4 Or. 339 | Or. | 1873
By tbe Court,
Tbis suit was originally instituted in tbe Circuit Court of tbe State of Oregon for Multnomab County, to quiet tbe title to certain parcels of land situate in tbe city of Portland. Tbe plaintiffs bad a decree, enjoining tbe defendant from disturbing them in tbeir enjoyment of tbe premises described in tbe complaint, and from setting up further claim thereto; and also for sixty dollars damages and for costs and disbursements. Tbe cause is in tbis Court at tbis time to be tried de novo, upon tbe transcript and tbe depositions certified up therewith.
Tbe complaint alleges in substance, that tbe plaintiffs are tbe owners in fee simple, and in possession of blocks numbered 280 and 281, in tbe city of Portland, county of Multnomab and State of Oregon. That tbe defendant claims an interest or estate in said blocks adverse to plaintiffs, viz. : That said property was dedicated by some former proprietors of tbe city of Portland for public use, and that tbe said claim is a cloud upon plaintiffs’ title. That on January 21, 1869, tbe defendant, under its said claim, wrongfully and unlawfully broke and entered upon said premises and broke and threw down plaintiffs’ fence, enclosing tbe same, and damaged plaintiffs in tbe sum of one hundred dollars. That
The defendant answered, denying the plaintiffs’ possession, and alleging the said property to be public parks, claiming that the same had been dedicated by the former proprietors of said city, viz.: Stephen Coffin, W. W. Chapman and D. H. Lownsdale, who, in 1850, were the owners and in possession, and who caused two maps of said city to be made by one Brady. That these two maps were copies of the original plat of the city of Portland, made by the proprietors, upon which the real property in controversy was marked out and designated as the public parks. That said Coffin kept and retained one of these copies, and made frequent sales of lots and blocks of land in said city by reference thereto. That the city of Portland adopted said map in 1852, and that Coffin ratified it after that date. That in 1862 Coffin obtained from the General Government a patent for the land taken by him under the Donation Act of September 27, 1850, which embraced the premises described in the complaint. That the plaintiffs fraudulently combined and confederated with said Coffin to obtain and recover from said city the said parcels of land dedicated to the public use. That on December 4, 1867, said Coffin, combining and confederating with the plaintiffs, fraudulently made and published a map, or plat, designated as “ Coffin’s Addition to the City of Portland.” That on this map the parcels of land in controversy were numbered as blocks usually are upon town plats. That on all prior maps the said parcels of land remained unnumbered, and were designated as public parks. That said pretended map was executed by said Coffin before the plaintiff Mason, who signed his name thereto as a witness, and who, be
Tbe reply of tbe plaintiffs puts in issue the material allegations of tbe answer, and further alleges that they bad purchased the property in good faith and for a valuable consideration, and without any knowledge, information or notice of tbe same having been dedicated to tbe public; that tbe map called “ Coffin’s Addition to tbe City of Portland,” is tbe only map of record of said property; that tbe Brady map was never of record, and that neither of tbe plaintiffs had any knowledge of tbe existence of any such map or plat until long after their said purchase; that said Coffin was tbe owner of said blocks, and that plaintiffs, nor either of them, bad any knowledge that there ever bad been a dedication of, or an attempt to dedicate, tbe said property to public use.
Tbe first question to be determined in this case is, did Stephen Coffin, tbe original owner of tbe land, and one of tbe proprietors of tbe town, dedicate these parcels of land to the public use, as alleged by tbe defendant in tbe answer ?
Beardsley, J., in tbe case of Hunter v. The Trustees of Sandy Hill (6 Hill, 407), has furnished tbe most comprehensive definition of dedication to be found in tbe books, and be declares it to be “tbe act of devoting of giving property for some proper object, and in such manner as to
The following facts are clearly established by the testimony: That during the year 1850, Stephen Coffin, Daniel H. Lownsdale and Wm. W. Chapman were in possession, and claimed to be the owners of what was known as “ The Portland Land Claim.” That in that year, and before the passage of the Donation Act, they caused a survey to be made of blocks, lots, streets, parks and othér public
The facts being as stated, we will proceed to an examination of the principles of law applicable thereto, in order to ascertain whether the acts of Coffin can be properly regarded as evincing a clear intention to dedicate, and whether the dedication when made became irrevocable.
