 270 in the 5 th District and 3 rd Section of Bartow County, Georgia.”
Cartersville Ranch commenced this action by filing a petition for declaratory relief against Dellinger and others seeking to extinguish the *4 reserved mineral rights by adverse possession pursuant to OCGA § 44-5-168 (the Mineral Lapse Statute) based on non-use of the rights and non-payment of taxes for the previous seven years. Dellinger answered the complaint, admitting that all the mineral rights at issue in this action had passed through testamentary succession to him and asserting that he was the exclusive owner of the mineral interests reserved under the 1918 deed. [4] Dellinger further asserted that he had for tax year 2011 and prior years continuously paid the taxes on these mineral interests as assessed by Bartow County. [5]
Cartersville Ranch thereafter amended its complaint to additionally argue
that the reservation of mineral rights in the 1918 deed created an indefinite
purchase option which violated Georgia’s Rule Against Perpetuities such that
in Land Lot 270 of the 5 th District and 3 rd Section of Bartow County.
Cartersville Ranch alleged and Dellinger admitted in the pleadings that the mineral
rights to Land Lot 270 reserved by the grantor had passed via testamentary succession to
Dellinger’s grandmother, to his mother and eventually to him. The trial court found it
undisputed that Dellinger was the only person claiming an interest in the reserved mineral
rights at issue in this case. See Georgia-Pacific, LLC v. Fields,
owner of 213 acres of mineral rights in Land Lot 270 is listed as the George Satterfield Estate. The evidence also shows Dellinger personally paid the assessed ad valorem taxes billed by the county on this property for a number of years since 1999, including the years of 2010, 2011 and 2012.
the reservation clause was void ab initio . Dellinger denied the additional allegations and filed a counterclaim seeking, among other things, a declaration that he remained sole owner of the mineral rights to all the property owned by Cartersville Ranch in Land Lot 270. Dellinger moved for summary judgment on Cartersville Ranch’s claims, and Cartersville Ranch filed both a response and cross-motion for summary judgment in which it argued for the first time that the conveyance of the mineral rights from Dellinger’s mother to Dellinger was unenforceable because the description of the mineral rights in the 1983 Executor’s Deed was too vague or indefinite to be enforced. Cartersville Ranch also objected to Dellinger’s affidavit filed in support of his summary judgment motion. Despite the fact that Dellinger had not yet had an opportunity to respond to Cartersville Ranch’s submissions, the parties agreed to argue both motions at the previously scheduled hearing. At the end of the hearing, the trial court agreed to allow time for each party to submit one final response brief. Thereafter, Dellinger filed a supplemental brief with four supporting affidavits. Cartersville Ranch also filed a supplemental brief and objected to Dellinger’s additional affidavits as late-filed evidence.
The trial court granted Dellinger summary judgment on Cartersville *6 Ranch’s claims and denied Cartersville Ranch’s cross-motion finding that (1) the legal description in the 1918 deed was not invalid due to vagueness or indefiniteness because it was clear the parties to the deed believed the land lot to be 160 acres, (2) the proviso in the 1918 deed did not violate the rule against perpetuities because it was a penalty clause and not an option to purchase, and (3) Dellinger’s interest in the property had not lapsed as he had paid taxes on the subject mineral rights for at least the past several years. Cartersville Ranch moved for reconsideration and for a ruling on its objections. Thereafter, the trial court issued an order sustaining the objections to the affidavits while denying Cartersville Ranch’s motion for reconsideration, noting that it had not relied on the evidence contained in the affidavits in granting summary judgment to Dellinger. Cartersville Ranch appealed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to this Court and Dellinger filed a cross-appeal (Case No. S14X0274) challenging the evidentiary ruling excluding the affidavits.
Case No. S14A0273
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1. Cartersville Ranch first challenges the trial court’s finding that
Dellinger had a legally enforceable interest in the mineral rights reserved under
the terms of the 1918 deed. Cartersville Ranch argues that because the 1983
Executor’s Deed of Distribution conveyed to Dellinger the “mineral interest and
mining privileges in 155 acres, more or less, of Lot 270,” while this land lot
actually contains 220 acres, the deed’s conveyance of the mineral rights was too
indefinite to be enforced. See Strickland v. CMCR Investments, LLC, 279 Ga.
112, 114 (
(1969).
This argument, however, misconstrues the import of the 1983 Executor’s
Deed which merely served as a deed of assent for the estate of Dellinger’s
mother. See generally OCGA § 53-8-15. Under Georgia law, Dellinger’s
interest in this property derived from his mother’s will. See Phillips v. Phillips,
(
Generally,
a defendant who will not bear the burden of proof at trial need not affirmatively disprove the nonmoving party’s case, but may point out by reference to the evidence in the record that there is an absence of evidence to support any essential element of the nonmoving party’s case. Cox Enterprises, Inc. v. Nix,274 Ga. 801 , 803 (560 SE2d 650 ) (2002).
