156 N.E. 518 | Ind. Ct. App. | 1927
This is a claim for compensation filed with the Industrial Board, occasioned by the death of James Carter, the father and grandfather respectively of appellants, in which they allege they were wholly dependent upon said decedent for support at the time of his death. *176
The board, on October 12, 1926, found that appellants should take nothing by their complaint herein, that appellant Frankie Carter was thirty-six years old and was neither physically nor mentally incapacitated at the time of the death of her father, that neither of the appellants was dependent on the said James Carter at the time of his death, and entered an award against appellants, from which this appeal, appellants assigning that the award is contrary to law.
The undisputed evidence in this case, in addition to the admitted fact of the death of James Carter resulting from an injury arising out of and in the course of his employment, shows that appellant Frankie Carter, the daughter of James Carter, deceased, had been, since her birth, a member of his family; that for nineteen years, since the death of her mother, she had kept house for her father and that, during that time, she had given birth to two illegitimate children. The elder, named Gertrude Humphrey, was nineteen years old August 5, 1926. The other, appellant Glenn Carter, was fifteen years old on April 12, 1926. These illegitimate children, together with their mother, constituted the family of James Carter at the time of his death, had been supported exclusively on his earnings during the past nineteen years, and neither of them had any other means or source of support except Gertrude, who was, at the time of the death, working but not contributing anything to the family.
The Industrial Board having found as a fact that appellant Frankie Carter was thirty-six years old, and was neither physically nor mentally incapacitated at the time of the 1, 2. death of her father, as to her, § 38 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, being § 9483 Burns 1926, expressly providing that the dependence of a child, except a child physically or mentally incapacitated from earning, shall terminate with *177
the attainment of eighteen years of age, the case of Srajn v.Tighe Coal Co. (1925),
Dausman, J., absent.