75 Ga. 747 | Ga. | 1885
1. The main question in this case is whether a person over sixty years of age is qualified to serve on the grand jury.
The act of 1799 (Cobb’s Digest, 455) fixed the qualification as of male persons between the ages of twenty-one and sixty years. The act of 1805 (Cobb’s Digest, 549) provided that the justices of the inferior court, together with the sheriff and clerk, should meet at the court-house to select from the books of the receiver of tax returns fit and
It is argued here that this act is unconstitutional, becausé the proviso is matter different from its title. We do not
Thus it will be seen that, since the constitution of 1868, and the passage of the act to carry the same into effect, and the passage of the act of 1875 before referred to, there can be no doubt as to the qualification of a person over sixty years of age to serve on the jury, and this is strengthened by the constitution of 1877 on this subject and the act to carry the same into effect. In Doyal's case, 70 Ga., 134, this court merely held and decided that, when a person over sixty years of age was put upon the prisoner and claimed his exemption, and was excused by the court, it was not error on the part of the court in excusing the juror. The question as to the qualification of the juror was not before the court. ■ All difficulty or doubt on this subject was created by the compilers of the Codes of 1873 and 1882, by inserting a paragraph pre
2. It is claimed that the court committed error in refusing to. continue the case after the special plea in abatement had been overruled by the court upon demurrer. Upon what law or rule this claim is based is unknown to this court. The case had been called for trial; the plea of abatement had been swept out of the way by the court having sustained the demurrer thereto. Nothing remained but to try the accused upon the charges in the indictment against him, which was done, and there is no error in this proceeding.
3. A new trial was prayed, upon the further grounds of newly discovered evidence, and that the verdict of the jury is contrary to law and evidence. The newly discovered evidence is cumulative and tends only to impeach or contradict the state’s witnesses, and this court has frequently held that such newly discovered evidence will not work a new trial. The evidence in the case abundantly sustains the verdict.
Judgment affirmed.