150 Ky. 525 | Ky. Ct. App. | 1912
Opinion op the Court by
Beversing.
The appellant, as administrator of the estate of Jeff Blevins, brought this action against tbe appellee railway
Ironton, Ohio, lies upon the opposite side of the Ohio Eiver, and the village of Chinnville lies immediately west of the yard.
There was, also, a baseball field near the well, and the players would cross the track in going and returning.
Blevins was not in the employment of the railway company at the time of the accident. He was employed by the Hudson Engineering Company, which was engaged in digging an artesian well on the property of the railway company, on the bank of the Ohio Eiver. This well was located about 1,200 feet north of the company’s yard, with an open field lying between the well and the yard. Blevins boarded during the week — from Monday morning until Saturday evening — at David Bevins’
At the close of plaintiff’s evidence, the circuit judge peremptorily instructed the jury to find for the defendants, and from a judgment so found, the administrator prosecutes this appeal.
'There is no claim made that the train was running at an excessive speed, and the uncontradicted testimony shows that it was not running faster than five or six miles an hour. There was no street or highway across the railway yards, either at or in the immediate neighborhood of the point of the accident. Yernon street, which is approximately the dividing line between the town of Bussell and the railway yard, is 1,265 feet from the point of the accident. Under these facts, and in consideration of the further fact that Blevins was not in the service of the railway company, the company insists that Blevins was a trespasser, to whom it owed no lookout duty, and no duty whatever until after his peril had been discovered; and that, as Blevins’ presence upon the track was not discovéred by the engineer until after he had been hit, the company is in no way liable for his death. On the other hand, appellant insists that Blevins was not a trespasser, but was a licensee, and had the right to cross the track at this point, which had been used for some thirteen years by the general public as a crossing place, with the implied consent of the company, and that it was daily crossed by from four to five hundred people, including the employes of the company, in going to and from their work. Appellant insists that these facts bring the case within that class of cases where the railroad company is required to give signals of the approach of the train, and to keep a lookout in all places where, by reason of the use of the track by the public, the presence of persons on it was to be reasonably anticipated. I. C. R. R. Co. v. Murphy, 123 Ky., 794; L. & N. R. R. Co. v. McNary’s Admr., 128 Ky., 408; L., H. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Lyons, 146 Ky., 603; and C. & Ry. Co. v. Warnock’s Admr., 150 Ky., 74.
In reply, appellee insists that the rule just announced does not apply to this case, because the accident occurred in the company’s private yards, which were not in a town or city, or intersected by a public crossing at the point of the accident. The question for decision,
Upon the question of the engineer’s negligence, it must be admitted that the testimony of Hill and Lusk as to his failure to give a signal of any kind, was sufficient to carry that question to the jury.
The question of the character and extent of the use of the crossing, is of more difficulty. The fact that the accident did not occur in an incorporated city or town cannot, of itself, affect the case; it is the nature and use of the crossing by the public that is to determine the applicability of the rule which requires the lookout duty. C. & O. Ry. Co. v. Warnock’s Admr., 150 Ky., 74.
If the use of the track by the public for crossing purposes was general, and acquiesced in by the railroad company, it was charged with notice of such use, and the trespasser became a licensee to whom the company owed a lookout duty, although the accident' happened in the company’s yard.
In Southern Ry. Co. v. Sanders, 145 Ky., 679, which was a case similar, in its controlling features, to the case at bar, we said:
“The facts of this case serve very well to illustrate the difference between the duty of the company at a street crossing and its duty in yards and premises owned and occupied by it. Here the place where appellee was injured was situated between two streets and was the private property of the railroad company. It had been set apart for its use in the transaction of its business and was occupied by its tracks and other buildings and property. It was not crossed by any street or public way, nor was it used for travel by the public, except on foot, but the company by its conduct recognized the right of the public to use these premises, and when a railroad company permits large numbers of the public to habitually travel to and fro upon its tracks and right of way, it must take care not to injure them, as the license to use the premises carries with it the assurance that the licensee will not be harmed by the neglect or carelessness of the licensor.”
In the case at bar it appears that the crossing where Blevins was killed, was used daily by from 400 to 500
Judgment reversed, and cause 'remanded for further proceedings.