*1 right to speedy (We waiver of defendant’s trial. before the district bench. do not con- 6, 1983, suppression hearing period The December sider the considering remand when interrupted limitation.) and continued until March one-year the go Even if we so 22, 1984, the because of State’s failure to (from far as days to subtract the seven prepare. As result the 22) district court November caused defense motion, sustaining defendant’s conflict, State counsel’s trial still more than a application discretionary filed an year review lapsed had with no trial. The defend- 6, April During appeal 1984. long ant weight has suffered too with the attorney general’s sought office twice and charges. of these criminal received extensions for time to file briefs Furthermore, of our affirm- (served 14,1984, August September 13, and court, ance of the district we note our 1984). year Within the first the defendant review is not de only novo. We reverse suppress filed motion and received a Lyburger, abuse of discretion. week continuance due to a trial conflict. only N.W.2d at 546. The State not failed 27, 1983, September September From showing its burden of good waiver or defendant did not waive his cause, it also failed to show an abuse in the speedy trial. trial court’s discretion. one-year period After has AFFIRMED. lapsed, the State has the burden of show ing “good delay. delay cause” for the September
here is from to Febru
ary key 1986. We consider the factor delay.”
“the reason for the delay (1)
Here by: was caused
period required to obtain a full and fair
hearing sup- on the defendant’s motion to press; (2) granted during extensions CARPENTER, Richard J. (3) appeal; the State’s amendment Petitioner-Appellant, delay to the information. The was the prepare result of: the State’s failure to 6, 1983, suppression hearing; December IOWA DEPARTMENT OF JOB SER attorney general’s timely failure to file VICE and Schneider Metal Manufac appeal; briefs on and the State’s amend- Inc., turing Company, Respondents-Ap ment of the nearly years information pellees. arraignment. State, after the initial “The No. 86-422. defendant, not the prosecu- must see that timely tion is trial is afforded Court of of Iowa. period.” within the Ly allowable State v. barger, (Iowa 1978). Dec. speedy guarantee trial designed, is
among things, other “to shorten disrup
tion of life pres caused arrest and the charges.”
ence of unresolved criminal MacDonald,
United States v. 456 U.S.
102 S.Ct. 71 L.Ed.2d
(1982). Here the State failed to fulfill its
duty. arraignment From the initial to the period days passed;
final trial date a of 862
of those 411 supreme were on
court and proceed 78 involved a remand Therefore,
ing. days for 373 this case was
Blair Dewey, H. Walter F. Maley, and Joseph L. Bervid the Iowa Department Service, Moines, of Job Des for respondent- appellee. SNELL, P.J.,
Heard by HAYDEN, SCHLEGEL and JJ.
HAYDEN, Judge. petitioner, Richard Carpenter, J. worked as an assembler at factory April 30, 1979, until his dis- charge January 22, on 1985. His wife was employed factory. also at this Petitioner discharged using was offensive lan- guage day toward on the of termination. petitioner’s
The incidents which led to discharge began January 20,1985, on when pipes the water mobile home evening he broke. That called his wife’s requested supervisor and that his wife be given day January off so repair plumb- she could attend of the ing. supervisor granted request. pipe repair, Due to peti- the nature reported to work January tioner given to be day and asked off so on the pipes. Again he could work water granted. request was Petitioner failed supervisor to tell his that his wife had also work been excused from to attend to the pipes. broken morning, January
On the next petitioner supervi- confronted his sor, him questioned why who as to he need- when day already ed the off his wife had off. As a day taken the result of this petitioner supervisor discussion told his “You can ass or fire me or kiss whatev- morning petitioner’s er.” the same On supervisor her wife was also confronted why both she and her asked husband day needed the off. After this confronta- began cry wife tion and left her work station. Petitioner saw her and questioned happened. her as to what had explain went to Petitioner then situa- supervisor, told him tion to his wife’s who Wagenaar Legal J. want Ronald Services that she did not to hear about it. In Corporation, City, petitioner-ap- going Mason said “I am response, petitioner to tell thing I pellant. you the same told Joe [his supervisor]. guys nay 17A.19(8)(f) You can all kiss pro Iowa Code section ap- ass.” This statement was made within vides that in a contested case the court proximately half an hour after his initial grant shall relief agency from an action peti- remark. Two hours after this last act supported by which is not substantial evi tioner insubordination. dence when that record is viewed as a whole. Evidence is substantial unemploy- Petitioner filed a claim for *3 agency’s if person decision a reasonable ment benefits which was denied in a claims adequate given would find it to reach the 7, deputy February decision dated 1985. conclusion. Meads v. Iowa appealed by petitioner; This decision was of Services, 555, Social 558 11, hearing was held on March 1985. 1985). possibility drawing of in officer, hearing in a decision dated March consistent conclusions from the record does 1985, 15, concluded: actions prevent agency’s finding not from be disregard of were the stan- ing supported- by substantial evidence. employer right dards which the has a Services, Depart Contract Ltd. v. Iowa expect; contrary the conduct was to and ment 372 N.W.2d 215- in the employer; not best interest of the of (Iowa 1985). 16 Our sole task is to deter disqualifying and therefore amounted to mine whether claimant is entitled to unem appealed ap- misconduct. Petitioner to the ployment Billingsley benefits. v. Iowa De board, peal April which af- partment hearing firmed the officer. He then filed a of (Iowa Ct.App.1983). 540 We do not chal request rehearing, which was denied on lenge employer’s right to terminate May Having 1985. exhausted his ad- employment. claimant’s remedies, petitioner pe- ministrative filed a judicial tition for in the review Cerro Gordo disqualified A claimant is from unem- district court. In an order filed June ployment department benefits “[i]f 1985, the court found misconduct and finds the individual has been thereby appeals affirmed the board’s deci- misconduct in connection with the individu- sion. employment.” 96.5(2) al’s Iowa Code § (1985). The provide Iowa Code does not
Petitioner asserts there was insufficient
definition of misconduct.
