Carter v. StateCarter v. State
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Per Curiam (per curiam)
This is an intеrlocutory appeal of an order entered during postconviction proceedings brought on behalf of a death-row inmate. The order at issue addresses the inmate‘s entitlement to a competency determination during postconviction procеedings. We have jurisdiction.
The appellant, Antonio Michael Carter, was found guilty of two counts of first-degree murder. In accordance with the jury‘s recommendation, the trial court sentenced him to life in prison on one count and death on the other. The convictions and death sentence were affirmed by this Court in October 1989. Carter v. State, 576 So.2d 1291 (Fla. 1989), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 879, 112 S.Ct. 225, 116 L.Ed.2d 182 (1991). In November 1992, Carter filed a motion for postconviction relief pursuant to
Before the original judge ruled on the motion to dismiss, Carter‘s counsel filed an emergency motion for mental evaluation. In response to that motion, the judge ordered an expedited evaluation of Carter for the purpоse of determining Carter‘s competency to proceed as well as the need for treatment to restore Carter‘s competence. Carter was evaluated by two mental health experts who determined that Carter was incompetent to proceed. However, the trial judge did not rule on the competency issue. Rather, a petition for involuntary commitment was ultimately granted by the circuit court for Union County, and Carter was committed to the Corrections Mental Health Institution (CMHI).
After Carter‘s discharge from CMHI in October 1994, thе collateral proceedings continued. Carter‘s competency remained in question and the trial judge inquired of counsel as to the proper standard for determining Carter‘s competency to proceed in the rule 3.850 proceeding.
Carter‘s counsel maintained that the Dusky2 standard, which aрplies to competency determinations at the trial level, should be used in determining competency during postconviction proceedings. The State took the position that Carter was not entitled to a competency determination. However, it is unclеar whether the State relied on this Court‘s decision in Jackson v. State, 452 So.2d 533, 537 (Fla.1984), which held that a death-row inmate was not entitled to a determination of competency to proceed in postconviction proceedings.
After briefing and a hearing on the issue, the trial court announcеd that “there is a right to a [competency] determination” in postconviction proceedings and that the standard for making such a determination is “whether the defendant has a present ability to consult and communicate with postconviction counsel regarding fаctual matters at issue in his postconviction proceedings.” According to the trial court, this standard is based on Justice Overton‘s concurring opinion in Jackson. In its order, the court further ruled that, under Justice Overton‘s concurring opinion, “a trial court should only be required to hold a cоmpetency hearing during postconviction relief proceedings when a capital defendant shows that there are specific factual matters at issue in those proceedings that require the defendant to competently consult with counsel.” The cоurt concluded that “[b]ecause there are factual
It is a well-established principle of law that “a person whose mental condition is such that he lacks the capacity to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to consult with counsel, and to assist in preparing his defense may not be subjected to a trial.” Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171, 95 S.Ct. 896, 903, 43 L.Ed.2d 103 (1975); see also Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 4 L.Ed.2d 824 (1960); Scott v. State, 420 So.2d 595 (Fla. 1982); Lane v. State, 388 So.2d 1022 (Fla. 1980);
[T]he designation of the criminal procedure rule [3.850] is a misnomer in that the proceeding is civil in nature, rather than criminal, and is likened to a combinatiоn of the common-law writ of habeas corpus and a motion for writ of error coram nobis.
In Medina v. State, 690 So.2d 1241 (Fla. 1997), a majority of this Court recently declined to revisit the Court‘s decision in Jackson. However, a majority also agreed that Medina‘s rule 3.850 motion was successive, and “until there was a determinаtion that there was an issue that warranted an evidentiary hearing, Medina was clearly not entitled to a competency determination for the purpose of counsel proceeding to a Huff [v. State, 622 So.2d 982 (Fla.1993)] hearing.” 690 So.2d at 1248. Unlike the situations in Medina and Jackson, Carter‘s motion for postconviction relief is not successive and the trial court expressly found that there were factual matters to be determined in this case.
We now accept Justice Overton‘s concurring view in Jackson that a trial court must hold a competency hearing in a postconviction proceeding only after a capital defendant shows there are speсific factual matters at issue that require the defendant to competently consult with counsel. See Jackson, 452 So.2d at 537. Thus, a judicial determination of competency is required when there are reasonable grounds to believe that a capital defendant is incompetent to proceed in postconviction proceedings in which factual matters are at issue, the development or resolution of which require the defendant‘s input. There can be no question that a capital defendant‘s competency is crucial to a proper determination of a collateral claim when the defendant has information necessary to the development or resolution of that claim. Unless a death-row inmate is able to assist counsel by relaying such information, the right to collateral cоunsel, as well as the postconviction proceedings themselves, would be practically meaningless. Accord People v. Owens, 139 Ill.2d 351, 151 Ill.Dec. 522, 564 N.E.2d 1184 (1990) (holding a defendant seeking postconviction relief must be competent
Until such time as the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure are amended tо specifically address competency during capital collateral proceedings,3 the rules for raising and determining competency at trial should be looked to. See
If a postconviction defendant is found incompetent, claims raising purely legal issuеs that are of record and claims that do not otherwise require the defendant‘s input must proceed.4 We caution that a finding of incompetency will not relieve collateral counsel of the duty to review the record for such claims and present them in a timely manner. We see no need for the appointment of a guardian or “next friend.” Collateral counsel will be in a position to adequately represent the inmate‘s best interest, to determine which claims must be raised, and to make all decisions necessary to the proceedings. Accord Hamblen v. Dugger, 748 F.Supp. 1497, 1498 (M.D.Fla.1990) (denying next friend standing to CCR because it had not met requirement of showing real party in interest was unable to litigate own cause due to mental incapacity, lack of access to the court, or other disability); Durocher v. Singletary, 623 So.2d 482, 485 (Fla.1993) (quoting Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 163, 110 S.Ct. at 1727 to hold CCR had no standing to proceеd as “next friend” of death-row inmate where CCR had not met burden of providing “an adequate explanation—such as inaccessibility, mental incompetence, or other disability—why the real party in interest cannot appear on his own behalf“).
If collateral counsel believes that a death-row inmate is incompetent prior to the institution of postconviction proceedings, and such proceedings must be instituted on the inmate‘s behalf in order to meet the time requirements of
We adopt these procedures in the hope of ensuring the consideration of all viable collateral claims a death-row inmate may have,
It is so ordered.
OVERTON, SHAW and HARDING, JJ., concur.
WELLS, J., concurs with an opinion, in which GRIMES, J., concurs.
KOGAN, C.J., and ANSTEAD, J., concur in result only.
WELLS, Judge, concurring.
I write to point out my view that the distinction between preconviction and postconviction competency to proceed which is delineated in this opinion should be required to be specifically pled as the basis for the invoking of a competency issue in a postconviction proceeding.
A motion of counsel for the defendant claiming that defendant is incompetent to proceed in postconviction proсeedings in which factual matters are at issue must allege with specificity the factual matters at issue and the reason that competent consultation with the defendant is necessary in respect to each factual matter specified. The trial court shall initiаlly determine whether consultation with the defendant is reasonably necessary in respect to the issues specifically alleged, and if the trial court determines such consultation is reasonably necessary, then the trial court is to proceed in accord with
GRIMES, J., concurs.