115 N.Y.S. 660 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1909
On the 7th day of October, 1907, the plaintiff and the defendant Adams entered into a contract of purchase and sale of certain real property, containing the following provision: “ Said premises are to be conveyed subject to a covenant as to the pollution of Awixa Creek, set forth in Liber 383 of Conveyances, page 36, and as to the condition iii Liber P. of Conveyances, page 198, the vendee agrees
There can be no doubt that the alleged release tendered by the plaintiff was not the release which the parties contemplated the plaintiff would perfect, obtain and record. Therefore,, the refusal of the Title Guarantee and Trust Company to approve it as such a release was not unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, if that be of importance. Obviously, the parties contemplated a release by some one who might have the right to claim a forfeiture for the breach of the alleged condition, if it be a condition, or damages for breach of the covenant, if it be a covenant. The instrument executed by the . plaintiff was a nullity.
The able discussion of counsel respecting the question of whether the said provision was a condition or a covenant seems to us entirely aside from the question involved on this appeal; nor do we think it material to inquire whether that provision renders the title unmarketable. The parties have expressly stipulated what its effect shall be, namely, that unless the plaintiff could within eighteen months procure a release of it the $2,500 deposited with the Title Guarantee and Trust Company should be returned to the vendee “in full release for all penalties or claims of any kind against the vendor because of such conditions.” In effect, the plaintiff sold the property for $68,000 if she could procure the release provided for, and for $65,500 if she could not. Though the title may have been marketable, the vendee was not obliged to contract for it, and the court cannot substitute a different contract in place of the one actually made because it may think that the plaintiff was unwise in making it. If the contract had been silent respecting the alleged condition or covenant, the law would determine whether the title was marketable; but the court cannot decide that to be immaterial which the parties agreed was a defect to be cured by a release or to be allowed for in fixing the purchase price. The principle of Flanagan v. Fox (6 Misc. Rep. 132; affd. on opinion below,144 N. Y. 706) is applicable and controls the decision of this case.
The judgment is affirmed.
Hirschberg, P. J., Woodward, Jenks and Rich, JJ., concurred.
Judgment unanimously affirmed, with costs.