In the United States v. Chicago, 7 How. (U. S.) 185, the principle is laid down that a mere survey of land, by the proprietor thereof, into lots, streets and squares, will not amount to a dedication without a sale, and it is well settled, by the weight of authority, that a sale of lots or blocks with reference to a given map or plat describing lots and blocks as bounded by streets, will amount to an immediate and irrevocable dedication of the streets. (Rowan’s Exrs. v. Portland, 8 B. Mon. 232; Augusta v. Perkins, Id. 207; Newport v. Taylor, 16 B. Mon. 699; Stone v. Brooks, 35 Cal. 489; Hannibal v. Draper, 15 Mo. 634; Schenley v. Commonwealth, 36 Penn. St. 62; Dubuque v. Maloney, 9 Iowa, 450; Winona v. Huff, 11 Minn. 119; Huber v. Gazley, 18 Ohio, 18; and Logansport v. Dunn, 8 Ind. 378.)
The same doctrine applies to public squares and parks, and the dedication may be established in the same manner as in case of streets and alleys. (Commonwealth v. Rush, 14 Penn. St. 186; Dover v. Fox, 9 33. Mon. 200; State v. Wilkinson, 2 Vt. 480; Watertown v. Cowen, 4 Paige (N. Y. Ch.), 510; Price v. Thompson, 48 Mo. 363; and Abbott v. Mills, 3 Vt. 526.)
In the last case referred to it was held that whenever a public square or common is marked out or set apart as such by the owners, and individuals are induced to purchase lots or lands bordering thereon, in the expectation held out by the proprietors that it should so remain; or even if there are no marks upon the ground, but a map or plan is made, and lots marked thereon and sold as such, it is not competent for the proprietors to disappoint the expectations of the purchasers by resuming the lands thus set apart and appropriating them to any other use.
Prom the facts and the law as stated, we are of opinion that Coffin made a dedication by parol of the parcels of land described in the pleadings to the public, to be used as public parks, and that the said dedication was subsequent to the date of the passage of the Donation Act, and prior to the date of the execution of the map known as “Coffin’s Addition to the City of Portland,” and also prior to the date of the execution of the deed of Coffin and wife to the plaintiffs, under which the plaintiffs claim.
We pass now to the consideration of the questions of acceptance and user; for it is claimed by plaintiffs’ counsel that nothing less than a formal acceptance, by the corporate authorities, of these particular parcels of land, or an actual entry upon, use and improvement thereof, by said corporate authorities, will amount to an acceptance, and that an acceptance was necessary to make the dedication irrevocable.
The facts tending to show an acceptance on the part of the city are the following: That on April 29, 1852, the City Council, by proper resolution, adopted the Brady map as the city map or plat, and ordered the Mayor to appoint a special committee, with instructions to call upon the proprietors of the city of Portland, and obtain from them a bond for or deed of all the public streets in said city, and a deed
If the position assumed by plaintiffs’ counsel be correct, there could be no dedication to an unincorporated town or village, either by deed or in parol. The law is, that a parol dedication is not a grant; it is a right created in favor of the public, and is in the nature of an estoppel in pais. There need be no grantee in esse to take the fee, nor is it essential that the legal title should pass from the owner. (Beatty v. Kurtz, 2 Pet. 256; New Orleans v. United States, 10 Pet. 662; Dubuque v. Maloney, 9 Iowa, 450; Kelsey v. King, 33 How. Pr. 39; Town of Paulet v. Clark, 9 Cranch, 292; McConnell v. Lexington, 12 Wheat. 582.)
