On Jаnuary 26, 2000, a serious automobile accident occurred at the intersection of Saginaw Street (M-43) and Fairview Street in the city of Lansing. The accident caused the death of a thirteen-year-old seventh-grader, and seriously injured a three-year-old child, both of whom were passengers in the
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“at-fault” vehicle, which ran a stop sign for traffic traveling south on Fairview Street. Plaintiffs claim defendant city of Lansing is liable because a tree obstructed the view of the stop sign as motorists traveled south on Fairview. Defendant city of Lansing (hereafter defendant) appeals by leave granted two orders denying its motion for summary disposition: one on April 2, 2002, denying defendant’s claim of governmental immunity, and one on April 4, 2002, denying defendant’s motion based on the contention that defendant did not have jurisdiction over the street location where the accident occurred. We conclude that the trial сourt clearly erred by finding the city had jurisdiction over the intersection and erred as a matter of law by denying defendant’s motion for summary disposition because governmental immunity barred tort liability. MCR 2.116(C)(7);
Nawrocki v Macomb Co Rd
Comm,
Plaintiffs accuse defendаnt of negligence and gross negligence, including a failure to design a safe roadway, failure to maintain a roadway in a safe manner, failure to set safe speed limits, placing stop signs in “low visibility areas which do not allow adequate time to stop,” and failure to place stop signs in areаs “where drivers can readily see them.” Defendant moved for summary disposition contending that it was protected by governmental immunity and that it was not responsible because M-43 was a state trunk line highway and the intersection was under the jurisdiction of the Michigan Department of Transportation (moot). The trial court rejected defendant’s jurisdic
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tion argument because the stop sign was on Fairview, a street clearly within the city’s jurisdiction. The trial court also denied defendant’s motion for summary disposition based on governmental immunity relying on
Ridley v Detroit (On
Remand),
This Court reviews de novo both a trial court’s decision on a motion for summаry disposition and questions of statutory interpretation involving the application of governmental immunity.
Hanson v Mecosta Co Rd Comm’rs,
The primary goal of judicial interpretation of statutes is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature.
Gladych v New Family Homes, Inc,
When we apply these principles to the undisputed facts of this case, it is clear that MCL 691.1402a, added by
A governmental agency must have jurisdiction over a highway for it to be liable under the highway exception for breaching its duty to maintain a highway “in reasonable repаir so that it is reasonably safe and convenient for public travel.” MCL 691.1402(1);
Sebring v City of Berkley,
Review of the case law and the evidence submitted below confirms that the trial court clearly erred in its faсtual findings and conclusion of law. In both Sebring, involving the intersection of a city crosswalk *382 and a state highway, and Markillie, involving the intersection of a county road with a state highway, an affidavit established the fact that the state had jurisdiction over the intersection. The only evidence plaintiffs submitted in opposition to the fact that the state controlled signage at the interseсtion was that defendant installed a second stop sign and a “stop ahead” warning sign after the accident. But the evidence plaintiffs submitted established that defendant took such action only after meeting with an mdot traffic and safety engineer in conjunction with other action both mdot and defendant рroposed to take with respect to the intersection. So, defendant’s placing a second sign was consistent with permissive authority under MCL 257.609(b). Thus, the trial court clearly erred as a matter of fact and as a matter of law by concluding defendant had jurisdiction over the intersection and signage сontrolling traffic there. MCL 257.609; Markillie, supra at 20; Lain, supra at 582.
The crux of plaintiffs’ theory of liability is that defendant was negligent in failing to remove a tree obstructing the view of the stop sign controlling traffic traveling south on Fairview or in not providing a warning to motorists approaching the intersection from the north. But this Court held in
Lain
that one governmental agency has no duty under the highway exception to “post signs on its own road warning of possible dangerous conditions which are under the exclusive jurisdiction of another governmental entity . . . .”
Lain, supra
at 582. Plaintiffs’ reliance on
Cox v Dearborn Hts,
The dissent accuses us of “shifting” the liability for traffic control devices, including traffic signs, from the state and county road commissions, to local municipalities. While the purpose of our holding today is merely to return to a principled application of the plain language of the highway exception, we are constrained to respond to the dissent’s misapprehension of the governmental immunity statute.
