*1 S000772.June 1991.] [No. ADMINISTRATIVE CALIFORNIA SOUTHERN
CARPENTERS CORPORATION, v. Plaintiff and Appellant, COMPANY, Defendant DEVELOPMENT EL CAPITAN Respondent.
Counsel Watson, Watson, Nicholson, Stanton, P. Kay Castle & & James
Cox, DeCarlo, Connor, Carroll, T. Charles P. Donald C. & John Scully, DeCarlo Connor, A. L. for Plaintiff Holliday Patrick Richard Brownstein Karen and Appellant. Richman, Davis, Wayne A. Jett &
Lionel & George Laquer, Pappy Pappy, Hill, Burrill, Jr., & Jett, McCarthy, H. Johnson Farrer & Stuart Young, Shannon, Nord, Sackman, J. Miller, A. & Steven Lori Gilbert Raphael Levin, Sackman, Feder, M. David Van R. Kenneth J. Gerald Kaplan, Rosenfeld, B. J. Van Michael & Victor Bourg, Roger Bourg, Weinberg, W. as Amici Curiae on Blythe Mickelson and Michael Schnake Roger, behalf Plaintiff and Appellant.
Littler, Mendelson, Ford, Williams, Jr., & Karen E. Tichy, Major Fastiff J. Dorothy Meyer R. for Defendant and Stephens Gregory Respondent. Musick, Garrett, K. J. Lynn Peeler & and Roberta Burnette as Thompson Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent.
Opinion 3111,1 PANELLI, J.—The issue is whether Civil Code presented section which creates liens on real in favor of trust funds established property pursuant to collective is bargaining agreements, Employ- ee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 U.S.C. 1001 (ERISA). (29 et We seq.) conclude that ERISA does 3111. preempt
Facts Carpenters Southern California Administrative Corporation (CSCAC) the administrator and the assignee of various rights trust multiemployer *5 funds established under collective bargaining agreements, including Carpenters’ Trust Funds. The Trust Carpenters’ Funds are employee pen- sion benefit employee welfare benefit within the meaning ERISA. (See 29 U.S.C. & 1002(1), (2)(A), CSCAC is a (21)(A).) “fiduci- § ary” as defined in ERISA. (29 U.S.C. 1002(21)(A).)
Collective bargaining agreements often to make contri- require employers butions to trust funds for the benefit of covered In the employees. present case, the covered are employees members of unions affiliated with the Unit-
ed Brotherhood of Carpenters CSCAC, and Joiners of America (Unions). due to its fiduciary with the Unions and in its relationship role as adminis- trust, trator of the has a duty to collect contributions from who employers fail to make the required payments to the trust.
El Capitan Development Company (El a condomini- Capitan) developed um on project its property Bakersfield. The contractor general was Grupe 1Civil provides: Code section 3111 “For purposes chapter, of this express trust fund pursuant established to a bargaining agreement collective payments to which required are be made on fringe account of supplemental wage benefits agreement to a for the benefit of a particular claimant on property real shall have a lien property on such in the amount of the supplemental fringe payments owing it pursuant to the bargaining collective agreement.” statutory
All further references are to the Civil Code unless otherwise indicated. Fram- Pacific Southwest with subcontracted Grupe Construction (Grupe). that John CSCAC alleges In its framing complaint, work. ing part bar- CSCAC made a collective with which (John K[all), Hall Enterprises John entity. are a Framing single and Pacific Southwest gaining agreement, funds in excess to the trust make benefit contributions fringe Hall failed to $121,000. El trust fund liens against CSCAC recorded Pursuant to section contributions to collect the delinquent real in order to Capitan’s property County El Kern Superior CSCAC later sued Capitan the trust funds. that, John Hall and because alleged foreclose the liens. CSCAC Court to entity, Framing Pacific Southwest are a Framing single Pacific Southwest therefore obli- John Hall and was CSCAC’s with agreement was bound alleged CSCAC further to make the contributions to the trust.2 gated of work performed were due on account because the contributions unpaid 3111 created liens on that property. El section on Capitan’s property, bargaining agreement El has not a collective signed Capitan, CSCAC, arguing demurred to CSCAC’s complaint, court El granted Capitan’s 3111. The trial 1144.) (See amend, the court When declined to leave to amend. CSCAC demurrer with entered a of dismissal. judgment El We granted Capitan’s
The Court of reversed the Appeal judgment. the matter to the Court of Appeal for review and retransferred petition v. Dedeaux of Pilot Ins. Co. light reconsideration Life remand, On the Court Life). S.Ct. Pilot (hereafter 1549] *6 affirmed the section 3111 and concluded that of Appeal of dismissal. We affirm. judgment
Discussion Introduction trust funds real favor of 3111 creates liens on property
Section in amounts equal bargaining agreements to collective established pursuant those collective which are due under to the benefit contributions fringe 3111, if fails to make Under section an employer bargaining agreements. contributions, where the can record a lien on the property the trust fund lien of the debt. and foreclose the to compel payment work was performed 2 signed bargaining agreement Framing has not a collective Pacific Southwest CSCAC. statutory
ERISA is a federal scheme designed comprehensive the interests of and their beneficiaries in promote employee employees Airlines, 85, v. (Shaw benefit Delta Inc. 463 U.S. (1983) plans. [77 497, 490, 2890].) L.Ed.2d S.Ct. fund imposes participation, “[ERISA] on ... As this ing, vesting requirements pension closely of part integrated regulatory system Congress included various safeguards pre clude abuse and ‘to secure completely rights expectations brought 93-127, into this landmark reform S. being by No. legislation.’ Rep. ... (1973). Prominent these 29 U.S.C. among safeguards 514(a), § [is] . . . .” ERISA’s broad Co. provision (Ingersoll-Rand pre-emption § __, 474, 482-483, v. McClendon 498 U.S. S.Ct. (hereafter Ingersoll-Rand).) 482] We must decide whether ERISA’s broad preemption provision “ section 3111. We conclude that it does. encompasses ques ‘[T]he tion a certain whether state action is is one by federal law of pre-empted congressional intent. “The of is the ultimate touch purpose Congress ’ stone.” To discern intent we examine the Congress’ explicit [Citations.] statutory and the structure and language the statute. purpose [Citations.] Where, here, . . . as has broadly included a worded expressly [ft] ERISA, in a such pre-emption provision comprehensive statute our task of discerning Congressional considerably intent is (Ingersoll- simplified.” Rand, at p._ S.Ct. p. 482].)
