Carroll v. PittsburghCarroll v. Pittsburgh
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Stern
Opinion by
Mr. Justice Horace Stern,The jury in this trespass action having found a verdict for defendants, we are of opinion that the court below was not justified in granting, as it did, plaintiffs’ motion for a new trial on the ground that the verdict was contrary to the evidence and that in the interest of justice a new trial should be had.
On the night of April 9, 1946 the wife-plaintiff, Marie P. Carroll, was a passenger on a trolley car on Federal Street operated by defendant Pittsburgh Railways Company. Federal Street is a main, much travelled, well lighted highway in the City of Pittsburgh. At Montgomery Avenue there was a regular carstop 10 feet back of the intersection and another one 45 feet to the rear, so that the cars customarily stopped within that 55 feet distance, as did the car in the present instance on which Mrs. Carroll was a passenger. She testified that she alighted from one of the front doors and in so doing her right foot became caught in a hole in the asphalt of the cartway, — a hole which she described as being larger than a dinner plate, irregular in shape, and of a depth of about three inches; she said she had so much difficulty in extricating her foot that she required the assistance for that purpose of the street car operator and her daughter who was a passenger with her on the car and alighted immediately behind her. She was not certain, in her testimony, whether her foot went directly into the hole as she stepped from the car or whether she had first taken another step. She claimed that she suffered injuries as the result of the accident and she and her husband brought suit against both the Pittsburgh Railways
We consider first the liability of the Pittsburgh Railways Company. It appears that there were Belgian blocks bordering the outside of the rails of the Federal Street tracks; from there to the sidewalks the street was paved with asphalt. In their complaint plaintiffs alleged that the Railways Company was negligent in failing to maintain the street at the point of the accident in a reasonably safe condition and in permitting the hole to be and remain within its right of way. But, concededly, the Railways Company was obliged to keep only the portion of the highway in repair that was
Plaintiffs’ other charge of negligence on the part of the Railways Company was based on their allegation that the motorman stopped the car and allowed Mrs. Carroll to alight at a point where he knew ór should have known of the existence of the hole. It is true that there are authorities to the effect that where a passenger is mistakenly led to alight at an extremely dangerous place which is not the usual stopping place the carrier may be held liable for any injuries which the passenger thereby sustains.
1
But in the present instance the car stopped at a regular stopping place at the intersection of two city streets, one of which was a principal high
In Scherer v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co., 295 Pa. 199, 145 A, 76, a passenger was held not entitled to recover from the trolley company where she was led to ■ alight at a point where there was an excavation in the course of repair of the track and the earth beneath the paving gave way as she stepped upon it.
In Martin v. Steen, 109 Pa. Superior Ct. 263, 167 A. 609, plaintiff fell into a hole or ditch in the street as she was about to board a car at the rear door as directed by the motorman. It was held that she could not recover because the street railway company was not responsible for the existence of the ditch and was not required to observe the condition of streets over which its cars travelled so as to stop them with exactness at places where passengers might avoid ordinary defects in the highway while boarding or alighting. ■ - -
In
Thompson v. Philadelphia,
129 Pa. Superior Ct. 174, 195 A. 174, plaintiff, alighting from a trolley car,
In Murtha v. Philadelphia, 130 Pa. Superior Ct. 411, 197 A. 513, it was once more held that where a passenger, alighting from a trolley car, stepped into a hole about fifteen by twenty-four inches and about six inches deep, the car having stopped short of the usual stopping place because there was another car ahead of it discharging passengers, she could not recover from the trolley company. It was pointed out that it is only where the company stops its car at a place manifestly dangerous, as on the side of a street immediately adjacent to an embankment or excavation, that it can be held liable for injuries to a passenger in alighting, and that the liability of the company does not extend to a situation where a hole in the paving is an ordinary defect in the highway.
In
MacDonald v. Philadelphia Rural Transit Co.,
147 Pa. Superior Ct. 220, 24 A.2d 37, plaintiff, alighting from a bus, stepped into a hole or depression about three feet long, one foot wide, and about three or four inches deep. It was held that the hole was not such as to make the bus company liable, since it was in a highway over which the company had no control and was no more than a defect arising from lack of surface repair, nor did the company have any duty or authority to repair it. The court said (pp. 224, 225, A. p. 39) : “The duty of stopping at a safe place to permit passengers to alight does not embrace the obligation to avoid every defect in a public highway. ... It is a matter of common knowledge that trolleys and buses traverse
It will be noted that in several of the cases thus cited the hole or depression which caused the accident was considerably larger than that which allegedly existed in the present case. The principle underlying all of them is that it would be unjust and impracticable to hold street railway companies liable to passengers alighting from their cars on busy city streets, where, especially in the case of asphalt pavings, there are frequently holes, depressions and worn out places of. various dimensions which may remain for considerable periods of time until repairs are made by the public officials who alone are responsible for the maintenance of the highway in good order and repair. Witnesses produced in the present case by plaintiffs testified to the presence of many holes in the asphalt paving at Federal Street and Montgomery Avenue, and holes no doubt existed at many other intersections, so that if plaintiff’s theory of the obligation of the Railways Company were correct it would have been practically impossible for it to stop its cars at the various streets along the route which it traversed.
In view of the law as thus laid down in the authorities cited it was clearly the duty of the trial judge to direct a verdict for the Pittsburgh Railways Company, and therefore it was an abuse of discretion, a verdict
We come then to the question of the granting of a new trial as to the defendant City of Pittsburgh. As previously stated it was only Mrs. Carroll herself and her daughter who testified that she fell into a hole of considerable size and of a depth sufficient to prevent her extricating herself without considerable difficulty. On the other hand, the testimony of the motorman and of a disinterested passenger was to the effect that at the point where Mrs. Carroll fell there was merely a slight crack in the asphalt paving of almost negligible width and depth. As the trial judge therefore properly told the jury: “the whole point in the case is the credibility of the witnesses”, and “the credibility of the witnesses is for you”. In granting a new trial the court did not express any opinion of its own as to the relative credibility of the witnesses or any belief that the jury had misjudged them or any of them. A new trial should not be granted because of a mere conflict in testimony or because the trial judge on the same facts would have arrived at a different conclusion:
Wilson v. Kallenbach,
332 Pa. 253, 255, 256, 2 A.2d 727, 728. Neither should it ordinarily be granted on the ground that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence where the evi
The order granting plaintiffs’ motion for a new trial is reversed, and it is directed that judgment be entered on the verdict for defendants.
Notes
O’Malley v. Laurel Line Bus Co., 311 Pa. 251, 166 A. 868 ; Brown v. Beaver Valley Motor Coach Co., 365 Pa. 578, 76 A. 2d 403; McCollum v. Pittsburgh Railways Co. (No. 1), 51 Pa. Superior Ct. 637; Gourlay v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co., 100 Pa. Superior Ct. 419; Gerlach v. City of Philadelphia, 103 Pa. Superior Ct. 401, 157 A. 212.
From the dissenting opinion of Justice Mestkezat in Sligo v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co., 224 Pa. 135, 141, 73 A. 211, 213.
Landis v. Conestoga Transportation Co., 349 Pa. 97, 101, 36 A. 2d 465, 467.