6 Mo. App. 216 | Mo. Ct. App. | 1878
delivered the opinion of the court.
This action was for damages against defendants for having fraudulently and collusively sold certain lands of plaintiff by foreclosure of a deed of trust which plaintiff claims was paid at the date of the foreclosure. Hall was trustee in the deed of trust, and the Bank of Missouri claimed to be the owner of the note secured by it.
The defendant Hall, by his guardian, Jamison, denied all fraud and collusion, and all knowledge that the note was paid; says that he acted in good faith, and disclaimed all interest in the suit. The defendant the bank denies that plaintiff owned the land, denies that the note was paid before the foreclosure, and denies all fraud and collusion;
The new matter in the answer was denied by the reply. The cause was tried before a jury. At the close of plaintiff’s
We have not the entire testimony in the case before us, as the deposition of Hall is not copied into the bill of exceptions. From what appears, however, it is manifest that plaintiff had no case. He certainly had no case unless the note was paid at the date of the foreclosure.
Plaintiff swears that he had paid over $700 on the note to Brown ; part of these payments were made after the note was due. He says he paid the balance due on the note after it had been purchased by the Bank of Missouri; that this payment was made to the bank in 1862, by a general settlement. In evidence of this settlement, plaintiff offered the following receipt: —
“ Beceived, Saint Louis, January 17th, 1866, from James M. Carpenter, eighteen hundred and seventy-six dollars ($1,876.29), and his notes dated January 13th, 1866, payable, one in three months, for six hundred dollars ; one in six months, for six hundred dollars ; and one in nine months, for six hundred dollars, all indorsed by John B. Lionberger & Co.; which money and notes are received in settlement of all demands which this bank holds against the firm of Cuddy, Carpenter & Co., including indorsements on the paper of Bollin Clark. And the Bank of the State of Missouri agrees to release the judgments which she holds against the said Cuddy, Carpenter & Co., or James M. Carpenter, in Montgomery County, Illinois, and in Saint Louis, Mo., at the expense of said Carpenter, when so required by said Carpenter. A. S. Bobinson, Cashier.”
Plaintiff then offered to prove that the settlement and payment evidenced by this receipt included the Brown note held by the bank, and under which the foreclosure took place. The court excluded all oral testimony tending to vary
The oral testimony in the case, besides that of plaintiff himself, was that of one Lowry, who was also liable to the bank on the paper of Cuddy, Carpenter & Co. Lowry testified that he and plaintiff went to the bank and proposed a settlement in January, 1867 ; and that the money for which the receipt was given was paid to settle the indebtedness of the plaintiff and himself on the Cuddy, Carpenter & Co. notes ; he remembered also that the indorsement of plaintiff on a note of Rollin Clark was spoken of as among the debts included. Lowry paid one-half of the money given to procure the receipt. He remembered no notes being spoken of in that settlement except the Rollin Clark note and the Cuddy, Carpenter & Co. notes, on which he was jointly liable with Carpenter. The whole transaction, he says, was embraced in the receipt. ,
The receipt of the bank to Carpenter seems to have been a memorial of the transaction between themselves and Carpenter, intended to stand as evidence of the intention and act of the parties in case of any future question about it. So far as this transaction between the bank and Carpenter is concerned, it seems to be complete. There is no ambiguity about it that needs explanation by oral testimony. It says that the money received from Carpenter was received in settlement of all demands against Cuddy, Carpenter & Co’.', and that certain judgments are to be released by the bank. It is not a mere acknowledgment of payment; so far as that, it is merely prima facie, and not conclusive; but as the evidence of the contract between the parties, it is as any other written agreement, and cannot be contradicted or enlarged by oral testimony. The paper was not a mere receipt: it constitutes and imports a contract, — and a contract, too, as to something future to be done.
The trial court committed no error in excluding oral tes
The judgment of the Circuit Court is affirmed.