for the Court:
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶ 1. On June 6, 2011, Monica Carson pleaded guilty in the Madison County Circuit Court to robbery. Carson was sentenced to fifteen years to serve in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC). She also pleaded guilty to robbery in two other related cause numbers, and received suspended sentences of fifteen years each, to run concurrently with each other but consecutively to the first sentence. Carson was sentenced to five years of supervised probation. On June 26, 2018, Carson filed a motion for post-conviction relief (PCR). The trial court denied Carson’s motion. Carson now appeals, asserting (1) ineffective assistance of counsel, (2) disparate sentencing, (3) error in the trial court’s acceptance of her plea, (4) error in the trial court’s denial of an evidentiary hearing, (5) error in the trial court’s denial of her motion for PCR, and (6) cumulative error.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶ 2. When reviewing a trial court’s denial or dismissal of a PCR motion, we will only disturb the trial court’s decision if it is clearly erroneous; however, we review the trial court’s legal conclusions under a de novo standard of review. Hughes v. State,
DISCUSSION
I. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
¶ 3. Carson argues her counsel was ineffeсtive because he failed to advise her about the law of robbery and accessory after the fact, inform her of the consequences of her plea, and investigate the сase and interview witnesses. In order to succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must prove that counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Strickland v. Washington,
¶ 4. Carson’s motion for PCR rests entirely on her own bare assertions. She offers no additional proof to support her claim that her trial counsel’s assistance was deficient and that she would not have pleaded guilty had it been otherwise. We therefore affirm the trial court’s decision to deny relief based on this issue.
¶ 5. While we affirm based on the above grounds, we also address Carson’s assertion that the facts only support' a conviction of accessory after the fact. Carson argues that had counsel advised her of this, she would not have pleaded guilty to the greаter offense of robbery. It is well settled that “[a] guilty plea will be found valid if it is shown to have been voluntarily and intelligently made by the criminal defendant before the trial court.” Burrough,
¶ 6. During thе plea hearing, Carson was given the opportunity to disagree with the factual basis of her plea in this case. She did not. She read and signed a petition to enter a guilty plea and stаted that she understood what she read. She stated that she, after discussions with her attorney regarding the facts and circumstances of the case, decided to plead guilty and that her admission of guilt was freely and voluntarily made. She said counsel advised her as to the elements of and the defenses to the crime. The trial court reviewed Carson’s rights with her, which she waived, and the consequences of the plea, including the minimum and maximum periods of incarceration that could be imposed for each cause number. Carson said that she was pleading guilty because she was in fact guilty of committing these crimes and that she was satisfied with her attorney’s representation. As this Court has stated numerous times, “[s]tatements made in open court under oath ‘carry a strоng presumption of veracity.’ ” Cane v. State,
II. DISPARATE SENTENCING
¶ 7. Carsоn argues that her co-defendant received a lesser sentence; thus, her due-process rights were violated. “Sentencing is within the complete discretion of the trial court and not subjеct to appellate review if it is within the limits prescribed by statute.”. Wall v. State,
¶ 8. Furthermore, a trial court is not required to impose the same sentence on coconspirators. Buckley v. State,
III. FACTUAL BASIS FOR GUILTY PLEA
¶ 9. Carson argues that the factual basis for her guilty plea does not support robbery and constitutes a denial of due process оf law. According to Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-3-79 (Rev. 2014):
Every person who shall feloniously take or attempt to take from the person or from the presence the persоnal property of another and against his will by violence to his person or by putting such person in fear of immediate injury to his person by the exhibition of a deadly weapon shall be guilty of rоbbery....
¶ 10. Carson confessed to jumping out of a vehicle with two other people, one of them held the gun, and one of them demanded money from Ramedio Venture.
IV. EVIDENTIARY HEARING
¶ 11. Carson argues that the trial court erred in failing to conduct an evidentiаry hearing before summarily denying her PCR motion. The Mississippi Supreme Court has stated:
Under section 99-39-11(2) of the Mississippi Code, a trial court may summarily dismiss a petition for PCR, without having held an evidentiary hearing, when it is clear that the petitioner is not entitled to relief under the [Mississippi Uniform Post-Conviction Collateral Relief Act]. This Court has established that dismissal of a PCR motion is proper where “it apрears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him torelief.” Turner v. State, 590 So.2d 871, 874 (Miss.1991).
State v. Santiago,
¶ 12. Carson relies entirely on her own assertions as evidence that she is еntitled to post-conviction relief. These bare assertions are in direct conflict with her open-court statements. As stated above, “[sjtatements made in open court under oаth ‘carry a strong presumption of veracity.’ ” Cane,
V. DENIAL OF THE MOTION FOR PCR
¶ 13. Carson alleges that the trial court erred by denying the PCR motion without evaluating the claims of the motion or making any specific findings on the individual claims. As stated ‘above, Carson relies solely on her own bare assertions without offering any new or additional proof to support her claims. The trial court reviewed the record and found Carson’s motion to be without merit. We affirm.
VI. CUMULATIVE ERROR
¶ 14. Finally, Carson contends that all of the errors in her case, taken together, warrant relief. Under the cumulative-error doctrine, individual errors “may combine with other errors to make up reversible error, where the cumulative effect of all errors deprives the defendant of a fundamentally fair trial.” Ross v. State,
¶ 15. THE JUDGMENT OF THE MADISON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT DENYING THE MOTION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO MADISON COUNTY.
Notes
. Different variations of the spelling of this name are seen throughout the record.