Todd Carpenter received a lump sum payment from the Social Security Administration (SSA). Shortly thereafter, Carpenter filed for bankruptcy relief under Chapter 7. Carpenter claimed the social security payment was exempt and should not be included in his bankruptcy estate, relying on 42 U.S.C. § 407 (“[N]one of the moneys paid ... under this [Social Security Act] shall be subject to ... the operation of any bankruptcy or insolvency law.”). The bankruptcy Trustee, Charles W. Ries (Trustee), objected to the exemption, and the bankruptcy court sustained the Trustee’s objection, finding the social security proceeds were property of the estate pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 541 (including “all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case,” and nоt excluding social security payments). The United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Eighth Circuit (BAP) reversed, finding the social security payment was excluded from the Chapter 7 bankruptcy estate pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 407. We agree with the BAP and reverse the bankruptcy court.
I. BACKGROUND
In March 2006, the SSA determined Carpenter was disabled. In September 2007, the SSA sent Carpenter a lump sum payment in the amount оf $17,165 for retroactive benefits due for September 2006 through August 2007. Carpenter deposited the check into a bank account on November 6, 2007, and kept the funds segregated. On April 3, 2008, Carpenter filed for relief under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. Shortly before filing for bankruptcy, Carpenter withdrew the social security funds in the form of a cashier’s check, dated January 31, 2008.
When a debtor files for bankruptcy, a bankruptcy estate is established.
See
11 U.S.C. § 541(a). The bankruptcy estate is generally deemed to include all of the debtor’s legal or equitable interests in
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property at the time of filing.
See id.
§ 541(a)(1). The Bankruptcy Code, however, permits the debtor to exempt certain property from the estate.
See Rousey v. Jacoway,
Carpenter elected the federal bankruptcy exemptions listed in § 522(d). One of the listed exemptions under § 522(d) exempts “[t]he debtor’s right to receive ... a social security benefit, unemployment compensation, or a local public assistance benefit.” Id. § 522(d)(10)(A). Carpenter claimed his social security proceeds were exempt under this provision. Carpenter further argued his accumulated social security proceeds should be excluded from the bankruptcy estate by operation of 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2), because the proceeds constituted “a bеneficial interest of the debtor in a trust that is enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law.” Carpenter also generally asserted his social security proceeds were protected by 42 U.S.C. § 407, which provides, in pertinent part:
(a) The right of any person to any future payment under this subchapter shall not be transferable or assignable, at law or in equity, and none of the moneys paid or payable or rights existing under this subchapter shall be subject to exeсution, levy, attachment, garnishment, or other legal process, or to the operation of any bankruptcy or insolvency law.
(b) No other provision of law, enacted before, on, or after April 20, 1983, may be construed to limit, supersede, or otherwise modify the provisions of this section except to the extent that it does so by express reference to this section.
(emphasis added).
The bankruptcy court held the 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) exclusion did not apply to the social security funds Carpenter had already received, holding, “[u]nder these circumstances, there is no trustee, beneficiary or trust res because the benefit was long since disbursed and the interest is no longer beneficial but a fully realized present interest in cash.”
In re Carpenter,
Carpenter appealed the bankruptcy court’s adverse finding to the BAP. The BAP agreed with the bankruptcy court’s position that Carpenter’s social security proceeds were not exempt under 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(A), because “the cashier’s check held by Carpenter does not consti
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tute ‘the right to receive’ a social security benefit, but instead represents funds which were previously paid as such a benefit.”
Carpenter v. Ries (In re Carpenter),
[S]ince no provision in the Bankruptcy Code makes express reference to § 407, and, without such express reference, that statute renders sоcial security benefits, paid or payable, free from the operation of any bankruptcy law, a bankruptcy trustee has no authority to administer, as property of the bankruptcy estate, moneys paid to a debtor as social security benefits.
Id. at 248. The BAP concluded Carpenter’s social security proceeds must be excluded from the bankruptcy estate pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 407 and may be retained by the debtor. Id. at 248-49. The Trustee appeals the BAP’s decision.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
“Applying the same standards as the [BAP], we review the bankruptcy court’s findings of fact for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo.”
Official Plan Comm. v. Expeditors Int’l of Wash., Inc. (In re Gateway Pac. Corp.),
B. Relevant Statutes
“Title II of the Social Security Act of 1935 established a social insurance program for wage earners and their dependents, to be pаid out of a trust funded by the payroll taxes of wage earners and their employers.”
Hildebrand v. SSA (In re Buren),
Congress later enacted the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. In doing so, Congress reformulated the classes of persons who may qualify as a “debtor” for purposes of Title 11. See 11 U.S.C. § 109. The Bankruptcy Reform Act did not significantly change the previous law as to who was eligible for liquidation under Chapter 7; however, it did broaden the class of persons who were eligible for relief under Chapter 13. See id. § 109(b) and (e); H.R.Rep. No. 95-595, at 118-19 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6080 (noting under the previous law, only a “wage earner” could file a Chapter 13 case, and by extending eligibility to any “individual with regular incomе,” the Act would permit “even individuals whose primary income is from investments, pensions, social security, or welfare [to] use Chapter 13 if their income is sufficiently stable and regular”). Congress also expanded the definition of “property of the estate,” declaring, as relevant here, that the bankruptcy estate is comprised of “all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in prоperty as of the *934 commencement of the case.” 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1).
