16 Haw. 242 | Haw. | 1904
OPINION OF THE COURT BY
This is an application for a writ of prohibition to restrain further proceedings in a matter instituted by the respondent J. S. Low, as next friend of Annie T. E. Parker, a minor, before the respondent the second judge of the circuit court of the first circuit, at chambers, for the removal of the petitioner as guardian of the property of the said Annie T. E. Parker. That matter was brought and is pending before the circuit judge at chambers under the provisions of Sections 37 and 38 of Chapter 57 of the Laws of 1892, commonly known as the Judiciary Act (0. L., Sections 1145, 1146), as amended by 'Sections 11 and 12 of Act 32 of the Laws of 1903; and also Sections 1343-1395 of the Civil Code of 1859, (Civil Laws, Ch. 126), as amended by Act 16 of the Laws of 1903, — these being the principal provisions that purport, among other things, to confer and to some extent define the jurisdiction of circuit judges at chambers in guardianship matters. The contention is that these provisions are void as being in conflict with Section 81 of the Organic Act, which reads as follows:
“Sec. 81. That the judicial power of the Territory shall be vested in one supreme court, circuit courts, and in such inferior courts as the legislature may from time to time establish. And until the legislature shall otherwise provide, the laws of Hawaii heretofore in force concerning the several courts and their jurisdiction and procedure shall continue in force except as herein ■otherwise provided.”
It is argued that this section vests all the judicial power of
The present case, however, can not be decided solely as if there were a definite constitutional or organic provision intended to control the organization of a judicial system in the future where none existed previously, or to be chiefly declarative of a different system previously existing, or to introduce radical changes in a previously existing system. No doubt the Organic Act may be regarded as in the nature of a constitution from the standpoint of the Territory, and Hawaiian laws relating to the judiciary, whether previously existing or subsequently enacted, cannot stand if in conflict with the provisions of that act (see 23 Op’s. Att’y. Gen’l. 539); and the circuit courts mentioned in Section 81 of that act may, perhaps, be regarded, from the territorial standpoint, as constitutional courts. See Hind v. Wilder’s S. Co., 14 Haw. 222; Ex parte Smith, 14 Haw. 269. Tet even a constitutional provision must be construed in connection with other provisions of the instrument, and also in the light of the circumstances under which it was adopted and the history which preceded it, and the natural consequences of a proposed construe
This is a question of construction. It is not inherently impossible to confer independent jurisdiction of cases not requiring-trial by jury upon judges at chambers. That may be done by constitutional provision or by statute in the absence of constitutional restriction. See Wilcox v. Wilcox, 14 N. Y. 577; Brewster v. Hartley, 37 Cal. 15; Stewart v. Daggy, 13 Neb. 290. Nor would it seem inappropriate where, as in Hawaii, the jurisdiction so conferred has as a rule been of an equitable as distinguished from a legal nature — such as was formerly exercised in England by the equity, ecclesiastical and admiralty courts — -and has been exercised with the formality and publicity usually obtaining in courts of law. The words “at chambers,” indeed,, may be used, and have been used here, in various senses. They may mean the judge’s lodgings or private rooms or they may-mean a room set apart, like an ordinary court room, for hearing matters without a jury. See Com. v. McLaughlin, 122 Mass. 449. Likewise, proceedings at chambers may imply a certain degree of informality; they may be more or less summary and! before a judge acting privately without a clerk; or, they may be formal, instituted by petition and process, with service of' summons as in cases before courts of law, and heard in a public court room by the judge with clerk, bailiff, and all the elements, that are usually supposed to make up a court of record. Even the word “court” is subject to moré or less confusion. It is. sometimes used to denote all that makes up the court, and sometimes to denote merely the presiding judge of the court. Again,, in order to be a court, a body need not have a particular name. It may be designated a “circuit court” or it may simply be called a court with jurisdiction to hear and determine certain classes of cases. “District courts” and “district magistrates”' are used interchangeably in our statutes to denote the same court. It is a court, though not of record. Commissioners of private-ways and water rights under our statutes hold courts without names. A court is a political being. It is incorporeal. It may
The words “court” and “chambers” have been used in various senses in Hawaii for more than half a century, but with recognized meanings, whether in statutes or judicial decisions, according to the circumstances. Powers at chambers of the incidental or ancillary sort have been conferred, but the words “at chambers” and other words deemed equivalent have also been used to signify certain distinctions in independent matters. The superior courts of record have borne different names from time to time, but superior jurisdiction has always been divided between the courts under their respective names and the judges of such courts at chambers. This has been a convenient way of indicating certain distinctions. The distinction is in general that between law and equity. The court, under its proper name, • as, for instance, the “circuit court,” sits at regular terms, with a jury, in law cases, which go to a higher court by bill of exceptions. The “circuit judge at chambers,” or the “circuit judge,” the “judge of a court of record at chambers,” the “circuit court at chambers,” the “probate court,” the “probate judge at chambers,” etc., as he is variously called, sits continuously, without a jury, in equity and probate, and formerly in admiralty and bankruptcy cases, which go to a higher court by general appeal. There is a court, without a proper name, of the circuit judge. It has often been referred to in both the statutes and judicial decisions as the court of equity or the court of probate, etc. Moreover, it is a court of record, with clerk, bailiff, etc. It usually sits in the public court room of the circuit court It sometimes sits in the judge’s room or chambers adjoining, as a matter of convenience. The court also, as distinguished from the judge or the judge at chambers, has sat in the judge’s chambers in matters not requiring a jury, or jury waived, or even with a jury, as a matter of convenience or necessity, though naturally not often, at least with a jury, for it is not convenient to have a jury in chambers. Eor the last twelve years cases could be brought to this court by writ of error as well as by appeal
