Carroll v. Alabama G. S. R.

| U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Northern Alabama | Nov 11, 1893

TOULMHsr, District Judge

(after stating the facts as above). The statute of limitations is no bar to this suit if the plaintiff brings himself within the exception of section 2623 of the Alabama Code; referred to; but, if his case does not come within the operation of that section, it is conceded, as I understand it, that he cannot maintain this action; that-the statute of limitations of one year is a bar. to it. ■ ■ To determine this question, which is the one raised by the pleadings now presented to the court, we must consider what the object of the legislature was in enacting the statute referred to, —what cases it was intended to apply to. In Roland v. Logan, 18 Ala. 307" court="Ala." date_filed="1850-06-15" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/roland-v-logan-6504353?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="6504353">18 Ala. 307, the supreme court says:

• “If a judgment be -rendered against a plaintiff for a defect of form, not touching the merits, he would be without remedy if the statute perfected the bar during the pendency of the first suit. To remedy this defect, the act referred to was passed. It contemplated the bringing of another suit within a year after a judgment in a suit at law for the same cause of action had been rendered against the plaintiff, but not upon its merits.”

It may be that this declaration of the court was unnecessary in the case then before it; that there was nothing in the case then under consideration that called for this expression of opinion by the court. However this may be, it was an expression of opinion bearing .on a statute similar to the one now being considered, and it is entitled to great respect. In the case of Napier v. Foster, 80 Ala. 379" court="Ala." date_filed="1885-12-15" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/napier-v-foster-6512545?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="6512545">80 Ala. 379, Stone, C. J., speaking of this statute (section 2623 of the Code), says, in the opinion of the court, that:

“It is oniy in cases where some error, mistake, or oversight is fatal to the right to maintain the action in the form in which it is first brought that it can ever become necessary to invoke the provisions of the statute; that the statute was intended to relieve parties of the consequences of some error, mistake, or oversight in bringing or prosecuting the first suit.”

It seems to me, then, that the test by which we are to determine the issue now before the court on the pleadings is whether the judgment of reversal was fatal to the plaintiff’s right to maintain the action in the form in which it was first brought, or, in short, whether the judgment of reversal rendered necessary the dismissal of the first .suit, — the suit in the city court of Birmingham. Now, was the dismissal of that, suit rendered necessary by the reversal of the supreme court? It does not appear that it was. It does not appear that the effect; of the reversal was to prevent the plaintiff from recovering In that suit. The supreme court held that the plaintiff could not recover in the case made on the record then before it, and that the lower court erred in not so instructing the jury. But it did not follow that on another trial the plaintiff might not be able to make a stronger or better case in the same action. The reversal of the case by the supreme court did not have the effect of defeating the plaintiff’s right to continue the suit, and recover in it. The reversal did not render necessary the dismissal of that suit. It was a voluntary dismissal. While the case at bar may come within the letter of the statute, is it not manifestly opposed to the spirit of it? The supreme court of Alabama, in the case of Napier v. Foster, supra, say:

“There aro cases which require us to disregard the letter of a statute when they are manifestly opposed to its spirit. It should be a clear case, however, to justify the application of this rule. There must be a moral conviction, based on the unreasonableness of the application sought to be made, that the legislature could not have intended such result.”

It seems to me that the application of the statute here sought to be made would be very unreasonable. It would be unreasonable to hold that the legislature intended to except from the operation of the statute of limitations a person who voluntarily dismisses his suit because of some adverse ruling of the supreme court in it, which did not render the dismissal necessary, but which had the effect only of declaring that on the facts of the case, as1 shown by the record before it, the plaintiff was not entitled to recover, and that the case should be remanded for another trial, wherein the plaintiff could have an opportunity of making a better case, if within his power to do so. As suggested by the supreme court in the case just referred to:

“Tbe statute was Intended to relieve parties of the consequences of some error, mistake, or oversight in bringing or prosecuting the first suit. If no oversight or mistake had been committed in the first suit, it would seem there could be no occasion for the statute. It is only in cases where the error, mistake, or oversight is fatal to the right to maintain the action in the form in which it is first brought that it can ever become necessary to invoke the provisions of the statute.”

Is the plaintiff suffering the consequences of any error, mistake, or oversight in bringing or prosecuting the suit in the city court of Birmingham? Is it a case where there was error, mistake, or oversight on his part that was fatal to his right to maintain the action in the form in which it was first brought? If not, there could be no occasion for the statute, and it could not become necessary to invoke its provisions. The dismissal of the former suit was not rendered necessary by the judgment of reversal, and my opinion is that the statute invoked has no application. The conclusion, therefore, is that the rejoinder is a sufficient answer to the replication, and that the demurrer thereto should be overruled. It is so ordered.