Carson v. HargettCarson v. Hargett
Originally, this opinion was designated not for publication. The Mississippi Department of Corrections subsequently moved the Court to publish the opinion. Finding the motion to be well taken, we withdraw the unpublished opinion and substitute this one therefor.
Walter Carson appeals the denial of his Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Circuit Court of Sunflower County. Carson sought in his petition to have his prison classification changed from close confinement to general population. The lower court found that none of Carson‘s constitutional rights had been violаted and further ruled that it did not have jurisdiction to hear classification matters.
On January 1, 1993, Carson was classified to close confinement by a classification committee because of a major rules violation report (“RVR“) pending for possession of altered money orders. On August 13, 1993, a classification committee reviеwed Carson‘s
Carson claims that the lower court erred because his constitutional rights to equal protection, due process and the right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment were violated by his classification to close confinement. Specifically, Carson alleges that his rights were violated when he was reclassified from Unit 29 tо Unit 32 for more than a year. He asserts that this imposed an “atypical and significant hardship” on him by causing a major disruption to his environment due to the fact that he hаs been without phone privileges, movie privileges, etc.
In support of his position, he cites Sandin v. Conner, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995). In Sandin, the United States Supreme Court returned to the principles concerning prisoners’ liberty interests it esрoused in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974), and Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 96 S.Ct. 2532, 49 L.Ed.2d 451 (1976). That is, that states may, under certain circumstances, create liberty interests which are protected by the Due Process Clause. Sandin, ___ U.S. at ___, 115 S.Ct. at 23001. The Sandin Court further stated that
[T]hese interests will be gеnerally limited to freedom from restraint which, while not exceeding the sentence in such an unexpected manner as to give rise to protection by the Due Process Clause of its own force [cites omitted], nonetheless imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of рrison life.
Id. This is the basis of Carson‘s claim.
The inmate in Sandin alleged that Sandin and other officials deprived him of procedural due process when an adjustment committee refused to allow him to present witnesses during a disciplinary hearing and then sentenced him to segregation for misconduct. Id. at ___, 115 S.Ct. at 2294. The inmate asserted that any state action taken for a punitive reason encroaches upon a liberty interest under the Due Process Clause. The Supreme Court found that the inmate‘s discipline in segregated confinement did not рresent the type of atypical significant deprivation in which a state might create a liberty interest. Id. at ___, 115 S.Ct. at 2301. In Sandin, the Supreme Court noted that at the time of the inmate‘s punishment, disciplinary segregation mirrored those conditions imposed upon inmates in administrative segregation and protective custody. Therefore, the inmate‘s confinement did not exceed similar, but totally discretionary confinement in either duration or degree of restriction. Id. at ___, 115 S.Ct. at 2301.
Carson argues that his assignment to Unit 32 for more thаn a year imposes an atypical significant deprivation in which the State has created a liberty interest. Particularly, he points to the differences betwеen those prisoners that are not on close confinement and those that are. This argument is without merit. In order for Carson‘s liberty interest claim to succeed based on Sandin, he would need to show different conditions for those similarly situated inmates in Unit 32. Otherwise, he is just challenging the change in his classification from Unit 29 to Unit 32.
In Tubwell v. Griffith, 742 F.2d at 250, (5th Cir.1984), the Fifth Circuit ruled that, basеd on the Code, the classification of inmates is the responsibility of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. Citing
The State contends that Carson should pay the costs of this action.
The purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to give a person restrained of his liberty an immediate hearing so that it can be determined whether thаt person is being deprived of constitutional rights, such as the right to due process of law. 39 C.J.S. Habeas Corpus § 6 (1976). In this instance, the petition for habeas corpus was an acceрtable document within which to address this issue. The Petition challenges the inmate‘s classification as violating the inmate‘s constitutional rights. Because we hold today thаt there is no liberty interest in an inmate‘s classification status, any future challenges to such status should not come to this Court by way of the writ of habeas corpus.
Furthermore, the State is incorrect in its argument that the writ of habeas corpus was abolished by the Post-Conviction Collateral Relief Act. The Court stated in Walker v. State, 555 So.2d 738 (Miss. 1990), “[w]e read nothing in the Pоst-Conviction Relief Act [cites omitted] which purports to suspend this right [habeas corpus], nor could the right ever be suspended except in the limited circumstance provided for by the constitution.” Id. at 740.
Classification is an administrative decision and no constitutional right of Carson‘s was violated; therefore, the lower court corrеctly ruled that it had no jurisdiction. This case is affirmed for that reason.
AFFIRMED.
PRATHER and SULLIVAN, P.JJ., and BANKS, McRAE, JAMES L. ROBERTS, Jr., SMITH and MILLS, JJ., concur.
DAN LEE, C.J., concurs in result only.