Section ERISA expressly “any and all state laws preempts they may insofar as any now or hereafter relate benefit employee . . . .” U.S.C. italics 1144(a), Section of ERISA added.) 514(c) defines the terms used term 514(a): ‘State Law’ includes “(1) laws, decisions, rules, all or other State action regulations, having effect law, any State, State. . . . (2) The term ‘State’ flj] any includes thereof, either, political subdivisions agency or instrumentality purports regulate, directly indirectly, the terms and conditions covered by this subchapter.” (29 1144(c).) *7 CSCAC that ERISA state argues preempts only those laws that regulate the terms and conditions of ERISA plans. argument This derives from the phrase in the “purports regulate,” definition of “State” in appears law, section of ERISA. U.S.C. 514(c)(2) (29 1144(c)(2).) The case how- § ever, does not CSCAC’s All that support argument. is necessary invoke statutory ERISA’s is that the state preemption provision law in question shown, “relate to” an ERISA will be 3111 plan. As section “relates to” such 1048 contribution an enforcing employer’s mechanism for by creating not did provide. that
obligations sake of Furthermore, argument for the even if we were accept law, must regulate to be preempted, that a CSCAC’s proposition section 3111 Although 3111 still would be preempted. section plan, in a it does be included plan, that certain terms require does specifically of a can be under which the terms plan the conditions to regulate purport of action for an additional cause so by creating The section does enforced. liable entity an additional by making contribution enforcing obligations v. Terotechnology Pension Fund Iron Workers contributions. (See for such 548, Workers).) 553 Iron (hereafter F.2d 1990) Cir. (5th Under The Breadth Federal Preemption has emphasized Court in a series of opinions United States Supreme describing provision, of ERISA’s express preemption the unusual breadth “virtually provision” ERISA as a unique pre-emption 514(a) 1, 24, fn. 26 463 U.S. (1988) v. Laborers Vacation Trust Tax Bd. (Franchise 420, 440, for its and as a clause 2841]), “conspicuous L.Ed.2d S.Ct. [77 _ 356, _, (FMC L.Ed.2d Holliday v. (1990) breadth.” Corp. [112 characterized the provision The court has also 407].) 111 S.Ct. 481 U.S. at Life, p. “deliberately (Pilot supra, expansive” [95 504, 523 451 U.S. Inc. Raybestos-Manhattan, Alessi v. 46], p. citing 402, 416, as an area of and as 1895]), “establishing] 101 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d [68 to’ an subject every federal concern the exclusive lrelate[s] v. Holliday, supra, ERISA.” (FMC Corp. governed _ 364, 111 S.Ct. at p.407].) L.Ed.2d at p. 498 U.S. at p. [112 court has also interpreted with the foregoing, high Consistent recently, Most 1144(a).) to.” statutory term “relate broadly key the court Ingersoll-Rand, supra, explained “[t]he in their broad used those words ‘relate to.’ Congress found the words have made sense, that would language more limited pre-emption rejecting subjects the specific laws only relating to state the clause ‘applicable 498 U.S. at p._ (Ingersoll-Rand, supra, ERISA.’” covered This is consistent omitted.) citations 482], S.Ct. at p. L.Ed.2d at p. “ ‘a state law “re in Pilot instruction with the court’s previous Life if it has a “in the normal sense phrase, to” a benefit plan, latéis] ’ ” (Pilot Life, to such a plan.” connection with or reference “Because of the breadth of omitted.) at citations 48], ERISA, broad remedial ‘state purpose clause and the the preemption
1049 ” laws found to be are beyond 514(a) few.’ scope [section ERISA] 1290, 1294, v. B. F Goodrich Co. Cir. 871 F.2d fn. (Cefalu (5th 1989) omitted.) whether section 3111 determining “relates to” benefit we take plan,
note that the United States
Court has on several occasions stated
Supreme
that “state laws which make ‘reference to’ ERISA
are laws that ‘relate
plans
to’ those
within the
v.
plans
meaning
514(a)
(Mackey
[of ERISA].”
Lanier Collection Agency & Serv.
829
L.Ed.2d
[100
836, 843,
Section 3111 Is Specifically Designed Employee Affect Benefit Plans
Section 3111 is specifically to affect designed employee plans. refers to expressly “trust established pursuant fund[s] a collective bargaining agreement” to such provides funds a mechanic’s lien remedy Thus, not provided by Congress. section 3111 out singles ERISA for plans treatment. special
CSCAC that “ERISA argues trust funds receive no greater benefits under than any other entitled to party [section invoke the mechanics’ lien 3111] sure, remedy.” To be section 3111 does treat ERISA the same plans other whose parties claims are based on having furnished labor or materials for a difference, construction however, project. significant is that do not furnish labor or materials for construction projects. Accordingly, treat them as who do furnish persons labor or materials is them out single for treatment.3 Because special section 3111 out singles is, fact, treatment special to affect designed them we specifically, conclude the statute “relates to” ERISA plans.4 significant Another difference between ERISA plans persons and other whose claims are based on furnishing labor or materials is that the latter assert their claims under section 3110. Section 3111 specifically express the use of pursuant trust funds established to collective bargaining agreements. 4CSCAC contends that because section of ERISA refers “plans” and section funds,” 3111 refers to “trust preempted by However, section 3111 is not ERISA. other state arguments ments and made CSCAC belie the contention that section 3111 does not affect example, For CSCAC states “Carpenters that the Trust Funds are
1050 Terms Does Not the and Require Regulation
Preemption an ERISA Plan Conditions of law it is well settled a state
Contrary
argument,
to CSCAC’s
terms
plan
not
the
and conditions of
ERISA
for preemp
need
regulate
the
has rejected
to
The United States
Court
Supreme
tion
apply.
in section
statutory
regulate”
that the
term
to
argument
“purports
similar
those
only
514(a)
preempt
causes
514(c)(2)
terms, conditions,
(Inger
laws
affect a
or administration.
state
plan’s
soll-Rand,
Section 3111 Also ERISA Plans Regulates Even a state law need not ERISA to be though regulate plans preempted, a that a state a finding necessarily law does ERISA includes regulate plans that the law “relates to” such a Union 598 Etc. v. J.A. finding (Local plan. 1213, 1218, Jones Const. Co. Cir. 846 affd. (9th 1988) F.2d 109 S.Ct. Section 3111 (hereafter Jones).) regu 210] lates ERISA a plans by creating by mechanism not funding provided Hence, the fact that Congress. section ERISA regulates plans provides further for the conclusion that section 3111 support “relates to” ERISA and is plans preempted.
