146 Ky. 733 | Ky. Ct. App. | 1912
Opinion of the Court by
Affirming.
J. W. Turk brought this suit against E. B. Carson, to recover damages for an alleged trespass by Carson, and the cutting of timber by Mm on a tract of land which Tnrk alleged be owned and bad in possession. Carson filed an answer in which be controverted the allegations of the petition as to Turk’s ownership or-possession of the land and pleaded affirmatively that it was bis land. On a trial of the case the circuit court practically instructed the jury that the land was the property of Turk, and the jury having returned a verdict in Turk’s favor fixing the damages, the court entered judgment upon the verdict and Carson appeals.
In April, 1900, a patent issued from the land office to J. S. Atkins for 100 acres of land, and on May 14, 1900, a patent issued to W. IT. Ponder for 200 acres of land. Atkins and Ponder conveyed these surveys to J.- W. Turk. They cover the land in dispute. On the other hand, the title of Carson to the land comes in this way: About the year 1884, a man named Josiah Adams put up a cabin on the lower end of Island No. 3 in the Mississippi river. Adams had a small clearing around his cabin, but he does not appear to have had any marked boundary. He was simply a squatter and had no title. On December 31,1894, he executed a deed to Carson and certain other parties for the lower end of the island, beginning at six cotton wood trees and running east across
Adams had no color of title to the 200 acres which he conveyed to Carson and his associates, as he had no marked boundary and he had not been in possession long enough to acquire title to any part of the land. In Stanberry v. Mallory, 101 Ky., 49, the court held -that the owner of the shore who acquires title only by adverse holding is confined to his actual occupancy on the shore. In that case the same contention was made as is made here, and in answer to it the court said:
“A complete answer to this contention is that the Stransberrys are the owners of the shore only by adverse holding. And it seems to be well settled that one who so holds is confined to his actual occupancy on the shore unless by .notorious acts of ownership in so far as he may be able to exercise them, he furnishes evidence of his intention to claim and hold to the middle of the stream. This case affords an illustration of the wisdom of this limitation on the general rule. If the owners of Towhead Island and its accretion opposite the land of appellants had sued the shore owners in ejectment the answer may well have been “ ‘We have not encroached on you — we are in the occupancy of the shore and have a right to be’ — and yet, if the patentees did not sue, it is contended the adverse holding of the shore ripened into a perfect title to the thread of the stream. ’ ’
The facts of this case well demonstrate the wisdom of the rule there laid down. The defendant who has a deed for 200 acres is now claiming between 700 and 800 acres, when his grantor and he have no right to any of the land except such as is acquired by adverse posses
There is authority to the effect that where a person takes possession of an island and holds it adversely, he is entitled to all the accretions subsequently formed on the island, and that his title to them will relate back to the date when he took possession of the island. (Benne v. Miller, 149 Mo., 228; Campbell v. Gas Light Co., 84 Mo., 352; C. & N. W. R. R. Co. v. Grob, 85 Wis., 641.) But we do not think that these authorities should be applied to a case like this or that they are applicable' in this State under the rules governing lands in this Commonwealth. There can be no adverse possession of land without a marked or well defined boundary, and when possession is taken to a well defined boundary, the title thus acquired, must be confined to that boundary. Neither Adams nor Carson took any right beyond the island. The title to the soil of the river beyond the island was in the Commonwealth and when this land was entered and surveyed by Atkins and Ponder, Carson could acquire no title to the land within their surveys by an adverse possession held without the lap.
It is insisted, however, for Carson that the patent to Atkins is signed by W. S. Taylor, as Governor of the State; that Taylor was not then Governor de facto or de jure, and that the patent is void. It is conceded that Atkins regularly-entered and surveyed the land; that he filed his papers in the land office and that the register issued to him a patent. The only defect claimed in the proceedings is that the patent was not signed by the right person as Governor, there being at that time two persons acting as Governor and each claiming to be the
.Judgment affirmed.