6 Ct. Cl. 156 | Ct. Cl. | 1873
delivered the opinion of the court:
The statement of the facts found by the Court of Claims may be condensed as follows: In the year 1863, Major Hunt, of the
Though it has sometimes been said that an action of debt, or assumpsit, for the use and occupation of land, can be maintained only when the relation of landlord and tenant has existed between the plaintiff and defendant, this is not strictly accurate, if it be meant that a demise must be in fact proved. It is true that the statute of 11 George II, ch. 19, sec. 14, enacted that the action might be sustained when a demise has been proved, but the action existed before the statute was enacted, and the only effect of the statute was to enlarge its sphere. Privity of contract is doubtless essential in all cases. But when the defendant has entered and occupied by permission of the plaintiff, without any express contract, the law implies a promise on his part to make compensation or pay a reasonable
It is contended, however, on behalf of the present plaintiff, that the contract of purchase under which, or in the expectation of the completion of which, the-United States entered, and under which they continued to hold until the deed was made and the purchase-money was paid, was invalid; that, until the act of Congress of 1866 was passed, no Executive Department had authority to purchase the island, and that,-therefore, there was no legal contract for the purchase in existence until the' deed was made and the price paid. But if this be conceded, it can make no difference. Let it be that neither party could have enforced the. parol arrangement,.', it is.,still tru,e. that it .was utterly inconsistent with any understanding that the parties contemplated the one was to pay and the other was to receive rent for the occupation of the property. The understanding of the parties is the material thing. Unless it was in their contemplation that compensation, other than the price stipulated to be paid for the transfer of the title, should be made, as O. J. Mansfield said in Kirtland v. Pounsett, a contra'ct to pay rent cannot arise by implication of law.
The plain common sense of the caséis, that if the .plaintiff was entitled to anything beyond what he hasreceived, it was to interest on the purchase-money from the time the possession was taken until the price of the sale' waé'paid. That he should have demanded before he' delivered the deed. Not having done so, but having accepted the principal and consummated the sale, he cannot now assert that the relation in which his vendee stood' to, him was that of a tenant to a landlord, and recover interest in the shape of damages for the breach of an implied promise to pay rent for the use and occupation of the island. There is no room in the facts found by the Court of Claims for the implication of any such promise. • •
The judgment of the Court of Claims is affirmed.