Cowart v. Widener, 287 Ga. 622, 623 (697 SE2d 779) (2010). Where a
defendant “discharges this burden, the nonmoving party . . . must point to
specific evidence giving rise to a triable issue.” Id. (quoting Lau’s Corp. v.
Haskins,
2. Cartersville Ranch next contends Dellinger was not entitled to
summary judgment because the reservation of mineral rights in the 1918 deed
violated the common law rule against perpetuities and was void ab initio. The
rule against perpetuities operates to void unvested, contingent interests in real
property when such interests are not guaranteed to vest within a specific time
period.
[12]
See Walker v. Bogle, 244 Ga. 439, 440 (260 SE2d 338) (1979);
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Landrum v. Nat. City Bank of Rome,
Even assuming without deciding that the proviso was a purchase option discussion of the rule, see Daniel F. Hinkel, Pindar’s Georgia Real Estate Law & Procedure §§ 7:137 - 7:138 (7 th ed. 2014).
which violated the rule against perpetuities, we find no merit to Cartersville
Ranch’s argument that the entire reservation of mineral rights in the 1918 deed
was void from its inception. In a similar case involving a 1910 deed, this Court
found neither the deed itself nor the reservation of mineral rights therein was
invalidated by the rule against perpetuities simply because an invalid purchase
option allowing the grantor, her heirs and assigns to repurchase certain acres if
needed for mining purposes was void. Milner v. Bivens,
It is clear that the parties to the 1918 deed intended to convey to the grantee fee-simple title to the surface rights, with a reservation in the grantor of retained title to the mineral rights of the property. [14] Accordingly, we find that the terms of the proviso (which only applied to the west half of the property in any event) are not essential to the mineral rights reservation under the deed, thus we decline to apply the doctrine of infectious invalidity in the manner urged by Cartersville Ranch. See Walker v. Bogle, supra at 443 (where departure from dispositive scheme is slight, the doctrine of infectious invalidity will not be applied to invalidate remaining and more significant provisions). [15] Moreover, *14 we find Dellinger has requested, and under the facts presented would be entitled to, equitable reformation of the 1918 deed pursuant to OCGA § 44-6-205 (b). As a result, the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Dellinger on this claim.
3. Finally, Cartersville Ranch asserts the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Dellinger on its claim that the reserved mineral rights on the property had lapsed under OCGA § 44-5-168 (the Mineral Lapse Statute). OCGA § 44-5-168 (a) provides that the owner of real property in fee simple may gain title to mineral rights by adverse possession
. . . if the owner of the mineral rights or his heirs or assigns have neither worked nor attempted to work the mineral rights nor paid any taxes due on them for a period of seven years since the date of the conveyance and for seven years immediately preceding the filing of [a] petition [for declaratory judgment].
This statute was enacted to serve the dual purpose of encouraging use of the
state’s mineral resources and the collection of taxes, while alternatively
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encouraging the use of land free of interference by the holders of mineral rights
who neither use nor pay taxes upon them. See Hayes v. Howell,
“Mineral rights are valuable property interests recognized and protected
in this state. [Cit.]” Hayes, supra at 584. The Mineral Lapse Statute was not
designed to itself divest the mineral owner of his rights; it only conditions the
retention of those rights upon the requirements of either using them or paying
taxes upon them for the public benefit. See id. On motion for summary
judgment, mineral rights owners have the burden of establishing that there is no
issue of fact with regard to the payment of taxes. See Dubbers-Albrecht v.
Nathan,
Case No. S14X0274
In this cross-appeal, Dellinger argues the superior court erred by
excluding affidavits he submitted in support of his motion for summary
judgment and in opposition to Cartersville Ranch’s cross-motion for summary
judgment. As this Court has affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor
of Dellinger in Case No. S14A0273, a decision in this cross-appeal would be of
no benefit to the complaining party and is no longer warranted. See Gober v.
Colonial Pipeline Co.,
Judgment affirmed in Case No. S14A0273. Appeal dismissed in Case No. S14X0274. All the Justices concur.
Decided May 19, 2014.
Title to land. Bartow Superior Court. Before Judge David K. Smith. Jenkins & Bowen, Frank E. Jenkins III, Brandon L. Bowen, Sutherland, Asbill & Brennan, Lee C. Davis, W. Henry Parkman, for appellant.
William A. Neel, Jr., for appellees.
Notes
[1] Although Land Lot 270 contains 220 acres, Cartersville Ranch does not own surface rights to approximately four acres in the northwest corner and three acres in the southeast corner.
