Carston v. StateCarston v. State
Appellant Jerry Carston was convicted of malice murder and related firearm and gang crimes after he shot and killed Quinton Williams, who had left Appellant‘s gang. In this Court, Appellant argues that the trial court erred by supposedly preventing his counsel from questioning one of the State‘s witnesses about pending felony charges and by admitting into evidence a video rеcording of a gang beating of Williams that did not involve Appellant. We conclude that Appellant has not shown that the trial court imposed any unreasonable limitation on questioning the State‘s witness and that the video was properly admitted, so we affirm.1
After Appellant and Robinson picked up Ramsey, they drove to an apartment complex on North Cary Street. Robinson, who was good friends with Williams, saw Williams at the apartment complex, got out of the car, and talked to him briefly, while Appellant and Ramsey waited in the car. When Robinson got back in the car, Appellant asked if that was Williams, and Robinson said yes. Appellant then told Robinson to drive a little further into the
Two witnesses testified about what they saw at the apartments that evening. A woman was outside near her apartment on North Cary Street when she saw a car come into the apartments’ parking lot. A person wearing a black shirt, black Adidas pants, and something covering “between the face and neck area” got оut of the car. The driver said something like, “There he is,” or “Go get him.” The witness turned away and then she heard a gunshot. Another woman, who lived in a house near the entrance to the apartments,
Police officers found Williams lying dead on the sidewalk along North Cary Street. He died from five gunshot wounds, one in his jaw and four in his lower abdomen; five bullet casings were found near his body. The shots were fired from between a few inches and a few feet away. The medical examiner testified that the trajectories of the bullets were consistent with Williams lying on his back on the pavement when he was shot in the abdomen.
Robinson testified that after Appellant got out of the car, Robinson and Ramsey drove to a nearby store, where they stayed for a short time before driving back toward the apartment complex. They picked up Appellant after he ran out of the bushes; he thеn told Robinson to “Get me the ‘F’ out of here.” Robinson saw that Appellant was holding a pistol and wearing a camouflage mask, a
Robinson drove Appellant and Ramsey to the home of Christopher Love, another member of the Bishop Bloods gang. When they arrived, Robinson heard Appellant tell Love, “Man, I shot him, bro. . . . He ain‘t had nothing to do with it. I shot him, bro. I don‘t care,” and, “Pete said we ain‘t dubbing him out of the hood no more. We double-deucing him out the hood.” Love told Appellant that he was “stupid,” but Appellant said, “Man, he‘s just a free stain.” Ramsey saw Appellаnt give the gun he had to Love.5
Appellant does not challenge the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions. Nevertheless, in accordance with this Court‘s soon-to-end practice in murder cases, we have reviewed the record and conclude that, when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdicts, the evidence presеnted at trial and summarized above was sufficient to authorize a rational jury to find Appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes of which he was convicted. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). See also Vega v. State, 285 Ga. 32, 33 (673 SE2d 223) (2009) (“‘It was for the jury to determine the credibility of the witnesses and to resolve any conflicts or
2. Appellant contends that the trial court violated his constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him by preventing him from cross-examining Robinson about unrelated pending felony charges. The record shows no such violation.
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution “guarantees to the defendant the right to inquire about a witness‘s . . . pending criminal charges in an effort to show that the witness has ‘possible biases, prejudices, or ulteriоr motives’ that may influence his testimony.” Wright v. State, 279 Ga. 498, 499 (614 SE2d 56) (2005) (citation omitted). However, the Confrontation Clause does not guarantee “cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish,” and “[l]imitations on cross-examination are generally
Appellant has not shown that the trial court placed any actual limitation on the questioning of Robinson about his pending charges. At the time of Appellant‘s trial, Robinson was detained in the Troup County Jail on charges of burglary and armed robbery from unrelated incidents. Before Robinson began testifying, the prosecutor аsked the court to prohibit Appellant from asking about these charges, but the court declined to do so, saying that defense counsel could ask whether Robinson was getting a deal on the charges in exchange for testifying and might ask other questions that would be proper; the court told the prosecutor to object if he believed that a question was improper. When the prosecutor later objected to a question about the pending charges posed at the start of Robinson‘s cross-examination, the court had an off-the-record
Given the trial court‘s ruling declining to prohibit Appellant from asking any questions about Robinson‘s pending charges, and the questions that defense counsel and the prosecutor then asked about those charges, Appellant has failed to demonstrate that the court imposed any actual limitаtion on his questioning, much less an unreasonable restriction. See, e.g., Watkins v. State, 276 Ga. 578, 582-583 (581 SE2d 23) (2003) (holding that the trial court did not impermissibly restrict cross-examination where the only limitation concerned the specific nature of the pending criminal charges and “the jury learned through . . . cross examination that [the witness] had charges currently pending against her, that she had been indicted by a grаnd jury, and the month and year when she had been indicted,” as well as “whether her testimony at trial was related to the pending charges against her” (footnote omitted)); Turtle v. State, 271 Ga. 440, 444 (520 SE2d 211) (1999) (concluding that there was no error where the trial court actually permitted defense counsel to question the witness about the topics at issue). Compare Hines v. State, 249 Ga. 257, 260 (290 SE2d 911) (1982) (holding that the trial court abused its discretion by prohibiting all inquiry into the witness‘s pending charges).
3. Appellant also contends that the trial court erred by admitting into evidence a video recording of Bishops Bloods members beating Williams. Appellant argues that because he did
(a) The State introduced into evidence a video recording showing members of the Bishop Bloods gang beating Williams, who has a red bandana tied around his wrist; red is a color associated with that gang. In the video, which is a total of 29 seconds long, Williams is seen in a wooded area, surrounded by four young men who repeatedly punch him; he makes some ineffectual attempts to fight back. The fighting stops twiсe: once when the group gets too close to some bushes, and once when Williams falls to the ground. The State‘s gang expert explained that the video depicted a “beat in,” in which Williams was beaten to show his worthiness to be in the gang. Appellant is not in the video, but he was sent the video by a member of the gang through a group message on Faceboоk on April 18, 2016, and about 30 seconds later, Appellant responded, “Hi[s] a[ss] got pained.”
When the State sought to admit the video recording into
(b) Evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it wоuld be without the evidence,”
The video was relevant and probative to show the existence of
Appellant also argues that the video should have been excluded
Under Rule 403, “[r]elevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice[.]” Anglin, 302 Ga. at 337. But as we have repeatedly explained:
“Rule 403 is an extraordinary remedy, which should be used only sparingly, and the balance should be struck in favor of admissibility. Thus, in reviewing issues under Rule 403, we look at the evidence in a light most favorable to its admission, maximizing its probative value and minimizing its undue prejudicial impact.”
Id. (citation omitted). As just discussed, the video of Williams‘s gang “beat in” was highly probative to establish Appellant‘s motive for the murder and its relationship to gang activity. See id. And the video was not unduly prejudicial, particularly because Appellant himself was not in the video beating Williams. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the video. See, e.g.,
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
Notes
As discussed further in Division 3 below, the State introduced into evidence a video of Williams being “beat in” to the Bishop Bloods gang. The fact that Williams later left the gang was supported by testimony from Ricky Edmundson, a football coach who did outreach in the community and hired Williams. Edmundson testified that he knew that Williams had been in a gang and told Williams that he did not want “any kind of outside trouble.” Williams responded that Edmundson “didn‘t have anything to worry about” and that “he was working on something.” This conversation happened about a month before Williams was killed. Shortly after the conversation, Williаms told Edmundson that he was “free.”