7 Ga. App. 584 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1910
Miss Carroll, a young lady of seventeen, while employed in the printing establishment of the defendant company, suffered a severe injury to her right foot; and, to recover damages therefor, this suit was brought. At the conclusion of the testimony offered in her behalf, a nonsuit was awarded, and to this judgment she brings error.
It appears that she had been working in the defendant’s establishment for some time; but that she had been working only a few
One of the allegations of negligence is based on the fact that the press had no guard or boxing around or about the cogs and teeth. There was much evidence pro and con as to whether it was usual to have guards at such places — enough evidence, if the case had turned on this issue, to require its submission to the jury, But
The other allegation is based on the unsafety of the box furnished her by the defendant company as a seat. As the plaintiff produced no direct evidence of any defect in the construction of the box, or of any failure of the defendant to inspect it for indicia of danger, and as she relies solely upon the fact of its giving way, to prove the employer’s negligence in this respect, she must and does rest her case, as to this feature, upon what her able counsel calls the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, but which we prefer to call circumstantial evidence. As she was the plaintiff, and as she was unaided in her proof by any statutory presumption, she had the burden of proving the negligence of the master; and as proof by circumstantial evidence works according to the process of exclusion, she had the burden of excluding as being unreasonable, or as being not so reasonable as the theory of the defendant’s negligence, the theories of accident and of the 'event’s having occurred through the operation of causes as to which she had assumed the risk. Cf. Ga. Ry. & El. Co. v. Harris, 1 Ga. App. 714 (57 S. E. 1076). It is impossible to say that the mere fact that the box gave way, under the circumstances shown, establishes these essential elements of the plaintiff’s case. See Palmer Bride Co. v. Chenall, 119 Ga. 837 (47 S.E. 329).
Indeed, it appears to be a ease where the plaintiff, without fault, without negligence, without having done anything which any ordinarily prudent person would not have done, without voluntarily exposing herself to any reckless hazard, has been hurt while carrying on her employer’s business; and yet it does not appear that the employer has done her any wrong, in a legal sense, or that it has incurred any liability to her, so far as our law recognizes. This young working woman, engaged honestly in earning a livelihood, faultless as she was in the transaction that caused her hurt, must, under our law, go forth without right or remedy as to pension or compensation, and join the ever-swelling army of industrial cripples. Isn’t it time to change the law P Doesn’t public expediency