Hеnry Carter was convicted of armed robbery in DeKalb Superior Court and sentenced to 13 years imprisonment, 4 years of which are to be served on probation. In this appeal from his conviction, appellant enumerates as error the denial of a motion for mistrial and the denial of a motion for directed verdict, as well as the denial of his motion for new trial. We affirm the convictiоn after a review of these issues.
Appellant’s first enumeration of error concerns the denial of his motion for a mistrial. The evidence showed that appellant persuaded Ricky Crowder, a 15-year-old, to rob the Peachtree Golf Club and furnished him with a shotgun for that purpose. The evidence also shows that appellant shared in the fruits of the robbery. Ricky Crowder, who testified for the state concerning the events in the morning of the robbery, stated, "I got up that morning, I wasn’t going to school so I ran into Henry [appellant], and so we were talking, so Henry, so Henry asked me, said, You want to smoke a joint? I said, I don’t mind.” At this point, appellant moved for a mistrial on the ground that his character had been placed in issue improperly because it is common knowledge that a "joint” refers to marijuanа.
The state argues that the testimony concerning the marijuana was relevant in that it was probably an inducement that led Crowder into сarrying out the armed robbery planned by appellant. In
Davis v. State,
In his second enumeration of error, appellant contends that the trial court erred in overruling his motion for a directed verdiсt on the ground that the testimony of the accomplice, Ricky Crowder, was
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uncorroborated. It is the law in this jurisdiction that the testimony of an accomplice must be corroborated by independent evidence tending to connect the accused with the crimе or leading to an inference that the accused is guilty. The evidence must do more than merely cast a grave suspicion of guilt on the accused. See
West v. State,
The corrоborating evidence here can be found in the testimony of two other witnesses. Appellant’s conversation with witness Joyce Jordаn prior to the robbery indicates that appellant was interested in persuading someone else to perform an act for appellant. In addition, another witness, Bud Ervin, testified that appellant had told him one week prior to the robbery that appеllant was "going to take the lick (rob)” the golf course because he had been fired as an employee there. In our opiniоn, this testimony, though slight evidence, is sufficient to connect the appellant with the crime as a participant in it. The sufficiency of the corroboration evidence is peculiarly a matter for the jury to determine. If the verdict is founded on slight evidence of cоrroboration connecting a defendant with the crime, the verdict is legally sufficient.
See Slocum v. State,
In support of his third enumeration of error, that the triаl court erred in denying his motion for new trial, appellant argues that the prosecution failed to reveal during the trial certain exculpatory evidence in its possession. The accomplice, Ricky Crowder, had initially implicated two other people in the crime. He then recanted that story, said that appellant had told him to blame them if questioned, and also said that appellant and one Joseph Crowder had been involved. He stated that Joseph Crowder was present at the scene of the crime, but that Henry Carter "didn’t go over there with us” but "set it up.” At trial, he changed his story and testified that Joseph Crowder was not involved. He further testified thаt appellant was present at the scene of the crime, *619 contrary to his prior statement. Appellant argues that at this point the prior statement of the witness that appellant was not present became exculpatory and the proseсution then had a duty to reveal the prior statement without request.
"There is no doubt that the prosecution in a criminal trial has a duty of сandor toward the defendant. Brady v. Maryland, 1963,
However, in this case the nondisclosed statement removing appellant from the scene of the crime would not exculpate appellant nor would it lessen his criminal liability. Admittedly, it was a prior statement of the accomplice witness inconsistent with the witness’ testimony at trial and it would tend to impeach his credibility. But, under the circumstances of this case, the nondisclosure at trial of this earlier statement, standing alone, is not enough to conclude appellant was denied a fair trial. There was abundant other evidence at trial *620 which would impeach this witness’ credibility, e.g., the witness’ false accusations оf three innocent men which was fully disclosed at the trial. In light of this, we hold that the nondisclosure of this statement by the prosecution during the trial without any request for it by the defense was not so prejudicial to the appellant that a new trial must be ordered in this case. See United States v. Hibler, supra. See also United States v. Agurs, —U. S.— (96 SC 2392, 49 LE2d 342) (1976).
Judgment affirmed.