The jurisdiction and procedure of the courts and the judges at chambers is not all defined by statute. Much of it is covered by statute only in a very general way. For instance, judges at chambers are given jurisdiction in equity in general terms— which means that they have such equitable jurisdiction as has been exercised in chancery in England and the equity courts in America. Even the act of 1878, which enumerates many subjects of equity jurisdiction, is not exclusive, although it was taken from the Massachusetts statute, which is there held exclusive. See Dole v. Gear, 14 Haw. 560. Similarly as to guardianship matters. See Hoare v. Allen, 13 Haw. 262. Much, as to jurisdiction and procedure, is governed by what may be considered Hawaiian common law, — that has grown up without the aid of statute or has been built upon statutes by inference and been recognized by bench and bar and has to some extent been assumed in the enactment of statutes. In fact, the judiciary has developed here, especially in its earlier period, much as it did in early English history, gradually, and largely without the aid of statute. There was a gradual separation of judicial from executive and legislative functions, a gradual organization of a judicial system, introduction of trial by jury, separation of law and equity, separation of civil and criminal matters at law, and of equity, probate and admiralty matters at chambers, and of the functions of the judge and the jury, and a gradual development in forms of pleading and practice. This began long before the first constitution, that of 1840, the provisions of which were somewhat crude and meager and but little suggestive of the system, especially so far as the superior courts of record — the governors’ courts — were concerned, that then existed and rapidly developed for some years afterwards. Prior to the Constitution of 1840, there were scarcely any statutory provisions relative to the judiciary. After that until the act of 1847, organizing the judiciary, there was little more than the act of
The question is not merely whether Congress intended by Section 81 of the Organic Act to prohibit the creation of such a. court in the future but whether it intended to abrogate such-courts already existing. That section is borrowed with modifications from the provision above quoted found in the last four Hawaiian constitutions, under which such courts must be held,, under the rule of long continued and unquestioned as well as contemporary construction, not to mention other rules, to have been legally constituted. If no modifications had been made in this, borrowed section, could we hesitate to hold that Congress did not intend that it should mean something so radically different from, what it has been construed for half a century to mean, or that Congress did not intend by adopting the same provision to repeal by implication what had become so thoroughly established under it % Do the modifications require a different construction ? The.only modification in the main provision of this section consists-in the insertion of the words “circuit courts.” It is contended that this modification in itself shows an intention to introduce
But it is contended that the remainder of the section shows that a change was intended. This, to repeat it, reads as follows: “And until the legislature shall otherwise provide, the laws of Hawaii heretofore in force concerning the several courts- and their jurisdiction and procedure shall continue in force except as herein otherwise provided.” The argument is that, “herein” refers to this section and not to the entire act, and that, since the insertion of the words “circuit courts” is the' only change made, the phrase “except as herein otherwise provided” must show that a change was intended in the classes of courts. It is clear, however, that “herein” refers to the entire act, and therefore, since a number of changes in the judiciary are made by other sections (e. g., Secs. 7, 83, 86), the phrase in question is fully explained by reference to them. “Herein” may refer to the act as well as to the section. It must be held to refer to the act or else this section would be in conflict with the other sections that make changes in the laws relative to the-judiciary. Moreover, the same phrase “except as herein otherwise provided” is found in other sections where it must refer' to the whole act. See Secs. 5, 12, 35, 48.
The latter portion of Section 81, indeed, far from showing an intention to repeal, shows a general intention to continue in force the laws “heretofore in force concerning the several courts- and their jurisdiction and procedure.” But it is suggested that the laws conferring jurisdiction on judges at chambers were void under the Hawaiian constitutions also, and so were not “heretofore in force.” This argument has already been practically disposed of. It is further argued that even if the old laws were continued in force, this would not affect the argument that the new laws, namely, the amendments of 1903, above referred to, were void. But (aside from the more reasonable view that future amendments might well be made as to details along lines consistent in principle with the old laws, and the fact that the-
Thus, not only is there nothing in Section 81 that requires us "to bold that Congress intended, by tbe insertion of tbe words ““circuit courts,” to effect tbe important change contended for— a change by mere vague implication that would abrogate in toto tbe courts having equity and probate jurisdiction, but there is much in this section to indicate tbe contrary. This different intention is strongly sustained by other sections of the act. Section 83, for instance, shows a general intent in this direction by providing “that tbe laws of Hawaii relative to tbe judiciary •department, including civil and criminal procedure, except as amended by this act, are continued in force,” etc., and then making certain specific changes, but not in respect to tbe jurisdiction or powers of judges at chambers. Section 7 expressly repeals many laws relating to tbe judiciary, such as that conferring upon circuit judges jurisdiction in bankruptcy. It even ■expressly repeals the “first subdivision of section eleven hundred and forty-five,” (relating to admiralty jurisdiction) of tbe Civil Laws, — the section that is now in question and that defines 'in twelve subdivisions tbe jurisdiction of circuit judges at ■chambers, but does not mention tbe subdivisions that confer upon such judges equity and probate jurisdiction. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Expressum facit cessare taciturn.
The permanent writ is denied and the temporary writ dissolved.