Federal case law on directly our view that section point supports by an additional creating mechanism for ERISA funding plans by to,” Congress, and hence “regulates,” “relates and is Workers, for that reason In Iron 891 F.2d preempted. supra, Fifth Circuit considered Louisiana mechanic’s lien law that was functionally identical to section 3111. Borden Chemical had entered into a contract for council, maintenance services with A Terotechnology trade on Corporation. unions, behalf of several executed a collective bargaining agreement for work to be Terotechnology at the Borden performed plant. agree- ment required to Terotechnology contribute to employee benefit funds for the work by its at the employees Borden After a plant. period compli- ance, Terotechnology stopped The unions and contributing. funds filed liens pursuant Louisiana’s Private Works Act against Borden’s real property. The Fifth law, Circuit held that the Louisiana because it created an addi- tional method of enforcing benefit funding requirements employee was plans, under preempted section of ERISA. 514(a) conclusion, its reaching the Iron Workers court discussed kinds of state laws that have been found to “relate to” benefit employee “The state plans: laws that have been found to be previously by preempted section 514(a) because they ‘relate’ to ERISA fall into [of ERISA] four categoriesf: (1)] laws that regulate of benefits or type terms disclosure, (2)] laws that create plans[; reporting, funding vesting requirements for ERISA (3)] laws that plans[; rules for the provide Cal.App.3d Supp. 608], Cal.Rptr. concluding relies on Pamas in that section preempted, is not disapproved. is 6In discussing the interrelationship regulate” of the “purports to and language, “relate to” stated, the Ninth Circuit Court Appeals ‘purports regulate’ narrower test is in “[t]he cluded within the broader finding ‘relates to’ test. Thus that a ‘purports statute [Citations.] regulate’ an employee plan necessarily benefit finding includes a that it ‘relates to’ such a Jones, plan.” (Fn. omitted. p. 1218.) 846 F.2d at be under plans[; of the amount of benefits to paid
calculation for misconduct laws common law rules that remedies (4)] provide under of the ERISA plan. principle out administration growing be that all would appear of these decisions lying [preempting laws] if be the conduct sought the state law of an the state law is of the administration ‘part regulated is, state law is the matters regulates plan’: preempted if disclosure, vesting, ERISA: regulated by funding, reporting, enforcement *11 Workers, 553, added.) 891 F.2d at italics (Iron supra, plans.” p. of benefit to regulate employee Section specifically purports an of a lien real by against additional method funding, providing under, by, is not and therefore is not allowed which property, essence, of for the ERISA. In section 3111 creates a new state cause action an collection owed to and makes additional of contributions benefit plans for such contributions. Lien actions under section entity liable law, the of the federal jurisdiction are are not to governed subject Admin, Housing Cal. v. Majestic courts under ERISA. Southern (Carpenters Cir. 1984) 1346.)7 743 F.2d (9th action the collection of
ERISA new state-law causes of preempts because, of contributions consistent its goal providing “appropriate ready 1001(b)), sanctions access to federal courts” U.S.C. (29 § the of Section itself the remedies for collection contributions. provides in of ERISA U.S.C. civil action 502(a) (29 1132(a)) part provides “[a] § . . a or may beneficiary, fiduciary (A) be brought—. participant, [f[] this any to act or which violates of title or enjoin any practice provision to of or relief (i) terms to obtain other plan (B) appropriate equitable this redress violations title or (ii) provisions such enforce of added.) terms (29 1132(a)(3), U.S.C. italics plan.” § of “Delin- Additionally, 1145) section 515 of ERISA U.S.C. (29 provides: § 515. to make Every obligated Contributors. Section who is quent employer under the terms of the or under plan contributions to multiemployer plan shall, extent collectively bargained terms of a agreement law, make such contributions in accordance with inconsistent with Hence, agreement.” terms and conditions of such such an partici- of 502(a) can an action under section beneficiary fiduciary or a pant, bring Majestic Housing, supra, Appeals considered connection the Ninth Circuit Court against The court held that action to enforce lien between section 3111 and ERISA. [a] “[an] state, Majestic’s Consequently, property one under and not federal law. the district [was] jurisdiction summary judgment.” (Id. court was rule on the motion without 1346.) p. under 1132(a)) obligation to enforce (29 employer’s § 1145).8 section 515 U.S.C. § in federal court Iron As the Court of in this case and the Appeal Workers, noted, Pilot establishes the remedies supra, Life, supra, section 502 ERISA are exclusive and state laws which displace purport forth a 502(a) create remedies. detailed set parallel provisions “[T]he civil . . . reflected enforcement scheme. choices comprehensive policy in the inclusion of and the under the certain remedies exclusion others federal scheme would be undermined if completely partici ERISA-plan and beneficiaries were free to remedies under state law that pants obtain . . rejected ERISA. ‘The . civil enforce Congress carefully integrated ment . . . provisions finally found statute as enacted provide strong evidence did not intend to authorize other ” Workers, remedies that forgot incorporate (Iron simply expressly.’ 891 F.2d at supra, Life, Pilot U.S. at quoting *12 L.Ed.2d at in pp. 52], italics “The federal original.) a expectations common law of rights and under obligations ERISA-regulated would . . . would make little if the develop, sense remedies available to ERISA and beneficiaries participants under could be 502(a) § [of ERISA] (Pilot or supplemented by state supplanted varying Life, laws.” 481 supra, 56 at L.Ed.2d p. 53].)9 [95 ERISA, 1974, argues originally 8CSCAC enacted in not of did include a cause ac and, hence, tion for the collection of benefit contributions could not have intended to preempt state law adopts position, causes of action. The arguing dissent CSCAC’s further 1974, that we scope must determine of preemption provision ERISA’s as of without re gard subsequent to (Dis. opn., post, pp. 1059-1060.) amendments. premise of arguments these is incorrect. Even in of 1974 ERISA contained a cause ac- terms, (29 tion to its 1132), enforce 502 provided section U.S.C. and the remedies in section § 502 of are (29 exclusive. With the 1145) addition of section 515 of ERISA U.S.C. § 1980, Congress sought only process collecting to streamline the delinquent contributions exclusively (See Cong. under federal 126 (1980): law. Rec. 23029 “Recourse available under collecting delinquent current law unnecessarily contributions is and insufficient cumber- pension some .... Federal permit law must delinquent trustees of recover contri- to efficaciously, butions regard and might labor-manage- without to issues which arise under ment 186.”) relations law—other than 29 U.S.C. § 9Various amici by curiae have asserted 3111 that section from a state