43 Ark. 99 | Ark. | 1884
After the case of Carr et al v, State, reported in 42 Ark., 204, had been remanded to the Circuit Court, Carr elected to sever, was put upon trial, convicted of murder in the first degree and a second time sentenced to be hanged. The evidence amply justified the verdict, and the court successfully ran the gauntlet of passing upon twenty-six prayers for directions prepared by the energetic counsel for the prisoner.
It was not competent for the State to impeach the characterofthese witnesses, or "discredit them before the jury, or impair the weight of their testimony in this manner. Anderson v. State, 34 Ark., 257.
When, before final submission of the cause, irrelevant evidence, which had been admitted, was withdraw from the jury and they instructed to disregard it, the presumption is that the jury based their verdict upon legal evidence only. Pennsylvania Co. v. Ray, 102 U. S., 451.
The defendant also offered to prove by a witness that he and some twenty or thirty other colored men assembled, on the night before Wyatt was killed, at a church in Hemp-stead County, near the house of Wyatt, who resided in Howard, for the purpose of concerting means to secure his arrest; that they had reasonable grounds to believe that he had just before committed two distinct felonies in Hempstead, namely, an assault with intent to kill, and an attempt to ravish. That they were acting under legal advice, or supposed they were; that the meeting on the following morning was to carry into execution the plan and design then formed and ■entered into, the sole object being to arrest Wyatt and take him before a magistrate to be dealt with according to law and not to kill him or in any wise to do him a bodily injury. But the court rejected the evidence. ' {
The fact that Wyatt came to his death by violence at the hands of a mob, of which Carr was the ringleader, not being seriously controverted, it became necessary to determine whether malice entered as an ingredient into such killing; and if so, then whether it was accompanied by those evidences of deliberation and premeditation which characterize the highest degree of murder. Now circumstances and declarations which were contemporaneous with the main fact under consideration or so nearly related to it as to illustrate its character and the state of mind, sentiments or dispositions of the actors are parts of the res gestae.
They are regarded as verbal facts, indicating a present purpose and intention, and are therefore admitted in proof like any other material facts. 1 Gr. Ev. Secs. 108-111; Wharton’s Cr. Ev. Secs. 262-270; 1 Bishop Cr. Pro., Secs. 1083-1087; Clinton v. Estes, 20 Ark., 216; Beaver v. Taylor, 1 Wall, 637; Ins. Co. v. Mosley, 8 Id., 637.
Thus on the trial of Lord George Gordon for treason, the cry of the mob who accompanied the prisoner on his enterprise, was received in evidence, as forming part of the res gestae and showing the character of the principle fact. 24 Howell’s Sb. Tr., 542.
In Pitman v. State, 22 Ark., 254, uncommuuicated threats, made by the deceased on the day of the killing, werejadmitted,
Nor need any such declarations be strictly coincident as to time, if they are generated by an excited feeling which extends without break or let down from the moment of the event they illustrate. But they must stand in immediate causal relation to the act, and become part either of the action immediately preceding it, or of action which it immediately precedes. Wharton’s Cr. Ev., Sec. 263; 2 Bishop Cr. Pro. Sec. 625.
Thus in Cornelius v. State, 12 Ark., 782, when defendant was tried for larceny of his neighbor’s cow and it was proved he had killed the cow in his pen about three a. m. declarations made the night before in presence of his family and visitors, of his intention to kill the cow before day and sell her for beef and that he had authoriiy from the owner so to do, if he would pay for her, and directions given to his slaves in reference to the matter, were adjudged to be competent evidence to show his intentions in killing the cow.
This statute is in affirmance of the common law. “ If a person, having actually committed a felony, will not suffer himself to be arrested, but stand on his orvn defense, or fly, so that he can not possibly be apprehended alive by those who pursue him, whether private persons, or public officers, with or without a warrant, from a magistrate, he may be lawfully slain by them.” 1 Hawkins, P. C. p. 81, Sec. 11.
If a felony be committed and the felon fly from justice, or a dangerous wound be given, it is the duty of every man to use his best endeavors for preventing an escape; and if in the pursuit the felon be killed, when he can not be otherwise overtaken, the homicide is justifiable. This rule is not confined to those who are present, so as to have'ocular proof of the fact, or to those who first come to the knowledge of it: for if in these cases first pursuit be made and a fortiori if hue and cry be levied, all who join in aid of those who began the pursuit are under the same protection of the law.” 1 East P. C., 298.
Here the rule is stated with its limitations, namely: that if the offence has been in fact committed and an individual has reasonable cause to suspect, a particular person, he may, acting in good faith, arrest him, without incurring any liability, civil or criminal, should the suspicion prove unfounded. And when the felony is past the only distinction between the power of an officer and a private person arresting without a warrant is this : “ Should the one arrested be found not to be guilty, the private person will not be justified unless an offense has been committed by some one; while the officer is justified though no offence has been committed ; yet both must have had reasonable cause to suspect the one apprehended. Eor when a charge of this high nature is made to an officer, he is bound to act upon it and pursue and airest the suspected person at once; and it would block the wheels of justice if he could not do his official duty without being answerable, should the event prove that the reasonable suspicion could not be made good by evidence. 1 Bishop Cr. Pro. Secs. 168, 181.
There was no proof in this case that Wyatt had committed any felony.
The law upon this subject is, that “ a man may be guilty of a wrong which he did not specifically intend, if it came naturally or even accidentally from some other specific, or a general, evil purpose. When, therefore, persons combine to do an unlawful thing, if the act of one, proceeding according to the common plan, terminate in a criminal result, though not the particular result meant, all are liable.” Bishop Cr. Law, Sec. 636, and authorities there cited.
Thus in Stephens v. State, a recent unreported decision of the Supreme Court of Ohio, where several agreed to rob a man at his house and one remained outside on guard, while the others went inside and in order to rob him, killed him, it was held that the one outside was guilty of murder also, although murder was not contemplated in their conspiracy, but it was the only means of accomplishing their ends.
Eeversed and remanded for a new trial;