agency’s finding
evidence to
of
asserts,
alternative,
misconduct. He
in the
The Iowa Administrative Code defines
law,
as a matter of
his use of
“misconduct” as:
towards the two
did not consti-
deliberate act or omission
a work-
[A]
disqualifying
tute
er which constitutes a material
of
breach
arising
obligations arising
In cases
out
Iowa Adminis-
the duties and
out of
Act,
scope
trative Procedure
our
of
employment.
review
such worker’s contract of
is limited to the correction of errors of
Misconduct
the term
law.
as
is used
(1985); Mary
disqualification provision
being
Iowa Code 17A.20
v. Iowa
limited
§
Transportation,
evincing
382
to conduct
such willful or wan-
of
(Iowa 1986).
N.W.2d
disregard
employer’s
131
When we
ton
of an
interest
court,
review the decision of the
district
as is found
deliberate violation or dis-
regard
issue with which we are concerned is
of standards of
which
behavior
correctly applied
expect
whether the district court
has the
“In
employees,
negli-
the law.
order to make that
or in carelessness or
determina-
tion,
applies
gence
degree
this court
the standard of sec-
of recurrence as to
17A.19(8)
agency
equal culpability, wrongful
tion
to the
action to deter-
manifest
in-
design,
mine whether this court’s conclusions are
tent or evil
or to show an inten-
the same as those of the
district court.”
tional and substantial
employee’s
County
Hospital
Jackson
Public
v. Public
interests or of the
Board,
Employment
obligations
employer.
280
duties and
Relations
(Iowa 1979).
inefficiency,
N.W.2d
mere
un-
429-30
On the other hand
conduct,
satisfactory
good per-
failure in
ant’s comment was not made in the course
inability
argument,
as the result of
or
formance
did not serve to undermine
incapacity,
ordinary
or
inadvertencies
authority,
her
and was an isolated incident
instances,
good
negligence in isolated
relatively
import.
minor
Id. at
We
judgment
errors in
or discretion are
faith
not think
do
the issue of
mis-
Wis.
This definition reflects the intent
legislature.
370 I.A.C. §
of
(Iowa),
meaning of the statute.
not
Boynton
cert.
be deemed misconduct within
denied,
Huntoon
4.32(1)(a) (language taken
296 N.W.
Cab
Co. v.
U.S.
Neubeck,
852, 100
(1941)).
447-48
S.Ct.
conduct should
ing
repeated
rous language
may amount to misconduct.
Even in
language:
[*]
From
incidents of abusive
[*]
factory setting,
be resolved this
does not
[*]
[*]
adopt
always prevail,
where deco-
[*]
the follow
easily.
[*]
*4
(1979).