saved legislative ment in history of the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980 96-364, (Pub.L. Amendments, No. Amendments]). disagree. Stat. 1208 We [hereafter among things, (29 other 1145) added section of ERISA U.S.C. and revised section § 502(g) fees, (29 costs, of ERISA 1132(g)) pertaining attorney U.S.C. liqui to awards § damages dated delinquent actions for contributions. Commenting statutory on provisions 502(g) section of ERISA 1132(g)), the relevant House committee “The Bill preempts § stated: state other law fees, prevent attorney’s would the award of reasonable liquidated court costs or dam- ages, or which would liquidated damages twenty limit an amount below the percent level. However, Bill preclude liquidated does not damages the award of twenty excess of the essence, by action section 3111 is a civil action In CSCAC’s under ERISA with to employer fiduciary provisions regard enforce ERISA, & 515 of 29 U.S.C. (i.e., 1132(a) contributions § § ERISA, terms of (i.e., 29 U.S.C. enforce the 1145) plan by collective bargaining agreement). contributions funding required Workers, the state is the Louisiana law in Iron F.2d supra, Like the terms and conditions of “regulate” pension attempting laws, however, action, use of its lien laws. State a new cause through be used the civil enforcement scheme may not to supplement supplant 481 U.S. at Life, ERISA. Pilot (See developed supra, p. 53].) already cause of those summary, by
In an additional action to providing ERISA, Louisiana in Iron Workers like the law This further 891 F.2d 548), recognition (supra, “regulates” is, to” the conclusion that the section “relates ERISA plans supports thus, preempted. Arguments
Other Serv., & Agency v. Lanier Collections Invoking Mackey that sec 108 S.Ct. CSCAC (Mackey), argues 2182] collection “ancillary tion 3111 is because it is a creditor that an remedfy].” Mackey, garnish money sought *13 beneficiaries, Mackey The to its who were the creditor’s debtors. owed plan analyzed a statute and antigarnishment Georgia’s general court Georgia The court that a statute that concluded procedures. Georgia garnishment funds or of an benefit plan barred the of benefits garnishment employee The held that this to ERISA was ERISA. court subject preempted to, to, solely statute referred antigarnishment expressly applied are and that laws which make reference to ERISA laws state plans, damages higher if under state percent liquidated permitted level an award of such a level of is any remedy permit- change type other of or other law. Committee Amendment does not respect delinquent multiemployer contributions.” ted under state federal law with Means, 96-868, (H.R. pt. Ways on 96th No. on H.R. No. 3909 the House Com. Sess., (1980).) Cong., pp. 2d 3037-3038 history argue legislative curiae of the that did Amici that this section indicates rights plans. preempt granting employee intend to laws mechanic’s lien benefit not comment, col- reading single pertaining specific is too broad. report This House This attorney against employers, liquidated damages delinquent remedies such fees lateral legislative against employers delinquent not evidence a intent to allow remedies does for ex- interpretation for in ERISA. Such an of this comment would vitiate the are not legislative history Supreme ERISA and the numerous United States Court state- tensive Congress’s regarding provisions of certain and the exclusion of all ments choice enforcement others. of section of ERISA meaning
that “relate to” those
within
at
486 U.S. at
L.Ed.2d
1144(a)). (Mackey, supra,
p.
p.
[100
The ERISA
further
843].)
Mackey
argued
beneficiaries
The United
garnishment
entire
ERISA.
Georgia
procedure
statute,
as a
Georgia’s
general-
States
Court held
Supreme
garnishment
not
ly
mechanism for the enforcement of
was
applicable
judgments,
ERISA.
at
L.Ed.2d at
preempted by
(Id.
851].)
p.
p.
[100
Mackey's analysis of
does not
Georgia’s general
procedures
garnishment
save section 3111
a
from
The decision concerned
third
preemption.
party
action for enforcement
beneficiaries of an ERISA
judgments against
plan.
ERISA does not contain remedial
for such actions.
provisions
Largely
reason,
this
the United States Supreme Court concluded that “state-law
must,
matter,
methods for
money judgments
as a
remain
collecting
general
otherwise,
by ERISA;
undisturbed
there
a
way
would be no
to enforce such
won
judgment
against an ERISA
plan.” (Mackey, supra,
at p.
p. 846].)
case is not similar because ERISA
present
remedies for
expressly provides
recovery
contributions to
delinquent
benefit
Furthermore,
holding that
garnishment statute was not
Georgia
preempted,
high court noted that the statute
no substantive
“createfd]
action,
relief,
causes
nor new bases for
any
grounds
recovery; [it]
does not create the
rule
decision
case
affixing liability.” (Mackey,
supra,
contrast,
U.S. at
fn. 10
p. 847].)
California’s trust fund lien statute does
than
more
a new enforce-
provide
ment mechanism for
collecting judgments;
creates new substantive rights.
Workers,
Iron
(Cf.
CSCAC next that argues section 3111 is not because preempted “[i]t land regulates rights, a historically reserved to the state.” How power ever, order avoid it is not preemption, sufficient that a state statute “[i]n A state power. purported the exercise traditional represent [Citation.] an element of when there is only state interest is relevant fundamental falls scope within challenged as to whether the uncertainty However, . . of the state strength . clause. [fl] clearly regu- law ‘purports is no where consequence interest a state being ‘In order to avoid preempted, an benefit late’ employee plan. must also of traditional powers an exercise being police law addition remote, tenuous, to warrant a manner “in too peripheral affect ”” ’ (Jones, 846 F.2d at that the law ‘relates to’ the finding plan. supra, omitted, 1220-1221, 3111 does not affect added.) italics Section citations pp. instead, remote, “tenuous, manner; in a ERISA plans merely peripheral” an liable to entity effect. The section makes additional it has a substantive Workers, F.2d 556.) at p. Iron (See contributions. neces- effective and Lastly, CSCAC that section argues “provides is irrelevant. may That this be so sary remedy plans.” held even state laws Court has specifically The United States Supreme are still effectuate ERISA’s underlying purposes may help at 829-830 preempted. (Mackey, supra, pp. [100 “ Court Mackey, explained In the United States 844].) Supreme ‘[t]he . . . all state laws that fall 514(a)] displace[s] pre-emption provision [of § state laws that are consistent within its even including sphere, Ins. v. Massachu- Co. ERISA’s substantive requirements.’ Metropolitan Life save a setts, .... intentions’ do not Legislative ‘good 739] [471 514(a).” (Mackey, supra, state law within the broad pre-emptive scope §of Thus, the 844], added.) italics 486 U.S. at L.Ed.2d 829-830 pp. remedy useful may provide fund lien procedure fact the trust CSCAC is irrelevant.
Disposition
reasons,
3111 is
Code section
we conclude that Civil
For
foregoing
affirmed.
ERISA. The
the Court
judgment
Appeal
Arabian,
Baxter, J.,
Lucas,
J.,
J.,
J.,
Kennard,
concurred.
C.
Agency
v.
Collection
&
BROUSSARD,J.
Lanier
Mackey
dissent.
—I
836, 108 S.Ct.