Clearly, traffic signals and signs are not implicated in the broad definition of “highway” in MCL 691.1401(e); MSA 3.996(101)(e): “ ‘Highway’ means a public highway, road, or street that is open for public travel and includes bridges, sidewalks, trailways, crosswalks, and culverts on the highway. The term highway does not include alleys, trees, and utility poles.” . . . [B]ecause traffic control devicеs are clearly not implicated in the broad definition of “highway,” there can be no “shifting” of liability from the state and county road commissions to local municipalities. [Nawrocki, supra at 182 n 37.]
Although, the trial court in the instant case dismissed footnote 37 in
Evens-Nawrocki
as dictum, this Court has noted that dictum is a “ ‘judicial comment made during the course оf delivering a judicial opinion, but one that is unnecessary to the decision in the
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case and therefore not precedential (though it may be considered persuasive).’ ”
People v Higuera,
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Indeed, in cases decided after
Nawrocki,
this Court has extended the holding of
Evens
to municipalities. In
Weakley v Dearborn Hts,
But this Court in
Ridley (On Remand), supra,
On reconsideration in light of
Weaver,
the
Ridley (On Second Remand)
panel concluded that “because illumination is not part оf the actual highway, the highway exception to governmental immunity does not apply and defendant city was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Ridley v Detroit (On Second Remand),
Although the Court primarily based its reasoning on the fact that a county road commission’s duty extends only to the roadbed itself, it is of particular interest to this cаse *387 that the Court also noted that traffic signals and signs fall outside the statutory definition of “highway” as well. [Nawrocki, supra] at 182-183 n 37. In fact, the Court specifically commented that, because signals and signs fall outside the definition of “highway,” there was no shifting of liability from the state and counties to local municipalities where the liability is premised upon inadequate signage or signals. Id. [Ridley (On Second Remand), supra,258 Mich App 514 .]
After reviewing Weaver, supra, the Ridley (On Second Remand) panel reluctantly concluded that illumination “is not included within the statutory definition of ‘highway’ [and] does not represent a defect in the highway itself because it is not part of the highway.” Id. at 515. The panel reasoned that if inadequate signage is not within the highway exсeption, neither is inadequate illumination.
The issue of lack of illumination is comparable to a claim of inadequate signage. In fact, plaintiff’s original brief makes that very comparison. Illumination, like signage, does not implicate the physical condition of the street itself. Like signage, illumination alerts a driver to a potential danger (e.g., a person lying in the street). But the inevitable conclusion is that, if the lack of adequate signage warning a driver of a danger does not come within the highway exception, neither does the lack of illumination. [Id. at 515-516.]
In dictum, the Ridley (On Second Remand) panel called on the Legislature tо review the issue of governmental immunity in regard to “traffic signals, signs, and lighting.” Id. at 516. The panel suggested several scenarios where governmental immunity would apply under the current statute.
We are required to conclude that the Legislature intended governmental agencies to be immune from liability where, *388 for exаmple: (a) a stop light malfunctions at an intersection, showing green lights to all traffic, and the local municipality fails for several hours, days, or years after notice to take corrective or safety measures before which time a motorist is injured in a collision caused by the malfunction, (b) a municipality negligently places a single one-way sign pointing in a direction opposite of the actual traffic flow, thereby causing a head-on collision for a motorist entering the one-way street, (c) a municipality fails to provide lighting at an intersection heavily used by motorists and pedestrians resulting in a car-pedestrian accident, or (d) a new road is constructed intersecting an established road without a stop sign or light being added before the road is opened, resulting in a collision. [Id. at 518.]
In summary, as applied to the undisputed facts of the instant case, the definition of “highway” patently excludes “trees.” MCL 691.1401(e). Further, traffic control or warning signs, or sightlines, are not part of the “highway” as MCL 691.1401(e) defines that term. And in light of the emerging case law, it is clear that Cox, supra, has been overruled to the extent that it holds that the highway exception includes a “duty to maintain . . . highways . . . [that] encompasses the duty to install adequate traffic signs.” Cox, supra at 394-395. When we apply to the undisputed facts of this case the principle that no action may be maintained against a governmental agency unless it is clearly within the scope and meaning of MCL 691.1402(1), Weaver, supra at 245, we must conclude the trial court erred as a matter of law by not finding that defendant enjoyed governmental immunity from the tort claims plaintiffs advanced, Nawrocki, supra at 182 n 37; Ridley (On Second Remand), supra at 516-518.
We reverse and remand for entry of summary disposition for defendant. We do not retain jurisdiction.