Despite this broad definition of “property of the estate,” the Bankruptcy Code contains several provisions which exclude specific property interests from the estate. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(b)(l)-(9). As discussed briefly supra, the Bankruptcy Code also permits debtors to exempt certain property from the estate. Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1), a debtor may elect to exempt the property listed under § 522(b)(2), or the property listed under § 522(b)(3), unless of course, the state opts out of the federal bankruptcy scheme. If the debtor elects to exempt the property listed under § 522(b)(2), the debtor may exempt from the estate all the property specified under § 522(d). See id. § 522(d)(l)-(12). One of the exemptions listed under § 522(d) includes “[t]he debt- or’s right to receive ... a social security benefit, unemployment compensation, or a local public assistance benefit.” Id. § 522(d)(10)(A). On the other hand, if the debtor elects to exempt the proрerty set forth in § 522(b)(3), the debtor generally may exempt “any property that is exempt under Federal law, other than subsection (d) of this section, or State and local law that is applicable on the date of the filing....” Id. § 522(b)(3)(A). None of the relevant Bankruptcy Code provisions mention 42 U.S.C. § 407, nor do they specify whether past and future social security proceeds are excluded from propеrty of the bankruptcy estate altogether, or whether such proceeds may only be exempted under either § 522(b)(2) or § 522(b)(3).
C. Conflicting Statutes
The conflict between the applicable bankruptcy statutes and 42 U.S.C. § 407 is readily apparent. Section 407, in its original form, expressly declared, “none of the moneys paid or payable ... shall be subject to ... the operation of any bankruptcy or insolvency law.” 42 U.S.C. § 407 (1939). In contrast, under the Bankruptcy Code, “all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property” are deemed to be property of the bankruptcy estate. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1). The Bankruptcy Code does not expressly reference § 407 or exclude social security income from property of the estate, but instead provides certain exemptions, which may, or may not, permit the debtor to exempt social security proceeds. The inconsistency between § 407 and the Bankruptcy Code is most transparent under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code, which was designed, in part, to expand relief under the Bankruptcy Code to social security recipients.
See United States v. Devall,
Due to these inconsistent provisions, courts have struggled to determine when social security proceeds should be included in a debtor’s bankruptcy estate. Some courts have held Congress implicitly re
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pealed 42 U.S.C. § 407 by enacting the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978.
See De-vall,
In 1983, Congress reacted to court decisions limiting the scope of the Social Security Act by amending § 407. Congress added subsection (b) which states, “No other provision of law, enacted before, on, or after April 20, 1983, may be construed to limit, supersede, or otherwise modify the provisions of this section except to the extent that it does so by express reference to this section.” 42 U.S.C. § 407(b).
2
This amendment did little to clarify the interplay between § 407 and the Bankruptcy Code, and courts have failed to interpret the applicable provisions consistently.
Compare In re Lazin,
D. Proper Resolution
The Sixth Circuit, in
In re Buren,
Although Carpenter’s case here involves a Chapter 7 bankruptcy, as opposed to a Chapter 13 bankruptcy, we believe
In re Burén
is instructive. As recognized by the Sixth Circuit, § 407 does not contain any qualifying language. It explicitly demands that no past or future social security payments may be subject to the operation of any bankruptcy law.
See
42 U.S.C. § 407(a). Section 407 also instructs that it is not to be limited by any other provision of law, without express reference to § 407.
See id.
§ 407(b). If we were to hold, as the bankruptcy court did in this case, that § 407 is a mere exemption which may not be claimed if the debtor instead elects the exemptions set forth in 11 U.S.C. § 522(d), then we would also be interpreting § 407 contrary to the express language of § 407, saying the scope of § 407’s protection is limited.
See In re Barron,
We
therefore hold, in accord with the BAP’s decision, that § 407 operates as a complete bar to the forced inclusion of past and future social security proceeds in the bankruptcy estate.
See Carpenter II,
III. CONCLUSION
We affirm the judgment of the BAP reversing the bankruptcy court.
Notes
. Section 522(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code permits states to opt out of the federal exemption scheme, thereby requiring debtors to claim the аpplicable state exemptions. Minnesota, Carpenter's home state, has not opted out, and Carpenter was therefore free to choose between the exemptions listed in 11 U.S.C. § 522(d), or those set forth under state and other federal law.
. We need not consider the legislative history behind the amendment because the language of the statute is unambiguous and clear on its face. See
Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass’n v. United Van Lines, LLC,
. We recognize it is not easy to reconcile our interpretation of § 407 with the provision in the Bankruptcy Code which states that a debt- or may elect to exempt "[t]he debtor’s right to receive ... a social security benefit, unemployment compensation, or a local public assistance benefit.” 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(A). As discussed above, there is no way to construe § 407 in a manner which would not conflict with the Bankruptcy Code. The bankruptcy court in
In re Barron,
. Such a holding does not deny social security recipients the opportunity to file for relief under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code.