(hereafter
While it the by broad used proper emphasize language United States Court clause of Supreme describing preemption ERISA, there, we may but not must also on stop recognize limitations And when we preemption. correct function of a mechanic’s recognize lien by and of the lien Civil section 3111 to relationship Code it employee compensation, Mackey is clear under not may we discrimi- nate ERISA against them liens others plans denying similarly given situated, may that we not discriminate against plan members providing remedies for recovery not compensation, Congress did liens, liens, that, intend to state law preempt including mechanics’ and case, although probably essential to in the decision instant intended certain permit state law actions to recover delinquent employer contributions. Preemption Expansive
I. The Clause Its Nature clause of ERISA is very broad and encompassing, it could be read as although preempting application any of state law in case in which an ERISA ais plan party, it settled that state law can be applied to some cases look involving congres- that we sional intent in determining may which state be laws The clause applied. “any and all State insofar preempts they laws as relate may now hereafter to any . .” employee benefit . . plan (29 U.S.C. 1144(a), italics added.) laws, decisions, rules, “The term ‘State law’ all includes regulations, law, other State action the effect of having State.” (29 U.S.C. 1144(c)(1).) The United States Court Supreme has characterized as provision “deliberately Ins. expansive” Co. v. Dedeaux U.S. {PilotLife 39, 46, L.Ed.2d 107 S.Ct. 1549]), and “as an area of establishing exclusive federal concern the subject every state law that to’ an ‘relate[s] benefit v. governed by ERISA.” (FMC Corp. Holliday (1990) _ _, 356, 364, 111 S.Ct. A 407].) “ relates to the normal plan, sense ‘if has phrase,
1058 ” (Pilot Co. v. De- Ins. a plan.’ with or reference such connection Life 39, 41, deaux, 48].) 47 L.Ed.2d supra, [95 Su- and the United States of the of provision The language preemption meaning be understood as Court is so broad that could cases preme an ERISA involving plan, in litigation law could never be applied state of the exemption preemption within the express cases coming except insurance, or securi- banking regulating clause for cases state laws involving the cases However, of the and ties. such broad interpretation provision would be improper.
“ action is federal whether certain state pre-empted question ‘[T]he ultimate “The of is the of intent. purpose law is one congressional ’ we examine the ex- To intent Congress’ touchstone.” discern [Citations.] of (See and the statute. and the structure statutory purpose plicit language _, 403, 407, _, S.Ct. 112 L.Ed.2d Holliday, 498 U.S. 111 FMC v. Corp. Lines, Inc., U.S., 95, 463 at 103 Delta 356 Shaw v. Air citing supra, (1990), U.S._, S.Ct., 498 Co. v. McClendon 2898-99).” (Ingersoll-Rand at _ 474, 483, 478, 482].) 111 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d case of court addressed Ingersoll-Rand, high pur-
In the recent he fired In that case a claimed of the ckuse. pose preemption that his was was terminated reason wrongfully principal pension years employer vest 10 and that the nearly about to after employment The court explained purpose to avoid the expense pension. sought “was follows: provision preemption provision preemption to a subject would be plan intended to ensure that and plans sponsors law; was to minimize administrative body uniform of benefit the goal States conflicting among and financial directives complying burden Otherwise, inefficiencies or between States and the Federal Government. Corp., FMC 498 could to the detriment beneficiaries. plan created work 10-11, Ct., U.S., at_, 107 Halifax, Fort at 111 S. at (citing 2904, 105, 25, S.Ct., S.Ct., Shaw, and n. at U.S. at 2216-17); subject like the one at issue here would n. state based actions 25.) Allowing not unlike those that Congress sought to burdens sponsors is the Particularly disruptive foreclose through provision]. [the courts, law. is foreseeable that in substantive It conflict potential substantive law different powers, develop their common exercising might conduct, tailoring requiring the same employer standards applicable the law of each juris- to the peculiarities conduct employer U.S._,_ McClendon, Co. v. (Ingersoll-Rand diction.” 484].) 111 S.Ct. *17 Preemption Congressional Clause and the Intent II. clause, rely upon in ERISA’s majority, express preemption The applying who which requires employers United States Code section 29 make shall to a multiemployer plan have to make contributions agreed law. This provision those contributions to the extent not inconsistent with How causes of action to recover employer delinquencies. federal provides ever, for this of ERISA as enacted and originally the section was not part in that the clause reason it furnishes no for the view support preemption Mackey, causes of action. In the United States such the clause of Court made clear that in Supreme interpreting preemption ERISA, is the intent of the the intent to be determined congressional the clause and not the intent of subse that enacted Congress preemption must look at the of ERISA and its Congresses. language quent “[W]e structure, enacted to determine the intent of the Congress originally in ‘It that enacted intent of provision question. Congress [the States, 324, 354, . . . 431 that controls.’ Teamsters v. United section] n. 39 (1977).” (Mackey,
S.Ct. at p. 2191.) of 29 United States Code section were added to provisions ERISA in 1980 as of the Pension Plan Amendments part Multiemployer enacted, Act. Since it was not of ERISA as it is for part originally improper the majority rely it in construing upon express preemption provision.
Moreover, even if it were to consider the Pension proper Multiemployer Plan Amendments Act of in construing express preemption provi- sion, considered, the entire 1980 act and its be legislative history must when this is done it must be concluded that to retain state Congress sought law actions to recover only intended a limited delinquencies preemption of state law actions to recover As will be governing delinquencies. pointed out later this in connection with it is clear opinion implied preemption, that Congress, when it enacted the Pension Plan Amend- Multiemployer ments Act of of state law to expressly provided application actions for recovery certain circumstances delinquencies and that the 1132(g)), legislative history of the act shows that Congress intended the only where it limited preemption recovery against to an amount employer less than federal law provided. majority ignore 29 United States Code section history 1132(g) legislative dealing preemption. outset, at the we must conclude that the
Accordingly, of 29 provisions United States Code section not be may considered construing part show an intent on the clause recovery delinquencies equal laws permitting employer preempt federal law. than greater permitted *18 Designed ERISA Plans Specifically III. Laws to Affect taken it for Mackey, “virtually granted In the court stated that has high to affect which are ‘specifically designed laws (Mackey, supra, are under the clause. plans’ pre-empted” preemption 844, 108 On the basis 2185.]) S.Ct. at p. U.S. at ERISA statute this rule the court invalidated a high Georgia exempted in bottom from the state’s law. their (Ibid.) majority plans garnishment ERISA from mechanic’s lien laws—violate line—by plans exempting ERISA rule treatment of against special plans. above, “any express provision applies
As out pointed but also to merely all laws.” That term to statutes and State applies . . . the effect of law of State.” “decisions having ordinarily it is for the just Legisla- 1144(c)(1).) Accordingly, improper ERISA it is ture to statutes to affect designed plans, adopt specifically to establish laws through specifically for this court its decisions improper to affect ERISA designed is to ERISA majority subject plans
The ultimate effect of the opinion of ERISA treatment. Civil Code section members plans special for identified ser- grants specifically persons mechanics’ liens to numerous have and have contributed unpaid vices rendered when such been persons to an Civil Code section 3111 the same mechanic’s provides improvement. insurance lien administer benefits like health for ERISA plans fringe those enumerated in Civil Code section By benefits. pension permitting to ERISA the majority single 3110 to obtain liens but liens denying plans, the ERISA plan ERISA for treatment. The payments out plans special those are who furnish be recovered sought part compensation by for The net effect of the state law established labor the improvement. obtain who not members of ERISA plans are majority employees who are members for their entire whereas those compensation, liens unpaid obtain a lien receive of their ERISA compensation through plans part of their only part compensation. seek to treatment majority justify special plans that, unlike those: mentioned Civil Code asserting project. (Maj. do not furnish labor materials to the construction plans ante, However, demonstrate, the ERISA claim is as I p. 1049.) part opn., be same as the other the worker and must treated the compensation compensation. are
The cases have that the claims the ERISA recognized part be treated the as the employee’s compen- and must same compensation Immel, Local 458 v. Inc. Wis.2d sation. Plumber’s H. N.W.2d lien statute for a lien for 44-45], mechanic’s labor,” “any and the court concluded that lien statute person furnishing not be but hourly could restricted included claims wages for funds for benefits. fringe
Similarly,
closely
situation
United States v.