In New Orleans v. United States, just cited, the Court says that it is not essential that this right of use should be vested in a corporate body; it may exist in the public and have no other limitation than the wants of the community at large. We are of opinion that the acts of the city, by its council, show an acceptance on its.part of the parcels of land in controversy, if such formal acceptance were necessary. But a formal acceptance is not necessary. The acts of the inhabitants in the purchase of lots, the improvement of streets, etc., and their use, conclude the owner, and the corporation may insist upon every right which any of its inhabitants may have acquired by virtue of the original dedication, (Watertown v. Cowen, 3 Paige (N. Y. Ch.), 514; Dovaston v. Payne, 2 Smith’s Ldg. Cases, 237, 241; Wyman v. Mayor of New York, 11 Wend. 499; Langley v. Gallipolis, 2 Ohio St. 107; New Orleans v. United States, 10 Peters, 713.)
The purchase of lots and improvement of streets, with reference to the Brady map or plat, were acts of acceptance of the streets and other public places, and indeed of the
We pass now to the consideration of the question as to whether the plaintiffs had notice of the claim of the public upon this land prior to their alleged purchase from Coffin and wife. The testimony shows that they knew that Coffin was the original proprietor of that portion of the city wherein the land in controversy lies. They knew also that he, together with the other proprietors, had laid out and established a town upon the “Portland land claim.” They knew also that a. town had been built upon said claim, which extended west beyond the public parks. They knew also that it had been built upon a plan indicated upon some other map than the one made by Coffin in December, 1867, and that no improvements had been made upon the “Park Blocks,” as they are commonly called, throughout the entire length of the Coffin claim, while the blocks on both sides of the parks had been extensively improved. The testimony also show's that both plaintiffs were residents of the city prior to the date of the making of the map of “ Coffin’s Addition to the City of Portland.” That Carter was a member of the City Council in 1866, when the ordinance authorizing the “Committee on Streets and Public Property” to contract for the improvement of the public parks was passed. That deeds from Coffin, conveying nearly all the lots and blocks lying in that part of the city, had been executed to different parties prior to December, 1867, and these deeds were of record in the proper office, and many of the lots and blocks were improved and occupied. That the map, according to which the conveyances were made, was the Brady map, copies of which were upon the walls of the public offices of the city and county, to which plaintiffs frequently resorted in transacting their business. That plaintiff Carter had been engaged in buying and selling real estate in said city, and had known this property for six
•Passing from the facts, let us consider the law touching notice. It is a well-settled principle that to constitute notice, it is not necessary that it should be in the shape of a distinct and formal communication, and it will be implied where a party is shown to have had such means of informing himself as to justify the conclusion that he has availed himself of them. It has frequently been decided by the American as well as the English.Courts, that whatever is sufficient to direct the attention of a purchaser to the prior rights and equities of third persons, so as to put him on inquiry into ascertaining their nature, will operate as notice. (Le Neve v. Le Neve, 2 Leading Cases in Equity, 160; Barnes v. McChristie, 3 Penn. St. 67; and Bohlman v. Carter, decided at the last term of this Court.)
Indeed, we think that notice should, with rare exception, be implied where a party is shown to have such knowledge as would superinduce further inquiry in an honest, conscientious man. In Rowam’s Executors v. Portland, herein-before cited, Marshall, C. J., in delivering the opinion
It was urged by plaintiffs’ counsel that a dedication could not be predicated of the use of the Brady map by Coffin, for that the same was not of record. It is unnecessary to discuss this proposition at length, for it must be obvious, from the views already expressed, that to support a dedication of streets, alleys, public parks, etc., it is not necessary to show that the map upon which such streets, alleys, public parks, etc., were displayed, was recorded, but simply that it W'as used and referred to by the proprietor in selling the lots and blocks to which the streets, alleys, public parks, etc., are appurtenant.
The remaining questions are unimportant, and as the views already expressed are decisive of the case, they need not be discussed.
It follows that subsequent to the passage of the Donation
Tbe decree of tbe Court below must be reversed and the suit dismissed at plaintiffs’ cost.
Decree reversed.