employer
The bemay fying conduct harmful to misconduct. justify employees er’s interests and testimony regarding The only discharge; nevertheless, it evokes language employer’s factory used at estab disqualification unemployment bene- vulgar language occasion lished that willful, only equally if it is fits wanton or petitioner ap ally heard. Here culpable. by supervisor proached his and asked to question is no his explain There ac- both his and wife’s absence intentional; rather, prior tions were date. Due to his frustration in this reasons, questions petitioner a and to trying whether as matter of law relate his told supervisor my “You can kiss ass or fire matter fact these actions constituted his petitioner The If acts had misconduct. contends this me whatever.” very stopped point Budding case is to at this case Budding similar However, supportive. arguably could be visiting Ct.App.1983). upon seeing In and with his petitioner, wife, receiving supervisor crying claimant was went his wife’s warnings twenty-six going you class-two in a said “I am to tell the same three and Claimant, period. receiving thing guys my I all month after told You can kiss Joe. act, reprimand, supervisor Through approximately to his as a referred ass.” “dirty thirty bitch.” court claim- the initial confronta- noted that minutes after
tion, petitioner possible 1) vulgar elevated a minor language use of is an iso- incident; peccadillo to lated an act of willful misconduct. 2) it in occurs an environment where de- law, employees As a matter of are not language required; corous is not and
expected entirely to be docile and man- well 3) it is not occasioned a deliberate nered at all times. Budding, 337 N.W.2d obey refusal a reasonable directive. But, repeated at 222. incidents of abusive Id. language supervisor may directed at a be Also, language abusive which First, I am not convinced that this is supervisor’s authority, undermines the and more than an isolated instance. The inci-
therein evinces a willful of the questioning dent arose out of the interest, can be misconduct. Fi- employee respective his wife their note, nally, proper under the concerning day circum- off taken language stances plumbing abusive directed to a su- husband and wife to fix pervisor their home. vulgar can be a form of Petitioner made insubordination remarks. He supervisor told his “You may disquali- which alone be can construed as my kiss ass or fire me or He fying whatever.” misconduct. See Carroll v. Board of told supervisor, going his wife’s “I am Review, 686, 692, Ill.App.3d 87 Ill.Dec. you tell thing the same that I told Joe. (1985), 477 N.E.2d guys You can all kiss ass.” I believe Strong Unemployment v. Commonwealth our in Budding referring to iso- Review, Board 73 Pa.Commw. vulgarity contemplates lated instances of 459 A.2d repeated pattern order *5 agency’s supported by decision is misconduct, constitute separate not substantial evidence and as a matter of emanating sentences from the same inci- law, petitioner’s actions constituted miscon- dent. See also Annot. 92 A.L.R.3rd 106 Viewing whole, duct. the record as a majority’s distinction of this find sufficient evidence to case from Budding on the basis of two agency’s finding of misconduct. These separated by “kiss ass” comments peccadillos, acts did not amount to mere period stemming short of time and they rather were intentional utterances is, least, the same incident at the strained. of a standard of be- Second, the evidence established that expect, havior the has a to language was used in this environ- amounting to misconduct. Budding, swearing ment. As in here was AFFIRMED. factory heard in this occasionally. at least Third, vulgar language was not occa- SNELL, J., concurs. sioned obey deliberate refusal SCHLEGEL, J., dissents. reasonable directive. There was no deliber- ate employee obey refusal di- SCHLEGEL, Judge (dissenting). employer. rective Neither of the law, As a matter of vulgar use of employee conversations between and em- language in these circumstances not ployer by anyone were witnessed other misconduct. participants. than the We have held that in some circumstances In dealing our cases vulgarity vulgarity the use of language and abusive misconduct, disqualifying we have either can amount to misconduct. Budding v. looked to the fact that customers or other Department Iowa 337 employees questionable overheard the lan (Iowa Ct.App.1983). We guage, e.g. see Zeches v. Iowa provided determining have criteria for if vulgar language the use of constitutes mis- Ct.App.1983),or we have looked to the fact Budding
conduct. states vulgarity that the use of that the accompanied with a vulgar language is obey not misconduct if: supervisors, refusal to e.g. see War Iowa rell v. (Iowa Ct.App.1984).
Budding’s examples of where go directly amount
could to misconduct where the use of such
situations
clearly impairs operation the essen functioning
tial
of the business
service.
Job Ser
vice,
Since listed misconduct not met in
determine were
instance, how, I do not see as a matter of
law, say we can here constituted
conduct INC., FS,
SOUTHWEST
Plaintiff-Appellee, FISHER, Raymond Stanley Pogge, Pogge, E. Root & E. Bluffs, Fleming, Defendant-Appellant. defendant-ap- Council *6 pellant. No. 86-486. Bluffs, Richard D. Council Crotty, Court of Iowa. plaintiff-appellee.
Dec. OXBERGER, C.J., Heard SACKETT, JJ.
SCHLEGEL SACKETT, Judge. dispute
This involves between Inc., FS, prod- a farm Plaintiff Southwest supplier, Stanley ucts and Defendant Fish- landlord, concerning er, a entitlement to a Pillsbury Company check issued appeals Fisher payment for beans sold. declaratory that South- judgment security crop in a farm west’s interest acquired by Fisher superior to the interest agreement a tenant. Fisher under not inferior due to his interest was asserts timely perfect a landlord’s his failure to provided in the manner Iowa Code lien agree. Chapter 570 We