analogous
presented
*19
776,
Carter
A similar in view is found our code sections dealing stop notices and state payment (the bonds state Miller Act which treat counterpart), claims Code, laborers by and ERISA as plans same Civ. being (See thing. §§ 3181, 3247.)
Our court long has the basic recognized that claims for principle fringe benefits are of the part and must be compensation treated as to accordingly creditors’ Thus in rights. Tremayne v. Dunlop Cal.2d 427 [42 held under we 368], P.2d A.L.R.3d
Cal.Rptr. creditors, for the benefit of to assignments statute preference applicable health, welfare, contri- pension Code of Civil Procedure section The court reasoned: under the term “wages.” butions would be included were employ- of the ascertained payments “The terms and conditions in wage negotiations, part of the employees ers and representatives gift are not as but Payments employer total made wage package. they sense In an economic of the services employees. consideration 431.) are Cal.2d at wages.” of our decisions. ERISA plans
We cannot
effect
practical
ignore
are usually
construction projects
have
claims based on
unpaid
others who
around. To
archi-
go
permit
are not
funds
enough
because there
unpaid
mechanics,
tects,
and others enumerated
surveyors,
laborers
engineers,
liens ERISA plans
obtain liens while
denying
Civil Code Section
creditors. The effect
the preference
is to make ERISA
second-class
will have a
ordinarily mean
Civil Code section
creditors
will
ERISA plans
their claims while
and will receive all or
part
preference
creditors flies
the face of
will receive none.
second-class
Making
in the plans
interest
express
participants
ERISA’s
policy
protect
*20
and,
policy
more
ERISA’s
(c))
express
U.S.C.
(29
1001(b),
particularly,
and
participants
“to
for the interests
reasonable
provide
protection
and “to
financially
multiemployer pension plans”
beneficiaries
distressed
employer
for the
financially
guarantee
a
self-sufficient
provide
program
(4).)
(29
1001a(c)(3),
benefits under multiemployer plans.”
in
is directed at state law general-
clause ERISA
The express preemption
treatment
law. Whether
ly,
both
and decisional
including
statutory
special
law
by statutory
general
a
from
exemption
of ERISA
is
plans
accomplished
applica-
a
of the court
Mackey,
by
permitting
as in
decision
requirements
individually
them
everyone by enumerating
a
tion of
specific provision
is
treatment
special
but
ERISA
the effect is
same.
leaving
plans,
out
and,
line
for special
at the bottom
majority
provide
because the
treatment,
federal law
contrary
enunciated
their decision is
law
Moreover,
union
decision discriminates against
is thus
preempted.
them lien
denying
to multiemployer
plans
belonging
employees
non-
allowing
their
for the
amount of
rights
compensation—while
full
compensation.
liens for all
their
employees
Preempted
Not
IV.
State
Laws
state lien laws.
has not preempted
Congress
that are not
establishes three classes of state laws
Mackey
preempted.
The first class
those
has
for the
is
cases where applica
tion of state law.
486 U.S. at
L.Ed.2d at
(Mackey,
pp.
p.
[100
845-846, VI
this
S.Ct. at
As will
2186-2187].)
part
pp.
appear
the use of
to enforce
has
opinion, Congress
expressly provided
duty
to make
to ERISA
“ERISA
be sued in
may
payments
action,
a second
of civil
as
type
well. These cases—lawsuits against
rent,
creditors,
for run-of-the-mill claims such as
failure to
unpaid
pay
or even torts
relatively
committed
ERISA plan—are
commonplace.”
U.S. at
2187],
108 S.Ct. at
fn. omit
p.
As will also
ted.)
mechanics’ liens are such run-of-the-mill claims.
appear,
court,
The third class was the one before the
garnishment. Because
high
it was
directly
Mackey
involved
it is treated first. The
of the
reasoning
high court is much broader than garnishment used to collect a judgment,
is
to treat this
as the
improper
part
Mackey
majority
opinion,
ante,
do (maj.
opn.,
1054-1055), merely
pp.
establishing garnishment
to the
clause.
exception
reasoning
merely
applicable
to garnishment but to all enforcement mechanisms for collecting money
judgments and also prejudgment mechanisms to secure the collection of
debts,
And,
liens such as the
including
mechanic’s lien before us.
while
Mackey obviously
involved suit against an ERISA
it is
plan,
apparent
same view should
when the
sues.
apply
Mackey,
court reasoned: “ERISA does not
an enforcement
provide
mechanism for
won in either of
collecting judgments
these two
types
Thus,
actions.
while
United States
the ‘sue
[1132(d)],
Code]
*21
be sued’ provision,
execution of
contemplates
won
judgments
against plans
actions,
in civil
Moreover,
it does not provide mechanisms to do so.
Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 69(a), which would
when either
of civil
apply
type
suit
court,
discussed above is
an ERISA
in
brought against
federal
plan
defers to state law to provide methods for collecting judgments. [Citation.]
must,
Consequently, state-law methods for
money
a
collecting
judgments
matter,
general
otherwise,
remain
ERISA;
undisturbed by
there would be
way
no
to enforce such a judgment won
an ERISA
If
against
attach-
plan.
ment of ERISA
funds does not
plan
‘relate to’ an ERISA
in any of
circumstances,
these
we do not see how respondent’s
garnishment
proposed
order
would do so.” (
S.Ct. at fn. p. 2187], omitted.) Procedure,
Federal Rules of Civil rule 69(a) (28 U.S.C.) that provides proceedings to and in “supplementary aid of a in judgment, and proceed- in in on and execution shall be accordance the practice aid of
ings held.” of the district court is It follows the state which procedure so on basis of state a lien must do seeking judgment to obtain parties and, I liens far as am Since does not for so provide judgment law. ERISA aware, has a act for federal the federal not government adopted recording liens, judg- to obtain and enforce proceedings real property judgment even is entirely judgment liens thus matters of state law where the ment are a federal judgment. liens run-of-the-mill
Generally, to establish and enforce are proceedings file a 20-day law notice of intent to proceedings. preliminary Code, most often mechanic’s lien is 3114) probably (Civ. §§ trust in our state. and deeds of legal Similarly, mortgages served document state, in this are the most recorded documents frequently probably among course, and, is to the lien. establish purpose recording lien of trust recorded with reconveyance mortgage cancel the or deed equal frequency.
