270 Mo. 238 | Mo. | 1917
. Assuming, as we must, under the terms of this statute, that the title of Ripley County was transferred prior to the change of boundary between that county and Butler County, whereby the land was taken into and became' a part of the domain of Butler County, it is evident that no title to the land ever vested in Butler County, and hence defendants could not have acquired any title based on a conveyance from it.
III. This leaves for decision only the question as to the nature of the title acquired by plaintiff and whether or not it has been lost by laches or barred by the thirty-year Statute of Limitations.
The basis of the rule estopping one by his own laches or that of persons with whom he stands in privity, is laid in the equitable maxim that “he who seeks equity must do equity,” and hence if the owner of a superior title, with full knowledge of his own rights, neglects to assert or establish them against an adverse claimant in possession of the land, for such a length of time as to afford a presumption that they have been abandoned or would prevent the other party from proving the claim or title, or would inflict an inequitable injury upon him, then the owner of such paramount title loses the aid of equity when he subsequently seeks to recover the land. This doctrine 'rests purely on equitable principles and may be invoked independently of the lapse of time fixed by the Statutes of Limitation. [Toler v. Edwards, 249 Mo. l. c. 167, and cases cited..] Although the present holder of the title to the property in dispute acquired the same by quit-claim deed from a non-resident whom he succeeded in finding after letters of inquiry, immediately before the institution of the suit, yet we .do not discover in the facts shown in the record, that the delay of the previous holders of the title, in the assertion of their rights, has altered the position of the defendants or those from whom their title is deraign.ed. The land seems to have been prac
Unless this payment of taxes was made on the land in dispute on behalf of the then owners of the record title, the bar of the statute for thirty years was sufficiently established by the testimony of witness Greason, Deputy County Clerk, and McClain, which disclosed that from 1882 to 1900, inclusive, the entire taxes on the land in dispute were paid by the railroad, which during that period was the holder of the title, based on the patent from Butler County, except that no taxes were paid during the years 1888 and 1889 on the south half of the land.. As to the latter date there was testimony tending to show that the railroad" company paid the entire taxes, although for that year the land was assessed erroneously to John Mangold. How the north half was paid for the year 1888 rests in inference. But there was no evidence from any source that plaintiff, or those under whom he claims, made any payments for either of those years, and unless the entry contained on the second leaf of the Tax Assessor’s hook above referred to, afford a basis for a reasonable inference of such payment on behalf of plaintiff’s grantors, then there is not a fact or circumstance in the record upon which such a finding could he predicated. The testimony as to payments by the railroad was given by the person employed in its land department, and was based on his own knowledge and own hand. riting and recorded on a separate tax book which was copied from the
After the railroad parted with its title, from 1901 to 1913, defendants introduced the tax receipts. It is, therefore, clear to. a demonstration that the "bar of the statute of thirty years accrued unless it is' shown by reasonable presumption from the interpolations and alterations on the second leaf of the Assessor^ book that the payment there noted was made in behalf of plaintiff’s grantors or by them. [Campbell v. Greer, 209 Mo. 199.]
The rule is well settled in this State that where documentary evidence is produced, showing on its face circumstances of suspicion, such as writings over erasures or the use of different inks, or interpolations, that they should not be received in evidence without explanation on the part of persons producing them.
In speaking of the alteration of a special tax bill by the erasure of descriptive words and the insertion of others, .it was said: “And this fact was sufficient to excite suspicion and justify the court in • requiring evidence that the alteration was bona-fide and proper before admitting the tax bill itself in evidence.” [Bank v. Manning, 133 Mo. App. l. c. 298; Paramore v. Lindsey, 63 Mo. 63; Stilwell v. Patton, 108 Mo. l. c. 360.] There can be no question from a consideration of the photograph contained in the abstract that the second leaf of the Assessor’s book bore on .its face evidence casting suspiciop. upon the altered and added entries. While it is true that public records are subject to less “suspicion” in case of alterations than private papers (2 Cyc. 242) yet this rule does not “obtain if the interlineation or alteration is itself suspicious.” [Cox v. Mignery & Co., 126 Mo. App. l. c. 682, 683 and cases cited; 2 Cyc. 242,. par. h.] The evidence is undisputed that this land was never at any time assessed for taxation against any holder of the title under whom plaintiff claims, and that in the instance relied on to show such payment, the actual assessment was of 127 acres against “Timberman, G. H,” This
“Mr. Hill. I next read in evidence page 21 of the book for the year 1882 of Butler County, Missouri, identified by the witness J. D. Greason, and particularly the following line, beginning at figure No. 716, ‘To whom assessed.”
“Mr. Curlee: We object to that for reasons— similar reasons given to the foregoing objection. Specifically this line, or lines about to be read from the entry, in the regular course of business, appears to be lot 2 of the southwest quarter and the south half of lot 2, northwest quarter. There has been erased the words: ‘Lot 2’ and substituted in a different handwriting, in a different colored ink, by interlineation in lieu of lot 2, the figures ‘E 1-2.’
“Mr. Hill: The land in suit, and the same writing: ‘Paid by J. M Hodgen.’
“The Court: Objection overruled.
“To which ruling of the court the defendant, by counsel, objected and excepted at the time.”
A careful consideration of the salient facts of this case exclude any reasonable inference or presumption of law of the payment of taxes by any other claimants to the land than the railroad and its successors in title. The plaintiff acquired his- quit claim deed a few days before his suit was instituted. He had no knowledge of the non-resident grantor, other than the discovery of his name in the examination of abstracts. He at once wrote for information to Illinois and finally got in communication with the seeming title holder in Arkansas, from Avhom he obtained the quitclaim. He
After a careful study of this record, we think the conclusion is clear that the title holders under whom plaintiff claims, completely abandoned the land; that they never paid any taxes thereon and that the immediate grantor of plaintiff was oblivious of any interest therein until he was ascertained by the inquiries which plaintiff set on foot, as he says, for “speculative purposes” after he had observed his name in an abstract and gotten into communication with him in Arkansas.
The result is that the judgment is reversed.