Christоpher Drew Carswell, M.D. appeals the trial court’s grant of summary judgment on behalf of Oconee Regional Medical Center, Inc. (“Oconee Medical”), in this breach of contract аction.
In his sole enumeration of error, Carswell argues that summary judgment was not properly granted to Oconee Medical because the *156 trial court erred in finding that his contract with Oconee Medical was an entire contract and not divisible, and in finding that the six-year statute of limitation for breach had not run as to any part of the contract. We agree, and thus reverse the trial court’s judgment.
Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c). We apply a de novo standard of rеview to an appeal from a grant of summary judgment, and we view the evidence, and all reasonable conclusions and inferences drawn from it, in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.
Matjoulis v. Integon Gen. Ins. Corp.,
So viewed, the evidence showed that in May 1993, Carswell, a pediatrician, entered into a contract deemed a “Not for Profit Net Income Guarantee Agreement” (the “Agreemеnt”). Pursuant to the Agreement, Carswell agreed to set up a full-time pediatrics practice in Milledgeville and serve as a staff physician at the hospital for three years, and in return the hоspital agreed to pay Carswell’s relocation expenses and to subsidize his practice income for two years. In the months Carswell’s monthly practice net income was less than the net income guarantee of $8,333.33, Oconee Medical would advance Car-swell the amount needed to equal $8,333.33. In the months that Carswell’s practice net income exceеded $8,333.33, he had to pay any excess earned that month to the hospital until the total amount subsidized to him, if any, had been repaid. 1 The payments were to be made within ten days from the end of the month in which the net income exceeded the guaranteed amount until any subsidy was repaid. Between July 1993 and December 1993, Carswell’s monthly practice income was less than the guaranteеd amount, and subsequently he was advanced $96,899.51. From January 1994 until June 1995, Carswell’s monthly practice net income met or exceeded the guaranteed amount, but he did not make any payments to the hospital, although the payments were due by the tenth of the following month.
*157 On June 29, 2001, the hospital filed a complaint for reimbursement of the income subsidy payments of $96,899.51, plus another $4,800 for a seрarate loan to Carswell. Carswell answered, contending, among other things, that the claim was barred by the statute of limitation. After hearing cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court granted summary judgmеnt to the Hospital, finding that the Agreement was an entire contract and the six-year statute of limitation for contracts had not run. Carswell appeals.
Carswell contends that the Agreement is a divisible contract, and as such, Oconee Medical is only entitled to recover those payments under the Agreement which came due within six years from the filing date of the complаint. He argues that the contract was first breached when he failed to make the first monthly payment which was due on February 10, 1994, and that this breach, and every other breach, except the finаl missed payment, due on July 10,1995, are barred by the statute of limitation because they occurred more than six years before the Hospital filed its complaint. We agree.
OCGA§ 9-3-24 requires that an аction upon a written contract be brought within six years after the contract becomes due and payable. And when that six-year period begins running on a breach of contract clаim depends on whether the agreement is entire or divisible.
Douglas & Lomason Co. v. Hall,
If the contract is found to be strictly divisible, the statute will run separately as to each payment or performance when it becomes due, either as an independent obligation or as a return for an installment of the counter-performance. . . . [OCGA § 13-1-8] provides that a contract may be either entire or sevеrable. In the former the whole contract stands or falls together; in the latter, the failure of a distinct part does not void the remainder. The character of the contract in such case is determined by the intention of the parties. Numerous cases have stated that the criterion for determining whether the contract is entire or severable under this rule is to be found in the question of whether the whole quantity, service, or thing, all as a whole, is of the essence of the contract, and if it appear that the contract was to take the whole or nonе, then the contract would be entire, but, on the other hand, if the quantity, service, or thing is to be accepted by successive performances, then the contract may be propеrly held to be severable.
Piedmont Life Ins. Co. v. Bell,
*158
In
Walker v. Gwinnett Hosp. System,
Oconee Medical argues that Walker pertained to a loan covering start-up expenses, not just the doctor’s salary, and thus, because the parties contracted for the loan, the loan was the consideration for the contract. It argues that in this case,
[Carswell] did not contract for, nor did the [Hospital] agree to loan, an indeterminate sum of money to establish [Car-swell’s] practice. . . . Rather, [Carswell], in return for his promise to serve the Milledgeville community for three years, was assured by the [Hospital] that, inter alia, he would receive a secure and definite monthly incоme stream during the first two years of his medical practice.
The hospital’s argument appears to be that Carswell’s contract was more akin to an employment contract, and that his service for three years was the entire agreement. We are not persuaded by this argument. The Agreement here is not entire, because the contractual consideratiоn at issue is not a single sum certain, but an indefinite total amount which was payable in installments. See
Douglas & Lomason Co. v. Hall,
supra,
Therefore, as a divisible contract, “all the breaches occurring up to thе commencement of the action must be included therein.” OCGA § 13-6-14. And the statute of limitation begins to run “on the date that suit on the claim can first be brought.”
Hoffman v. Ins. Co. of North America,
Here, the six-year period in this case started when the first breach of the Agreement occurred, which was February 1994, the first
*159
month after Carswell’s monthly net practice exceeded the net income guarantee. From January 1994 until June 1995, Carswell’s net practice income exceeded the guaranteed amount 11 times. Because the Agreement is “strictly divisible, the statute will run separately as to each payment or perfоrmance when it becomes due.”
Piedmont Life Ins. Co. v. Bell,
supra,
The Hospital filed this claim on June 29, 2001, and pursuant to the Agreement, Carswell’s last payment was due on July 10, 1995. Accоrdingly, the statute of limitation had run as to all of the monthly payments except the last one. See
Mobley v. Murray County,
Therefore, the judgment of the trial сourt is reversed. Because Carswell did not enumerate as error the trial court’s denial of his motion for summary judgment, we cannot direct the trial court to issue judgment in his favor on Oconee Medical’s claims that are barred by the statute of limitation.
Judgment reversed.
Notes
The contract provided that:
The subsidy will equal the difference between net practice income for each of the initial 12-month periods and One Hundred Thousаnd Dollars ($100,000) per 12-month period, prorated monthly. The subsidy will begin the date Physician begins practice. In no event will the subsidy exceed One Hundred Thousand Dollars ($100,000) during each of the initial 12-month periods.
Nеt practice income is defined as gross collections . . . minus reasonable professional expenses. . . . Net practice income will he computed on a cash basis. Pаyments will be made each month to equal the difference between monthly net practice income and $8,333.33. In the event net practice income during the month exceeds $8,333.33 per month, Physician is obligated to pay the difference between net practice income and $8,333.33 to the Hospital. .. .