Furthermore, that state lien laws are when to conclude millions, billions, means of dollars are involved plans perhaps and deeds by invested notes secured mortgages pension liens, liens, “ad- are mechanics’ of trust Those like jeopardized. provide other cause of in the of a fourth a property party, party ditional action” than the does employer, provide employee plan, a Congress adopted method to enforce To mortgages. suggest interests comprehensive protect participants law state lien laws 1001(b)) intended preempt credulity. strains the ultimate
Generally, state law mechanisms securing prejudgment courts. While Rules of debts are utilized federal Federal payment Procedure, methods rule for the adoption Civil provides Civil rule 64 of the Federal Rules of judgment, to obtain collection after state law methods Procedure provides adoption prejudgment available The rule that the remedies thus provides of debts. payment secure arrest, attachment, and other sequestration, “include garnishment, replevin, remedies, designated regardless however corresponding equivalent *22 must be to an action or remedy ancillary whether the is procedure clear that the an action.” Under this it is provision obtained independent be able a an ERISA and their workers should builders of building plan a me- jurisdiction to secure and enforce federal court (when proper) Likewise, ERISA lien under state law. chanic’s arising against property liens, should be entitled to enforce state law under this provision mechanics’ liens. including be made as to liens from may arising provisions
No distinction In Mackey, in favor ERISA and other liens or against may be garnishment the Solicitor General while other argued types should not permit gar- court permitted respect plans, be to a plan nishment when it will affect whether benefits will paid partici- beneficiary may that a or pant. bring expressly provides participant due, to clarify an action to recover benefits to enforce under rights plan, under and to obtain relief rights (29 plan equitable Dedeaux, and Pilot Ins. Co. v. 1132(a)(1)(B), (a)(3)), Life Pilot held that ERISA state law causes of (hereafter Life), action aby beneficiary or to enforce his or her participant rights. court General’s on the Mackey rejected argument Solicitor that the ground clause did not the distinction—it could permit not be held that the garnishment did not “relate to” the when third plan were parties involved but did “relate to” the when the rights plan plan were participants involved. U.S. at here,
S.Ct. at pp. 2188-2189.) Similarly, may not be concluded that me- chanics’ liens do not “relate to” the when laborers or seek to plan suppliers establish liens against office built but “relate to” the building by plan, when it seeks plan to recover contributions. employer The majority that Civil Code section 3111 argue creates new substantive rights to enforce a permitting debt of a third against property party ante, that is not a to the collective party (Maj. bargaining agreement. opn., However, p. 1055) the lien does liability not create of the It personal owner. mechanic, has long been recognized that lien of the artisan and supplier is equitable because those have created the parties very property upon which the lien attaches. v. (Tuttle 360; (1857) Cal. Connol- Montford ly v. Inc. Development, Court 17 Cal.3d 825-827 Superior 477, 553 P.2d Cal.Rptr. 637].) Obviously, return of the materials labor or laborer unpaid supplier is not a viable and the law’s option, recogni- tion of the unpaid supplier’s laborer’s contributions to the improvement owner, does not create a debt or liability on the but personal only part an interest in the they create. property helped
The fact that the mechanic’s lien may third provide priority against so if the debt is parties, the lienor unpaid may the detriment proceed of third does not mean parties, that a cause of action is created. personal The effect of a lien against is to the lienor property give against priority owners, some other claimants to the such property, subsequent mortgag- ees, words, lienors judgment In other purchasers. may the fact that a lien third prejudice claimants is not party mechanics’ liens but is unique liens, common to all and the effect in all cases is to the lienor an give *23 with lesser third affecting parties the against property actionable claim same, such as a are the when the and the owner Only employer priority. liable, builder, and then its individually will the owner be specification the lien. As we does not seek to enforce even the liability though plan exists and seen, of the workers stands in the shoes merely have lien also is based upon so its recovery of their compensation, seeks lien attaches. which the very property upon creation limited to property a cause of action that California has created The fact The Georgia not mean there is preemption. of a third does party rights in favor of a of action created a cause Mackey statute upheld garnishment concerned with fundamentally ERISA is third party against and the plan employers, the members of plan, between relationship with the are concerned and of its fiduciary, hardly provisions and its and duties of third rights parties. ERISA, state laws providing which does not preempt
I conclude that state laws provid- also does not preempt mechanisms to collect judgments, liens, such as of debts mechanisms to secure payment ing prejudgment causes of action if has preempted that this is true even Congress the debt. collect Payments Employer
V. The Cause to Recover of Action lien which is not preempted instant case involves a state law Since the to collect the debt is preempted, not the related cause of action whether or ERISA’s preemption reach the issue whether necessary does not seem Nevertheless, I will actions to enforce the agreed payment. clause preempts conclusion is My address it. majority with the issue because the deal ERISA, enacted, cause of action a federal did originally provide that, money against delinquent employers to recover a judgment the fundamental con- found if causes of action were preempted, be defeated. benefits would gressional purpose protecting look to above, clause we the preemption As out pointed interpreting the structure the clause and consider that enacted the intent of there are ERISA plans statute to regulate of ERISA. a comprehensive between namely, relationship areas obviously regulation, three requiring in using of the plan and the ERISA plan, operation the employer assets, and its members the plan and the between relationship beneficiaries. enacted, ERISA, as originally civil enforcement section of recover beneficiary aby participant
for a federal cause of action *24 terms, an ERISA enforce under rights benefits due from plan, A federal cause of clarify rights. (29 1132(a)(1)(B).) and to future U.S.C. § Labor, Secretary action was also for actions participant, a fiduciary duty by fiduciary. or for breach of beneficiary, against fiduciaries U.S.C. There a to enforce the terms (29 1132(a)(2).) general provision was but that was limited to relief. plan, provision equitable Subparagraph an (3) “by of 29 United States Code section for action a 1132(a) provided beneficiary or fiduciary enjoin any practice act or participant, (A) violates any (B) this the terms of the provision subchapter plan, obtain other relief to redress such violations or equitable (i) (ii) appropriate to enforce of this or the terms of the subchapter plan.” provisions (Italics added.)
It is of 29 Code section apparent United States subparagraph (3) only for 1132(a) Because provides equitable proceedings. subparagraph of 29 United States Code section for causes expressly provides beneficiaries, action to recover benefits due to and because participants they are along (3), mentioned fiduciaries it is clear subparagraph that the latter does not authorize an action at law to recover a subparagraph money judgment against enact- delinquent employers, originally that as ed Congress did not for such federal provide a cause of action. The fact that in 1980 found it to add a Congress necessary money for provisions judg- ment against a U.S.C. delinquent lends employer 1132(g)) §§ that, enacted, to the support conclusion ERISA did not originally pro- vide for such an action.
