Carter v. GreenwayCarter v. Greenway
- Reporters:
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- Before:
- Hart
(after stating the facts). The theory upon which appellees brought this suit and upon which it was tried in the lower court was that they were entitled to the amounts of the checks on the ground of a gift causa mortis. The law on this question has been clearly and concisely stated by the New York Court of Appeals in Ridden v. Thrall, 11 L. R. A. 684. Judge Earl, speaking for the court, said:
‘ ‘ Gifts causa mortis, as well as inter vivos, are based apon the fundamental right every one has of disposing of his property as he wills. The law leaves the power of disposition complete, but, to guard against fraud and imposition, regulates the methods by which it is accomplished. To consummate a gift, whether inter vivos or causa mortis, the property must be actually delivered, and the donor must surrender the possession and dominion thereof to the donee. In the case of gifts inter vivos, the moment the gift is thus consummated it becomes absolute and irrevocable. But in the case of gifts causa mortis more is needed. The gift must be made under the apprehension of death from some present disease, or some other impending peril, and it becomes void by recovery from the disease or escape from the peril. It is also revocable at any time by the donor, and becomes void by the death of the donee in the lifetime of the donor. It is not needful that the gift be made in extremis when there is no time or opportunity to make a will. In many of the reported cases the gift was made weeks, and even months, before the death of the donor, when there was abundant time and opportunity for him to have made a will. These are the main features of a valid gift causa mortis, as they are set forth in many text-books and reported cases.”
The language used is in accordance with our own holdings on the subject. Ammon v. Martin, 59 Ark. 191; Hatcher v. Buford, 60 Ark. 169; Lowe v. Hart, 93 Ark. 548; Harmon v. Harmon, 231 Ark. 501, and Gordon v. Clark, 149 Ark. 173.
It is equally well settled under these authorities that an acceptance may be implied where the gift, otherwise complete, is beneficial to the donee. It was also held in the case of Gordon v. Clark, supra, that where a gift causa onortis is made to one person for another, there is a presumption of acceptance where the gift is beneficial.
The evidence shows that at the time C. H. Greenway delivered the box containing the checks to his sister, and also at the time of his death, he had on general deposit
. It is earnestly insisted by counsel for appellants that a check can not be made the basis of a gift causa mortis. There is some conflict and confusion in the authorities on this question. But we think that the better reasoning and the trend of our own authorities, where the rights of creditors are not involved, is that when the delivery of the check is coupled with an intent to transfer a present interest in the money, and no revocation is attempted, the intent of the donor should be given effect, and that the donee has the right to the payment of the check after the death of the drawer as well as before. This is a part of the reasoning in Lowe v. Hart, 93 Ark. 548, although the precise point was not involved and was not decided. See also Gordon v. Clark, supra.
We think that the rule laid down in Morse on Banks and Banking (5 Ed.) vol. 2, par. 549, p. 198, to the effect that there may be a gift of a check causa mortis is the correct one. After saying that, in order to complete the gift, there must be such a delivery by the donor as to clearly indicate his intent to transfer the property from himself, and an actual transfer of the rightful control of the property, the learned author continues as follows: “But this, we contend, is done when he gives a cheek to the donee, or to another to give to the donee, and does not revoke before the delivery is made according to instructions. In this peculiar case of a check, the donor could revoke during his life; but as against the rest of the world it is a clear delivery of control of the money, and no one but the creditors of the donor have a right to object. They have a superior equity to the donee, but, if the donor is solvent, and continues in the same mind till his demise, what right has any one else to interfere with his clear intent? A bill of exchange may be the subject of a donatio causa mortis, and the death of the drawer of a bill does not operate to change the duty of the drawee to accept it; why
To the same effect see Varley v. Sims (Minn.) 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 829; May v. Jones (Iowa) 54 N. W. 231; Phinney v. State, (Wash.) 68 L. R. A. 119; Murphy v. Bor dwell (Minn.) 85 Am. St. Repts. 454, and Mill v. Escort (Tex. Civ. App.) 86 S. W. 367, and cases cited.
Error is predicated upon the action of the court in giving certain instructions asked by appellees and re-fusing others asked by appellants. With regard to these assignments of error, we only deem it necessary to say that the instructions given -by the court are in accordance with the principles of law announced and approved in this opinion. The instructions asked by appellants were either not in accordance with the principles of law herein declared, or they were peremptory in their nature. Therefore, the assignments of error with respect to the instructions are not well taken.
Finally, it is insisted that the evidence is not sufficient to support the verdict. We do not agree with counsel for appellants in this contention. According to the evidence for appellees, O. H. Greenway had resided with his widowed sister, Mrs. Smith, for nine years prior to his death. He was a bachelor and thought more of his youngest brother, J. H. Greenway, than any of his other brothers. Here, then, is shown the motive for making the gift to his widowed sister and his youngest brother, but of course there must have been not only an intent to give, but also a deliverv of the thing given. According to the testimonv of Mrs. Smith, her brother gave her the box and told her to keep it and put it away where it would not get destroyed. After- he died, she opened the box in the
Upon the authority of Lowe v. Hart, 93 Ark. 548, it is fairly inferable that there was an actual delivery of
We find no prejudicial error in the record, and the judgment will be affirmed.