84 Ga. 287 | Ga. | 1890
1. The charge on which Carr was tried by the mayor was for “quarrelling, cursing and acting otherwise disqrderly.” It may be assumed that the city had a valid ordinance embracing the matters of this charge, as nothing to the contrary is alleged in the petition for certiorari. Phillips v. Atlanta, 78 Ga. 773. The evidence upon which the mayor founded his judgment is correctly set out in the official report. Did that evidence establish the charge? It shows no disorderly conduct on the part of Carr otherwise than by the use of words. Did his vituperative and threatening words amount to quarrelling? They were spoken in an ordinary tone. Jones, the person of whom they were spoken and to whom they were addressed, made no reply. There was no altercation, dispute, brawl or angry contest. It seems to us that it takes two to make a quarrel; that a quarrel cannot be ex parte. Certainly so, unless the speaker utters his words in a loud and angry tone. Even then his conduct would be better described as disorderly conduct by loud and angry speaking, than by denominating it quar
2. The judgment passed by the mayor was that Carr pay a fine of ten dollars and costs, and upon failure to pay the same, that he work in the city chain-gang for twenty-five days and then be discharged. So much of this judgment as sought to enforce the payment of the fine by consigning the accused to the chain-gang was unwarranted, there being in the charter of Conyers no express grant of power to enforce the payment of fines by such means. Brieswick v. Brunswick, 51 Ga. 639; 1 Dillon Mun. Corp. §353 ; Horr & Bemis Mun. Pol.