Once it is did not federal recognized a cause of provide enacted, action to recover in ERISA as delinquencies we must originally conclude that Congress did not intend to causes such of action preempt under state Alaw. conclusion that there was no action collect employer delinquencies under either state federal or law would defeat the simply fundamental of ERISA purpose protect employee rights. (29 We cannot such an 1001.) attribute intent to Congress. Implied
VI. Preemption of Causes of Action
Delinquencies Even clause did not though express of ERISA preempt action money causes of to recover delin- judgments employer quencies, the remains the 1980 to ERISA in whether amendments question themselves established intent to the state causes of action. law preempt the existence of a Although regulatory detailed scheme does not itself so, imply features of law do preemption, special may including law provides parallel scheme of federal rights. (See Ingersoll-Rand _ 474, 486-487, McClendon, Co. v. *25 478, 484-486].) S.Ct. Code
The 1980 included 29 United States amendments to make their contributions duty which a federal imposed upon employers 29 States Code section which plan, 1132(g), to a and United multiemployer 1145. to be awarded in actions to enforce section damages the provided However, 1132(g)(2)(C) expressly 29 United States Code section provides circumstances, in and the legislative of state law certain application of makes amendments were history the 1980 enactment clear the 1980 only and intended state causes of action to preempt to retain law than by Congress. insofar for lesser those provided damages provided fixed in under damages The has to be Congress part fact that to state law law of action determine what are state state causes contemplates history makes clear law The of the amendments damages. legislative this is what exactly Congress contemplated. Human
The staff of Committee of Labor and Relations the Senate report Act 1980 was states that the Pension Plan Amendments of Multiemployer of contributions and assist plans intended “to the promote prompt payment in cost in delinquencies.” (Staff incurred connection with recovering Relations, Sen. No. 1076: of the Sen. Com. on Labor and Human Rep. Act 96th 2d Pension Plan Amendments of Multiemployer Cong., Sess., Sen. Labor Com. Print.) Congress recognized obli- instability caused funds to accrue benefit industry of construction fund benefits. without sufficient contribution to those gations collecting Sess., 2d in 1980 (1980), No. (H.R.Rep. 96-869(1), reprinted News, Bill 2921.) any Code & Admin. “The pp. preempts Cong. fees, attorney’s other the award of reasonable or law which would prevent damages or would limit damages, liquidated court costs or liquidated However, an the Bill does not preclude amount below level. percent an level where the award in excess liquidated damages percent of higher damages appli- award such a level is under liquidated permitted not change cable State other law. Committee amendment does law with remedy respect other under State Federal type permitted & Cong. U.S. Code delinquent contributions.” multiemployer plan News, 3037-3038, added.) Admin. italics pp. intended retain state causes
It thus clear that of action to recover action did not state causes preempt intend of action precluded extent that such causes delinquencies except award of 1980 amendments. damages provided Language VII. No Additional Remedies sum, In Pilot “In Life, the court stated: the detailed high provisions United States Code section set forth a civil enforce- 1132(a)] comprehensive ment scheme that a careful of the need for represents balancing prompt claims settlement interest procedures against public encouraging fair the formation of choices reflected policy inclusion of certain remedies and the exclusion of others under the federal scheme would be if undermined completely ERISA-plan participants were free to obtain remedies under state law that Congress *26 beneficiaries in rejected ERISA. ‘The six civil carefully integrated enforcement provi- sions in found United States Code 1132(a)] finally as enacted . . . evidence provide strong did not intend to authorize Congress other remedies that it U.S. at simply forgot incorporate expressly.” (481 added, first and p. 52], second italics third italics in original.)
In Pilot Life, it was held that a state law action for breach of the covenant faith good and fair by a in dealing brought delay for plan participant benefits was paying preempted.
The majority rely the above upon quoted that a state language arguing law cause of action to enforce claims for employer is delinquencies preempt- However, context, ed. must language be read in and within its own limitations. To read the quoted broadly as language meaning that states may not provide remedies cases involving would be directly case, contrary to the subsequent Mackey shortly decided after Pilot Mackey held that state law and garnishment run-of-the-mill causes of Life. action were not It is preempted. that the court is not apparent high reading so language broadly as to generally preempt remedies involv- third ing since neither parties majority nor dissent in Mackey saw fit to even discuss the By its language. own terms Pilot is language Life's limited beneficiaries, to cases claims involving by participants and as above, out pointed 29 United States Code section both provides federal cause of action for relief in damages equitable By such cases. contrast, the section as originally enacted only relief provided equitable where a sued to enforce the There employer’s promise pay. were not six carefully crafted remedies to sustain the rights of the Additional- ly, remedies, for predicate is that Congress has but provided above, mechanisms, out liens, pointed has not Congress like provided collection of debts whether before or after I conclude that the judgment. broad is language here it inapplicable because is limited to actions by partic- beneficiaries, ipants and to situations where Congress has provided remedies. Cir. F.2d Terotechnology (5th 1990)
Iron Fund v. Workers Pension ante, 1053) majority (maj. also relied opn., upon no-additional-remedy on a broad largely reading language based that, read, Pilot be Pilot The court not as so would recognize did Life Life. that, even Mackey assuming in direct with the later decision conflict action it did not cause of to collect delinquencies, found due. mechanisms collect amounts provide Civil Code section 3111 is There also is no merit the claim that It does establish because preempted imposes funding requirements. level It more a statutes is no statute than funding. funding providing attachment, liens, liens funding are judgment mortgage garnishment, statutes.
VIII. Conclusion I that Civil section 3111 is not ERISA. conclude Code *27 law, decision, by California whether to statute or judicial due out ERISA it treatment. singles plans special plans, if members furnishing stand the shoes their seeking agreed payments, differently labor for than other improvements, treating claims, nonmembers, those majority compensation including opinion, for ERISA and their not treatment Legislature, provides special members. broad, does clause ERISA is sweep preemption
Although for securing state lien or other mechanisms laws preempt pretrial addition, be need not of debts. although point probably payment decided, to absence of federal cause of action at law recover money precludes finding judgment employer delinquencies intended, to when the clause was Congress preemption adopted, preempt mean that there such state causes of because such would action action, federal, to no to recover promised was cause payments fundamental, Given the expressed purpose Congress benefits, all be intent such actions cannot protect preclude Plan Amendments attributed to In the Pension Congress. Multiemployer collection Act of to add new remedies to permit Congress sought only remedies sought employer delinquencies preempt federal law. full they recovery insofar as precluded state reme- believed there were history shows that congressional them. and intended delinquencies preserve dies recover the judgment been section 3111 has not preempted, Civil Code be reversed. Court of should Appeal
Mosk, J., concurred.