190 Ind. 611 | Ind. | 1921
— This is a prosecution for receiving stolen goods, as defined by §381, Acts 1905 p. 668, §2273 Burns 1914.
The errors brought to this court are: (1) Overruling appellant's motion for a new trial, and (2) that the judgment appealed from is not fairly supported by the evidence.
The specifications of error of law in the motion for
Of the three vital elements of proof of this crime— to wit, (1) the larceny of the goods, (2) the subsequent reception of the stolen goods by the accused, (3). that the accused knew the goods were stolen — évidence which relates to the first and third element to be proved are complained of on this appeal.
Evidence was introduced by the state which tended to prove the accused guilty of other similar offenses for the purpose of proving his guilty knowledge. The questions which elicited this evidence were objected to by appellant, and the question is presented here upon exceptions to the rulings of the trial court thereon.
the intent of its commission is inferred from the act itself, and the jury would not be aided in determining guilt, by the proof of the commission by the accused of other similar offenses. 1 Wharton, Criminal Evidence (10th ed.) §36; Kahn v. State (1914), 182 Ind. 1, 105 N. E. 385. It was not error to admit evidence of the commission of other similar crimes by the accused for the purpose of proving intent in the case at bar. 1 Roscoe, Criminal Evidence (8th Am. ed.) p. 141; Beuchert v. State (1905), 165 Ind. 523, 76 N. E. 111, 6 Ann. Cas. 914. The proof of other crimes of like nature by the accused for the purpose of proving guilty knowledge was permitted by statute in England, (Prevention of Crimes Act, 34, 35 Vict. ch. 112, §19) which recognized the necessity of permitting the introduction of such evidence in prosecutions for receiving stolen goods. While the admission of such evidence is not gov
There being no reversible error in the record, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.