[2] Previously this property was owned by W. C. Satterfield’s father, George Satterfield, who died in 1911. Pursuant to the terms of his will, George Satterfield’s entire estate was left to his three sons, all of whom were named executors and received an equal share in the estate. While it is unclear how and when W. C. Satterfield acquired more than a 2/6's interest in this particular property, the evidence shows that in 1918 a tax return was filed by him as the owner of Land Lot 270, identifying the property as “160 acres of wild land.” There is no dispute in this case as to W. C. Satterfield’s ownership of or conveyance to Cline of the entirety of Land Lot 270 minus only the Dobbins parcel consisting of a few acres.
[3] Cartersville Ranch named as defendants in both the original and amended complaints The Heirs, Assigns, and Legal Representatives of Mary Cobb Satterfield, Known or Unknown, including the Heirs, Assigns, and Legal Representatives of Evelyn Cobb Satterfield (a/k/a Evelyn Satterfield Dellinger), James R. Dellinger, Jr., as heir of Evelyn Satterfield Dellinger and as trustee and beneficiary of the trust created in the will of Evelyn Satterfield Dellinger), and Any Other Persons Claiming or Having an Interest in Certain M ineral Rights
[6] Although the trial court appears to have erroneously attributed the mineral rights descriptions contained in both the 1983 Executor’s deed and the 1918 deed to the 1918 deed, this error in no way vitiates the trial court’s findings with respect to the parties’ knowledge of the acreage or its ruling with respect to the adequacy of the legal descriptions.
[7] “The purpose of [a] deed of assent is to show to the recipient of the deed, and
others, that all debts are paid and that [an] estate is settled.” (Citations omitted.) Phillips v.
Phillips,
[8] When construing the devises in a will, the law at the time of the testator’s death is
the law to be applied. See Davis v. Parris,
[9] Cartersville Ranch pled, and Dellinger admitted, that upon the death of Dellinger’s mother, her interest in the mineral rights became a part of her residual estate, fifty percent (50%) of which was devised to Dellinger outright, with the remaining fractional share devised to a trust for which Dellinger is trustee and sole beneficiary of the trust income.
[10] In addition to specifically identified properties, the 1983 Executor’s Deed conveyed to Dellinger “any and all other real estate and interests therein owned by the said Evelyn Satterfield Dellinger at the time of her death.”
[11] Because Cartersville Ranch alleged in its pleadings that the reserved mineral rights passed via testamentary succession to Dellinger and that no person other than Dellinger had any interest in these rights, Dellinger was entitled to rely upon these admissions as establishing the facts so alleged with no additional proof needed. See Georgia-Pacific, LLC v. Fields, supra, 293 Ga. at 501. Moreover, even if Cartersville Ranch withdrew these admissions prior to the trial court’s grant of summary judgment, it has failed to point to any evidence showing Dellinger did not acquire the mineral rights at issue by testate succession.
[12] In 1990, Georgia adopted the Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities, OCGA
§§ 44-6-200 to 44-6-206, which repealed Georgia’s former statutory expression of the rule
set forth in OCGA § 44-6-1 but did not entirely supplant the common law rule. Although the
rule no longer applies to nonvested property interests arising out of nondonative transfers
such as this one, see OCGA § 44-6-204 (1), with respect to nonvested property interests
created before May 1, 1990 which violated Georgia’s rule against perpetuities applicable at
the time the interest was created, the courts have been granted limited equitable powers of
reformation to reform the disposition in a manner that most closely approximates the
transferor’s manifested plan of distribution within the limits of the rule against perpetuity in
effect when the interest was created. See OCGA § 44-6-205 (b). See also, Scott v. South
Trust Asset Management Co.,
[13] The trial court found the rule against perpetuities did not apply to the proviso which it deemed a penalty clause for sloppy mining, not involving an interest in land.
[14] “The intention of the parties as reflected by the instrument as a whole determines the nature of the interest conveyed. [Cits.]” Milner, supra at 51.
[15] It is undisputed that Cartersville Ranch purchased only the surface rights when it bought the subject property and that it was fully aware of the mineral rights reservation. Although not determinative on this issue, we additionally note that the December 9, 1985 indenture by which the property at issue was conveyed to Cartersville Ranch described the mineral rights reservation clause as follows: There is excepted from this conveyance of Land Lot 270 of the 5 th District and rd Section of said county the ores, minerals, and mining rights, and the right to use the west part of Land Lot 270 for dumps and dams, ponds, and ditches as excepted and set out in deed of W. C. Satterfield, to L. L. Cline recorded in Deed Book WW page 326, Clerk’s Office, Superior Court of Bartow County, Georgia, to which reference is hereby made. (Emphasis supplied. )