139 Misc. 2d 423 | New York Court of Claims | 1988
OPINION OF THE COURT
This claim arises under the Unjust Conviction and Imprisonment Act of 1984. (See, Court of Claims Act § 8-b.) At trial the State did not seriously contest liability under Court of Claims Act § 8-b, but did contend that claimant has already received the fair and reasonable compensation called for under it (see, Court of Claims Act § 8-b [6]) from a settlement in a Federal court action. We so find.
On September 15, 1981, Clarisa Herndon, the foster mother of claimant’s then estranged wife, Delisa Durham Carter, was killed in Queens, New York City. Four days later claimant was arrested for Ms. Herndon’s murder and for assault upon his wife, largely based on accusations by the latter. Mr. Carter was indicted September 23, 1981, held without bail and on June 4, 1982 was convicted after a jury trial of second degree murder and first degree assault (see, Penal Law §§ 125.25, 120.10). On September 13, 1982 he was sentenced to 25 years to life on the murder charge and 5 to 15 years on the assault charge, said sehtences to run concurrently. He was thereupon imprisoned at the Fishkill State Correctional Facility and then the Comstock State Correctional Facility, a maximum security prison.
Claimant appealed his conviction and during the pendency of the appeal information came to light indicating that his wife had committed the murder and that exculpatory evidence relative to Mr. Carter’s alibi defense had been withheld or not supplied to the District Attorney by New York police officers involved with the case. Claimant moved to vacate his conviction (see, CPL 440.10) and on January 17, 1984 a hearing was held (see, CPL 440.30) after which claimant was released on
As to damages and the noted settlement, following his release claimant commenced an action in Federal District Court against New York City, its Police Commissioner and various police officers. This action was based on violations of Mr. Carter’s civil rights (see, 42 USC § 1983), as well as on pendent State claims for negligence and malicious prosecution against the city and its police department (claimant served notices of claim against them Apr. 11, 1984 [see, General Municipal Law § 50-e]). The action was settled pursuant to a stipulation filed June 6, 1986 for $450,000. The claim in this court was then timely filed July 28, 1986 (see, Court of Claims Act § 8-b [7]; L 1984, ch 1009, § 4).
The gist of the State’s defense is said Federal settlement compensated claimant for all damages resulting from his unjust conviction and imprisonment, the State is entitled to a complete setoff therefor under General Obligations Law § 15-108 and consequently claimant is not entitled to any recovery in the instant action. Claimant contends the Federal action and settlement are separate and independent of this claim, said section 15-108 is not applicable here and consequently there should be no setoff.
Relative to damages, the Unjust Conviction Act simply states that "the court * * * shall award damages in such sum of money as the court determines will fairly and reasonably compensate [claimant].” (Court of Claims Act § 8-b [6].) The Law Revision Commission Report, on which Court of Claims Act § 8-b was largely based, indicates only that it was felt no statutory restrictions should be imposed on the amount or type of damages recoverable under Court of Claims Act § 8-b. (See, 1984 Report of NY Law Rev Commn, 1984 McKinney’s Session Laws of NY [hereinafter Report], at 2932-2933.)
Turning then to the applicability of General Obligations Law § 15-108, we note initially that said section is a statutory modification of the common-law rule that release of one tortfeasor bars any further recovery against any other tort-feasors (cf., e.g., Hill v St. Clare’s Hosp., 67 NY2d 72, 83). Thus, but for this statute, traditional tort principles would bar any further action outright. More importantly, contrary to claimant’s argument that because this statute speaks only in terms of torts and tort-feasors, it must be so limited, it has been held that section 15-108 applies equally to claims and actions grounded on theories of liability other than tort. (See, County of Westchester v Becket Assocs., 102 AD2d 34, 45-46, affd 66 NY2d 642.) Therefore, the fact we are dealing with two species of statutory liability (i.e., Federal and State) does not require that said section be found inapplicable. It is damages we are concerned with here, not fault (see, Hill v St. Clare’s Hosp., supra, at 85), and to the extent this section operates to reduce a claim by the amount of the settlement consideration paid, we find it consistent with fair and reasonable compensation (see, Court of Claims Act § 8-b [6]).
Moreover, said section is also consistent with the more general equitable principle that a claimant may not obtain a double recovery for the same injuries and damages. (See generally, Berg-Bakis Ltd. v City of Yonkers, 90 AD2d 784; Zarcone v Perry, 78 AD2d 70, 79-81, affd 55 NY2d 782; Grynbal v Grynbal, 32 AD2d 427, 429-430.)
The next question then is how and to what extent this settlement should be considered in abeyance of claimant’s damages. As indicated in analogous circumstances, it is the trial court action where the settlement is sought to be utilized that makes these determinations, not the settling party or even the settling court. (See, Hill v St. Clare’s Hosp., supra, at 85-86; Casey v State of New York, 119 AD2d 363, 366-369.) Further, while settlement in this context is a matter of defense, when the settling party seeks to limit its effect in said subsequent action, the burden is on him to establish why and to what extent it should be accorded less than its apparent full effect. (See, Hill v St. Clare’s Hosp., supra, at 84, 86; Retzel v State of New York, 94 Misc 2d 562, 570-572.)
