Benjamin Carpentier, Plaintiffs v. Champlain Housing Trust, State of Vermont, and the Town of Williston, Defendants
Case No. 24-CV-04900
VERMONT SUPERIOR COURT, Chittenden Unit, CIVIL DIVISION
October 8, 2025
Megan J. Shafritz, Superior Court Judge
Filed 10/08/25 Chittenden Unit
This case arises out of allegations by Plaintiff Benjamin Carpentier regarding building code violations in his Williston residence. Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that the air in his apartment is contaminated with toxic dust and is making him ill. Plaintiff has filed suit against Champlain Housing Trust, the Town of Williston and the Williston Fire Department and Police Department, and the State of Vermont Division of Fire Safety. Mr. Carpentier represents himself, the Town of Williston is represented by John H. Klesch, Esq., and the State is represented by Assistant Attorney General Sara Moran. All Defendants have moved to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Rules
Factual Background
In his Complaint, Mr. Carpentier alleges that the Defendants are not addressing the air quality in his apartment and that his apartment needs to be brought into compliance with the housing codes. He cites Act 181, which has been codified as
Discussion
“Motions to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim under
I. Town of Williston‘s Motion.
Mr. Carpentier‘s Complaint against the Town is a Rule 75 request for mandamus relief, although Mr. Carpentier did not style it as such. “Mandamus is a command from the court to an official, agency, or lower tribunal to perform a simple and definite ministerial duty imposed by law.” Wool, 2020 VT 44, ¶ 18 (quoting Wool v. Menard, 2018 VT 23, ¶ 11, 207 Vt. 25). “Although the formal writ of mandamus was abolished by
(1) the petitioner must have a clear and certain right to the action sought by the request for a writ; (2) the writ must be for the enforcement of ministerial duties, but not for review of the performance of official acts that involve the exercise of the official‘s judgment or discretion; and (3) there must be no other adequate remedy at law.
Id. (quoting Wool v. Menard, 2018 VT 23, ¶ 11).
Mandamus is ordinarily available only to compel ministerial duties that do not involve discretionary decision-making. Maple Run Unified Sch. Dist. v. Vt. Human Rights Comm‘n, 2023 VT 63, ¶ 12, 218 Vt. 496. “A ministerial duty is one regarding which nothing is left to discretion – a simple and definite duty, imposed by law, and arising under conditions admitted or proved to exist.” Id. (quotation omitted). In other words, “if the duty is one that necessarily involves an exercise of judgment it is not considered ministerial but discretionary.” Id. (quotation omitted).
Mr. Carpentier asserts problems with the heating, ventilation, and air conditioning system (“HVAC“) in his apartment. In opposing the Town‘s motion, he states that his requests for help from the Town, its fire department, and its police department have gone unanswered, and he seeks injunctive relief to ameliorate his situation. See Pl.‘s Opp. to Town‘s Mot. to Dismiss (describing public records requests made to the Town). A town‘s fire and police departments are
The Town makes two arguments in support of its motion. First, it contends that, to the extent Mr. Carpentier is seeking access to any of the Town‘s records, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to consider this issue because Mr. Carpentier has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Mot. to Dismiss at 2-3. “[W]hen administrative remedies are established by statute or regulation, a party must pursue, or ‘exhaust,’ all such remedies before turning to the courts for relief.” Jordan v. State Agency of Transp., 166 Vt. 509, 511, 702 A.2d 58, 60 (1997) (citing In re D.A. Assocs., 150 Vt. 18, 20, 547 A.2d 1325, 1326 (1988)); accord Mullinnex v. Menard, 2020 VT 33, ¶ 14, 212 Vt. 432 (“To allow complainants to bypass their administrative remedies deprives the parties and the courts of the benefit of the administrative agency‘s experience and expertise, and denies the agency the opportunity to cure its own errors.” (quotation omitted)).
Access to public records is governed by
The Town‘s second argument is that Mr. Carpentier has failed to specify any duty that the Town owes to him with regard to his HVAC system. Mot. to Dismiss at 3-4; Supp. Mem. at 1-3. The Department of Public Safety is a state entity, and its Commissioner “prescribe[s] standards for the health, safety, sanitation, and fitness for habitation of rental housing . . . to protect the public, property owners, and property against harm.”
Although some towns and cities in Vermont have cooperative inspection agreements with the Vermont Department of Public Safety, Division of Fire Safety, Williston does not. See https://firesafety.vermont.gov/buildingcode/municipalinsp (listing towns and cities that have cooperative inspection agreements). Mr. Carpentier has not identified any local ordinance that Williston has adopted that addresses his concerns, and the court is not aware of any such ordinance. Because Mr. Carpentier has failed to identify a duty the Town or any of its departments owes to him or how any such duty has been violated, the Town, as well as its police and fire departments, are entitled to be dismissed from this lawsuit. The Town‘s motion is granted.
II. The State‘s Motion.
Mr. Carpentier‘s Complaint against the State is also a Rule 75 request for mandamus relief. The State recognizes its responsibility to conduct inspections of rental housing in response to complaints regarding health, safety, sanitation, and fitness for habitation of rental housing. Supp. Memo. at 6; see
The State points to no other adequate remedy Mr. Carpentier has to obtain the relief he seeks other than Rule 75 mandamus. See Wool, 2020 VT 44, ¶ 18 (mandamus relief is appropriate if plaintiff satisfies first two factors of test and has no other adequate remedy at law). Accordingly, mandamus relief is the appropriate vehicle for Mr. Carpentier to raise his claims to the Court. See Wool, 2020 VT 44, ¶ 18 (mandamus relief is appropriate if plaintiff satisfies first two factors of test and has no other adequate remedy at law). However, relying on Conley and Mullinnex, the State argues that the Court should consider the Assistant Fire Marshall‘s affidavit to conclude that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction to consider Mr. Carpentier‘s complaint against it. Such reliance is misplaced.
Conley and Mullinnex addressed whether the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction to grant the relief the plaintiffs in those cases were seeking. In Conley, 2010 VT 38, ¶¶ 2-3, the issue was whether plaintiff wife had properly established residency for purposes of being entitled to a divorce in Vermont. In Mullinnex, 2020 VT 33, ¶¶ 3-4, the issue was whether the plaintiff inmate had exhausted his administrative remedies before initiating litigation. In both cases, evidence outside the pleadings was considered for the purpose of determining whether the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction.
In this case, by contrast, the State concedes that Mr. Carpentier is entitled to the State‘s ministerial act of investigating his complaint as required by
Accordingly, the Court concludes that it has subject matter jurisdiction over Mr. Carpentier‘s Complaint against the State and that Mr. Carpentier has stated a claim for mandamus relief against the State pursuant to Rule 75. The State‘s motion must be denied.
Order
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant Town of Williston‘s motion to dismiss (Mot. #4) pursuant to both Rule
Defendant State‘s motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule
In addition, the parties shall submit their proposed discovery scheduling order within 30 days.
Electronically signed on October 8, 2025 at 10:44 AM pursuant to
Megan J. Shafritz
Superior Court Judge