5 Minn. 78 | Minn. | 1860
By the Qowt
This action was tried and decided before a referee to whom it bad been committed to bear and determine tbe whole issues therein. The first objection urged by the Appellants is that the referee bad no power under tbe State Constitution to exercise judicial powers, tbe language of that instrument being as follows : — “ Tbe judicial “ power of tbe State shall be vested in a Supreme Court, Dis- “ trict Courts, Courts of Probate, Justices of tbe Peace, and “ such other Courts inferior to the Supreme Court, as tbe Leg- “ islature may from time to time establish by a two-third “ vote.” Constitution, Article 6, Section 1. The language of the Constitution is, for the purpose of this question, identical with that employed in the organic act of the Territory which was our Constitution before we entered tbe Federal Union as a State. Section 9 of that act is as follows: “ The judicial power of said Territory shall be vested in a Supreme Court, District-Courts, Probate Courts, and in Justices of the Peace,” &c. Under the organic act, the statute concerning referees was passed in the year 1851, and has been tbe law of the Territory and the State ever since, without any question of its validity having been made. Oornyp. Stats. 566. Probably there is no act upon the statute book under which more interests have been affected, more rights passed, and property involved, than the statute authorizing the appointment of referees; under this pressure of'great.interests, this Court would hesitate long
A referee under our statute is! a person appointed by the Court to perform certain offices in the progress of a cause depending in the Court of his appointment, and it may be to try the whole issue. Comp. Stats. 563. The intention of the statute is clearly for the convenience of the parties, and the Court, in affording the former a tribunal of their own selection, desirable for purposes of expedition and economy, and in relieving the latter of a vast amount of business which its time and strength are illy competent to entertain and dispose of.
¥e will now see if the establishment of' this officer by the statute to aid the Courts in their labors, is a diversion of the judicial power of the State from its legitimate channels, and a location of it in unauthorized hands. In the first place there is no such officer as a referee permanently' attached to a Court. Again, there can be no referee created until there is a cause pending in one of the constitutional Courts, and after his appointment, even if it be to try the whole issue in the cause, it does not take the case out of the Court, but merely calls this officer into the Court to act in the cause in a certain maimer, at all times in strict subordination to the Court itself. During the trial of the issue before the referee the cause is as much a cause pending in the original Court as if it was on trial in term before a Jury; and every act done by the referee, is in contemplation of law, as much an act of the Court as if done by the Judge in open term time. The Court speaks and operates through the referee, its subordinate officer. The referee exerts no power jproprio vigore. Without the Court he could have no existence; without the Court he could not act after his creation; and without confirmation and adoption by the Court, his acts have no force or validity whatever. Nothing-can originate before a referee, and nothing can terminate with or by the decision of a referee. The Court acquires the juris
If tbe Legislature should attempt to establish independent tribunals and vest them with judicial powers, tbe constitutional formalities would have to be complied with to give them validity ; but in merely supplying tbe Courts already established with these necessary and ■ convenient agents or officers, we see no violation of tbe Constitution whatever.
Tbe respondents object to tbe sufficiency of tbe complaint because they allege that at tbe time tbe power of attorney was given to Huff, Smith did not own, and could not have owned any land in Fillmore county, tbe whole of such lands being in tbe United States. The power of attorney authorizes Huff to “ enter into and take possession of all such lands and tene- “ ments, hereditaments, and real estate whatever in tbe county “ of Fillmore and Territory of Minnesota, to, or in which I “ am, or may be in any way entitled or interested,” &c.
This Court will take notice that tbe treaty under which the lands at that time composing Fillmore county were acquired from tbe Indians, was ratified by tbe United States on tbe 24th day of February, 1853, and we cannot ignore tbe fact that tbe treaty was made long anterior to that date, and that many people bad entered upon tbe lands after tbe treaty, and extensive and valuable interests bad grown up thereon, and that tbe Legislature bad recognized and made provision for tbe protection of such interests; and that a large proportion of tbe titles of tbe State have grown out of the interests then acquired.
As early as 1851, tbe Territorial Legislature passed an act for tbe protection of settlers upon tbe public lands of tbe United States where settlement was not expressly prohibited by tbe general government or some department thereof, and allowed an action to be maintained for injuries to such a possession of lands, and to recover tbe same. Comp. Stats., 654. We are cited to the act of Congress of March 3, 1807, (U.S. S
This act has always been construed, so far as we have been able to ascertain, not only to permit rights to be acquired upon the unsurveyed lands after its passage, but also to recognize such as had previously accrued. It is clearly such an adoption of such acts by a change of policy, as will effectually prevent a party from defeating an obligation growing out of such rights, on the ground that it was against public policy and public law. The act of i.Congress of May 28, 1844, under which towns or municipal pre-emptions are settled and entered, goes hand in hand with the agricultural pre-emption laws, and the extention of the pre-emption laws to the unsur-veyed lands in Minnesota by the act of August 4th, 1854, carried with it the right to acquire rights upon such lands for municipal, manufacturing and other purposes recognized by the pre-emption laws. See pre-emption la/ws of 1841.
