Carr v. SparksCarr v. Sparks
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Almand
The judgment under review is one sustaining a motion to dismiss a petition for the writ of mandamus.
Eleanor Carr brought her petition for mandamus against George Sparks and others in their capacity as Trustees of the Teachers’ Retirement System of Georgia, such persons being vested under the act .of 1943 (Ga. L. 1943, p. 640) with the management of the Teachers Retirement System. The amended petition alleged that the plaintiff was the daughter of Mrs. Eleanor O’Connor Carr, who, as a teacher in the public schools of Bibb County, became a member of the Teachers Retirement System on April 13, 1953. At the time she became a member of this system, Mrs. Carr designated the plaintiff as her primary
On the hearing, the defendants filed a plea to the jurisdiction and a motion to dismiss. The court overruled the plea to the jurisdiction, but sustained the motion to dismiss. The plaintiff filed her bill of exceptions assigning error on the order dismissing her petition, and the defendants filed their cross-bill of exceptions assigning error on the overruling by the court of their plea to the jurisdiction.
The plaintiff bases her claim of right to receive a reduced monthly retirement allowance under Option 2 of section 5 of the retirement act on the ground that, since her mother did not have the mental capacity to make a contract, Mrs. Carr’s effort
The plaintiff contends that, when, her mother signed the application to retire from the system, she made a new contract, and though she had not been, adjudged insane at the time she attempted to retire, she was mentally incapable of making such a contract. Since the contract was voidable, the plaintiff as her heir had the right to disaffirm the contract, and therefore the mother died while still a member of the system. Conceding but not deciding that the act of the plaintiff’s mother in retiring did constitute the making of a new contract, we are of the opinion that the plaintiff shows no right
to
receive the retirement allowance. Her petition discloses that the plaintiff’s mother executed her application for retirement before she was adjudged insane, and does not disclose that the defendants had any knowledge of her alleged mental incapacity. Mrs. Carr’s act was not void but merely voidable. Code § 20-206. There are no allegations that- negative the good faith of the parties defendant or that the consideration was unfair or unjust. The retirement system agreed to pay Mrs. Carr a fixed monthly sum for the remainder of her life, which they did, and therefore the alleged contract has been fully executed. It is now impossible to restore the parties to the position they were in when the plaintiff’s mother signed her application for retirement. The reason for the rule of law that prevents the plaintiff from avoiding the consequences of an executed voidable contract is clearly and succinctly stated by Judge Jenkins, now Chief Justice Emeritus of this Court, in
Watkins
v.
Stulb & Vorhauer,
23
Ga. App.
181 (1) (98 S. E. 94): “Even where there has been no
“In order to entitle one to the writ of mandamus, it must appear that he has a clear legal right to have the particular act performed, the doing of which he seeks to have enforced.” Adkins v. Bennett, 138 Ga. 118 (1) (74 S. E. 838). Since it clearly appears from the amended petition that the plaintiff does not have any right to receive the reduced monthly retirement allowance under section 5, Option 2, of the Teachers’ Retirement System Act, supra, the court did not err in dismissing her petition for a writ of mandamus absolute, seeking to require the trustees to pay this allowance.
There being affirmance on the main bill of exceptions, it becomes unnecessary to consider the cross-bill of exceptions.
Judgment affirmed on the main bill; cross-bill dismissed.
All the Justices concur, except Duckworth, C. J., who dissents.