The Law Revision Report indicates that both pecuniary and nonpecuniary damages should be potentially recoverable under Court of Claims Act § 8-b. (See, Report, op. cit., at 2932-2933.) Further, both parties agree that the relevant period for damages is from conviction to the end of imprisonment, subject presumably to any subsequent or continuing damages shown to have proximately resulted from those incurred during said period (see, at 426-427, supra). Court of Claims Act § 8-b is one to redress damages resulting from unjust conviction and imprisonment and thus damages accruing prior to conviction should not be considered.
As to pecuniary damages, the only ones indicated here are lost wages
As to nonpecuniary damages, the principal elements here would appear to be loss of reputation and emotional
As to loss of reputation, claimant testified that prior to the subject incident he had never been arrested or involved with the law and was known in the community from being a high school basketball star. His testimony also indicated that even after his release his reputation in the community was not wholly restored. We thus find he suffered some damages from loss of reputation.
As to emotional distress, Mr. Carter testified to the mental anguish he suffered from the discomfort, fear, lack of
Claimant also testified to emotional damages he suffered after his release, such as estrangement from his son, dreams about his imprisonment and fear and distrust of police. As to these items of damage, while the court does not necessarily disbelieve Mr. Carter’s testimony relative to them, we consider such damages of the type that require expert medical or psychological support, both as to their existence and causality. (Cf. generally, 11 Fuchsberg, Encyclopedia New York Law, Damages, § 1059, at 74-78.)
Therefore, based on the foregoing, we find the evidence on nonpecuniary damages supports an award of $200,000. Consequently, claimant’s total compensation under Court of Claims Act § 8-b is fixed at $240,000.
That brings us to the final and critical determination, the amount of the above damages claimant has already been compensated for by the Federal settlement. We note initially that defendant’s position that the entire $450,000 thereof can be attributed to such damages is not supportable. It is clear other elements of damages were included in the settlement. First, the settlement stipulation (see, at 426, supra) specified that it included any attorney’s fees which may have been awardable under the Federal civil rights attorney’s fees statute (see, 42 USC § 1988). Said statute by its terms is not applicable to the subject State act, attorney’s fees are generally not recoverable as damages in this State, absent statutory authority (see generally, 36 NY Jur 2d, Damages, § 91), and such are specifically barred from recovery in the Court of Claims (see, Court of Claims Act § 27). Second, the noted pendent negligence and malicious .prosecution claims were ostensibly included in said settlement, although, as hereafter found, we believe only a part of the settlement can be attributed thereto.
Having so found, however, we think it clear the settle
As to the noted items of damages not within those covered by Court of Claims Act § 8-b (see, at 431-432, supra), the attorney’s fees recoverable under the Federal statute would not necessarily have been what claimant’s attorney contracted for or even received under the settlement. Presumably they would have been less, particularly since the case was settled before trial. (See, e.g., 43 ALR Fed 243,298-299, § 21.) As to the pendent
In any event, it was claimant’s burden to show that the portion of the settlement covering unjust conviction and subsequent imprisonment damages was less than the $240,000 found above. This he manifestly failed to do. The court recognizes there is an element of speculation in attempting to apportion a settlement into relevant and irrelevant parts, especially where the latter are not before the court (cf., Casey v State of New York, 119 AD2d 363, supra). Hence the approximate nature of our findings relative thereto. Nonetheless such findings are required by the Court of Appeals (see, Hill v St. Clare’s Hosp., 67 NY2d 72, 85-86, supra) and we believe the above proper, especially since we are not relying on them to determine claimant’s total potential damages (cf., Ott v Barash, 109 AD2d 254). That determination was made independent of the settlement, on the evidence at this trial. The onus and consequences of any sparsity of evidentiary support for said findings must be borne by the party responsible therefor (cf., Retzel v State of New York, 94 Misc 2d 562, supra).
Accordingly, the State’s trial motion to dismiss, upon which decision was reserved, is hereby granted.
. The Supreme Court did not specify the grounds for vacatur of claimant’s conviction, but clearly paragraphs (b) and (g) of CPL 440.10 (1) applied. (See, Court of Claims Act § 8-b [5] [b] [ii].)
. The parties did not cite and the court’s research failed to uncover any appellate or even any trial-level decisions concerning such.
. Ott v Barash (109 AD2d 254) is not inconsistent with the application of said principle here because there a prior settlement was attempted to be used to bar a subsequent action outright, not just reduce the damages
. While defendant’s answer contains no specific reference to the Federal settlement, claimant raised no issue of surprise relative thereto nor any other objection to its presentation at trial. Such was proper in light of his obvious prior knowledge of the settlement and the fact defendant had -raised the settlement issue well before trial in a preliminary conference and later in a pretrial motion for summary judgment. We thus deem the State’s answer amended to include the settlement as a defense (see, CPLR 3025 [b], [c])-
. No diminution of future earning capacity was claimed or indicated (cf., 1984 Report of NY Law Rev Commn, 1984 McKinney’s Session Laws of NY, at 2933).
. The ad damnum clause of the claim alleges only $25,000 in lost earnings, but the State raised no objection to the noted testimony showing greater damages and no prejudice appears. Thus, as with defendant’s settlement defense, we have deemed the pleadings conformed to the proof (see, CPLR 3025 [c]; Loomis v Civetta Corinno Constr. Corp., 54 NY2d 18, 23-24).
. The only documentary evidence on the settlement was the settlement stipulation and complaint in the Federal action annexed to defendant’s noted summary judgment motion (see, at 426, supra) which, at the State’s request, were made part of the record at trial.