Lead Opinion
OPINION
By the Court,
In 1992, Stanton Park Development, Inc. (“Stanton Park”) developed the Mountain Park subdivision in Carson City. As a condition of approval of the subdivision, the Board of Supervisors of apрellant Carson City (“Carson City”) required construction of a storm drainage detention facility. Rather than build and maintain such a facility itself, Stanton Park dedicated the “easterly sixty feet of [subdivision] lots 96 and 127” (the “detention pond”) to the city of Carson City to satisfy the condition. Carson City accepted and recorded the dedication in December 1993.
In June 1994, aрpellant Citizens for Affordable Homes, Inc. (“CAHI”) proposed to Carson City that the detention pond property be conveyed to CAHI for use in its affordable housing program. In exchange, CAHI agreed to reengineer and reconstruct certain drainage structures within the subdivision. A draft agreement for the project was formulated and a public heаring scheduled. On August 5, 1994, written notices of the date, time, and subject of the hearing were mailed to all lot owners whose property lay within three hundred feet of the detention pоnd. A few days later, Cheryl Blomstrom (“Blomstrom”), CAHI’s executive director, apparently sent out a separate, more detailed notice
At the August 18, 1994 public hearing, the Carson City Board of Supervisors heard from city officials, CAHI representatives, and proponents and opponents of the proposal. The board voted unanimously to approve the project. It appears that respondents Gregory and Cheryl Price (“the Prices”) and respondents Mike and Julie Waters (“the Waters”) (collectively “respondents”), all of whom owned property abutting the detention pond, did not attend the meeting. Hоwever, in early September 1994, the Prices informed Blomstrom and Carson City Mayor Marv Teixeira of their opposition to the project.
On November 21, 1994, after CAHI had satisfied all material portions of the agreement for reengineering and reconstruction of the subdivision storm drainage system, Mayor Teixeira executed a quitclaim deed conveying title of the detention pond property to CAHI. On November 30, 1994, CAHI recorded the deed. On February 17, 1995, the Carson City Public Works Department issued building permits for construction of single family homеs on the detention pond property. Millard Construction, the same builder that had erected the other Mountain Park subdivision homes, began construction shortly thereafter. Millard employed the same building plans and specifications as were utilized to build the other subdivision homes.
On April 11, 1995, respondents filed a complaint against CAHI and Carson City (collectively “appellants”) claiming inverse condemnation, breach of the subdivision’s CC&Rs, breach of respondents’ contractual rights as third-party beneficiaries of the Carson City-Stantоn Park contract, estoppel by appellants’ failure to observe the dedicated-use drainage easement of the detention pond property, and рroperty damage. Respondents sought injunctive relief and monetary damages.
On May 2, 1995, the district court granted respondents’ application for a temporary restrаining order prohibiting any further construction of the CAHI homes pending a full hearing on the matter. By that time, the two CAHI homes were approximately 75% complete.
On May 26, 1995, the district cоurt issued an order granting a preliminary injunction restraining CAHI from continuing construction. The district court found, inter alia, that the conveyance of the property from Carson City to CAHI, as well as construction of the CAHI homes on the site, violated the subdivision’s CC&Rs and provisions of NRS Chapter 278.
Appellants contend that the equitable doctrine of laches precludes issuance of the preliminary injunсtion because respondents waited more than eight months after receiving notice of the project before filing their complaint. Respondents contend that аppellants’ actual notice of respondents’ opposition to the project as of September 1994, well before the filing of the complaint, precludеs application of the doctrine of laches.
“Laches is an equitable doctrine which may be invoked when delay by one party works to the disadvantage of the other, causing a change of circumstances which would make the grant of relief to the delaying party inequitable.” Building & Constr. Trades v. Public Works,
The record shows that the Carson City Board of Supervisors held a public hearing about the proposed CAHI project in August 1994. Prior to the hearing, Carson City and CAHI mailed notices concerning the subject and date of the hearing to residences neighboring
Despite respondents’ early opposition to the project, we conclude that their claim for injunctive relief is barred under the doctrine of laches. Respondents did not threaten tо institute legal proceedings against Carson City and CAHI until more than six months after the public hearing, and did not actually file their complaint for two more months. Thus, unlike the property owners in Dickstein v. Williams,
However, respondents are not foreclosed from pursuing their claims for monetary damages.
We reverse the order of the district court and remand this case for further proceedings.
In their answering brief, respondents contend that this appeal should be dismissed because appеllants filed their opening brief one day late. See N.R.A.P. 31(c). We deny respondents’ “motion” and elect to hear this appeal because respondents have not alleged or shown that they suffered any prejudice as a result of this delay.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting:
The district court saw a need to preserve the status quo during the pendency of this litigation. The trial judge made dеtailed findings of fact before issuing the preliminary injunction, all of which appear to support the trial judge’s conclusion that “this is a proper instance for the issuancе of a Preliminary Injunction, in that irreparable loss or damage will result to the Plaintiffs unless Defendants are prohibited from continuing with the construction of the two residences in questiоn.” I see no cause for this court’s interfering with the district court’s judgment in this regard.
The majority appears to base its dissolution of the preliminary injunction on its own factual determination that respondents “caused a material disadvantage to CAHI.” I do not believe that this court is presently in a position, while the litigation is still pending before the trial court, to make an appellate judgment on the degree to which CAHI might have been disadvantaged. The question of whether CAHI has suffered such a “material disadvantage” as to warrant denial of preliminary injunctive relief is a factual question that is fairly answerable only at the conclusion of the evidence in the district court case. I would leave the district court alone and permit this matter to go its course at the trial level before we stick our appellate noses into the case. I dissent.