232 Pa. 362 | Pa. | 1911
Opinion by
The material facts in this controversy are not in dispute. The appellee was a wholesale dealer in confections, and, in connection with that business, dealt in fireworks. The refuse which accumulated at his place of business was put into barrels and taken to and deposited on a
The dumping by the appellee of refuse containing fireworks on a lot where boys gathered to play is the negligence of which the appellant complains. Whether his doing so was negligence is a question upon which we need not pass, as it clearly appeared that the direct, proximate cause of the injuries sustained was something else. Under the uncontradicted testimony, the refuse, as soon as deposited upon the ground, became the property of Ludlow. In addition to receiving a stipulated sum for the privilege of depositing it, whatever was in it became his property as soon as it was deposited on the lot. Counsel for the appellee contends, and with reason, that after the refuse was thus sold to Ludlow, he alone was responsible for what was done with it. But on this we need not dwell. In dumping the refuse on the lot no injury was done to the boy. After it had been dumped on the lot nothing in it injured him there, and nothing in it would have injured him elsewhere if he had left it alone. Instead of doing so
There was nothing unlawful or unusual in appellee’s dumping refuse upon the public dumping ground. He did what is and has been constantly done in all thickly settled communities. In all rubbish heaps on dumping grounds there are to be found rusty iron, broken knives, bottles and glass and innumerable other useless articles, always likely to cause injury to boys who may dig them out and handle them, but it has never yet been held that one who thus does what is usual and customary is guilty of any negligence. Though there were unexploded fireworks in the refuse deposited by the appellee, they could have caused no injury unless fire was applied to them, while all the other articles enumerated might have caused injury without any intervening agency. The appellant- and his companion might have handled the flowerpot on the premises without the slightest danger of any injury to them unless they lighted it. The injury to young Carpenter was not the immediate consequence of the deposit of the refuse on the dumping ground, but resulted from his independent, intervening act in taking the flowerpot from his home, to which place he had safely carried it, and setting fire to it sometime afterwards. His injury could not reasonably have been contemplated as the result of the appellee’s act in placing the rubbish on the lot. -The boy’s own act was the direct, proximate eause of his injuries: Marsh v. Giles, 211 Pa. 17.
The assignments of error are overruled and the judgment is affirmed.