We have held that inchoate interests in town sites by parties occupying them, wei*e such interests as were included within the recording acts, and that conveyances of such interests duly recorded were notice to subsequent purchasers. Davis & Barnes vs. Murphy, 3 Minn. R., 119. On page 125, the Court says in speaking of such interests, “.This is certainly an interest in land, inchoate it is true, yet nevertheless
We have also held that settlements under the act of May 23d, 1844, may be otherwise than in person, and there need be no cultivation of the soil. Indeed I see no reason why the occupation of any land in’a town site may not be by a person residing withoututhe State, if he keeps a representative fairly on the land, by improvement, tenant, or agent. Leech vs. Rauch, 3 Minn. R., 448.
In view of the law then, as we understand it, Mr. Smith may have had very valuable interests in real estate in the county of Eillmore on the 3d day of October, 1853, the day on which he executed the power of attorney to Mr. Huff, notwithstanding the land was unsurveyed, and he resided in .the State of Illinois.
In passing to a consideration of the manner in which the power was executed by Mr. Huff, we will first examine the power conferred upon him. I cannot see how more forcible or appropriate words could have been selected to authorize him to sell and convey by deed of warranty any interest in real estate that Mr. Smith may have had within the prescribed limits. The words are, “ to grant, bargain and sell the same, “ or any part or parcel thereof, for such sum or price, and on “ such terms as to him shall seem meet, and for me and in my “ name to make, execute, acknowledge and deliver good and “ sufficient deeds and conveyances for the same, either with or “ without covenants, and warranty.”
Could he sell for anything but cash ? could he sell for anything but money ? could he^sell an undivided interest ? These questions meet us in the outset, as the attorney sold on time, and only part of the consideration was in money, and he sold an undivided interest.
I think it is clear that the words “ and on such terms as to him shall seem meet” following the words "immediately “ for such sum or price,” must refer to such previous words, and
Tbe authority to sell and convey on such terms as ttto tbe agent should seem meet carried with it a power to receive tbe purchase money, so that payment of tbe note to fIiuff was a good payment to bis principal. Story on Agency, Sec. 58. Peck vs. Harriot 6 Serg. & Rawle, 149.
Tbe consideration for which tbe interest was sold, was six hundred dollars, and tbe agreement that tbe purchaser should “ open and keep a lumber yard in the village of Winona, Minnesota a§ soon as practicable;” and tbe question is whether tbe attorney bad any right to include anything but money. “ The extent of tbe power is to be settled by tbe language employed in the whole instrument (4 Moore 448,) aided by tbe situation of tbe parties and of tbe property, the usages of tbe country on such subjects, the acts of tbe parties themselves, and any other circumstance having a legal bearing and throwing light on tbe question.” LeRoy vs. Beard, 8 How U.S. Sup. Ct. R. 466.
Tbe record discloses that tbe claim bad been "made for tbe purpose of a town site. The complaint says “ That some time thereafter, (after 1851) and before the execntion of tbe aforesaid bond, (contract in suit) tbe said Johnson and tbe said Or-rin Smith, laid out and platted said land into lots and blocks,, and duly filed and recorded tbe same,” &c. Tbe parties were-then engaged in tbe speculation of enlarging tbe town of Wi-nona, by making additions thereto, as it appears that after-wards this land was entered under tbe town act as part of the-town of Winona. Under these circumstances tbe power was-conferred upon Mr. Huff. Tbe prime object clearly was to-
This language is very broad, and if we confine it as we must to those matters “requisite and necessary” to carry out the main object of the power, which is the advantageous sale of the land, still we would have to ignore the promptings of our own senses, and our knowledge of the manner of transacting such business, if we should hold that the provision for establishing a lumber yard in the town was without the spirit and meaning of the power. There is nothing more common than the insertion, in conveyances of land, or interests in town enterprises, of a provision that the purchaser shall improve the land sold, or adjacent lands, to enhance the value of the remaining lands of the grantor, and render them more saleable. The stipulation for the establishment of a lumber yard in a young and growing town was one evidently designed to raise the value of the remaining lands of the seller; and the fact that it might and would at the same time increase the value of the lands owned by the agent Huff or any other citizen of that place, can in no' manner affect the question of its value to the grantor Smith, unless it is shown to operate so unjustly as to be a fraud upon the rights of Mr. Smith. ¥e think the consideration for which the interest was sold was fully justified by the power; its inadequacy is not raised.
The same remarks which have just been made concerning the aids a Court may use to throw light on the instrument it is called upon to interpret, are applicable to the question whether the power authorized the sale of an undivided inter
The complaint is good, and there must be a new trial.
Note. A motion for a re-argument of this case was denied at the July Term, 1861.