222 Conn. 269 | Conn. | 1992
The sole issue in this appeal is whether the plaintiffs’ application for a wetlands permit was automatically approved when the local inland wetlands agency failed to hold a public hearing on the application within sixty-five days after its receipt, in accordance with General Statutes (Rev. to 1989) § 22a-42a (c)
Although the plaintiffs raised several claims in their administrative appeal, including that concerning automatic approval of the application,
We begin our analysis with the language of the relevant statute and regulation. When the plaintiffs filed their application,
We have held a time limit to be mandatory, so that a land use agency’s failure to comply with it results in the automatic approval of an application in three situations: (1) the statute contains express language invalidating belated action by the agency or automatically approving an application not acted upon within the requisite time period; id., 554-55; see also Finn v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 156 Conn. 540, 554, 244 A.2d 391 (1968); (2) the statute contains a provision requiring an applicant’s consent for an extension of the statutory time period; Vartuli v. Sotire, 192 Conn. 353, 363-64, 472 A.2d 336 (1984); see also Carr v. Woolwich, 7 Conn. App. 684, 694-95, 510 A.2d 1358, cert. denied, 201 Conn. 804, 513 A.2d 698 (1986); and
The plaintiffs concede that the applicable statute and regulation contain neither express invalidating language nor consent to extension provisions. They claim, however, that § 22a-42a (c) is mandatory because it is administratively linked to General Statutes § 8-3 (g),
In Vartuli v. Sotire, supra, this court interpreted the time limitation contained in the Coastal Management Act, General Statutes (Rev. to 1983) § 22a-109 (f),
Unlike the statutory scheme in Vartuli, the inland wetlands statutes in existence at the time the plaintiffs’ application was pending contain no language directly connecting the wetlands time limitation to any statutory provisions for automatic approval or consent to an extension. The zoning statutes mentioned by the
The plaintiffs also advance the argument that, even if no express administrative linkage exists, the statute and regulation must be interpreted as mandatory in order to promote uniformity among the time constraints placed on land use agencies. They claim that, since the legislature placed the same sixty-five day time limitation on site plan review; General Statutes § 8-7d (b); coastal site plan review; General Statutes § 22a-109 (g); subdivision applications; General Statutes § 8-26d (b); and inland wetlands and watercourses applications; General Statutes § 22a-42a (c); all those time limitations should be interpreted as creating a mandatory duty. The commission points out, however, that in 1977, the legislature enacted Public Acts 1977, No. 77-450, which amended the existing planning and zoning statutes to include a uniform time limitation of sixty-five days within which a planning and zoning commission must take action on an application and a provision for automatic approval of applications not acted upon within the requisite time period.
We agree with the commission that the legislature’s failure to amend the time limitations on inland wetlands agencies in 1977, when it amended the time limitations on several other land use agencies, is a significant indication that it did not intend to impose the same mandatory strictures on inland wetlands agencies. The legislature enacted § 22a-42a (c) in 1973, fours years before the 1977 act. Because “the legislature is presumed to exercise its statutory authority with knowledge of existing statutes and with the intention of creating one consistent body of law”; Kinney v. State, 213 Conn. 54, 65, 566 A.2d 670 (1989); we conclude that its omission of inland wetlands agencies from the purview of the 1977 act indicates its intention not to make the time limitation on wetlands decisions mandatory, as it did in planning and zoning decisions.
Both the plaintiffs and the commission claim support for their diverse interpretations of § 22a-42a (c) in a subsequent amendment to that statute, Public Acts 1989, No. 89-356, § 16
Relying on the precept of statutory construction that the legislature intends to change existing law when it enacts new statutory language unless a contrary legislative intent appears; see Hall Manor Owner’s Assn. v. West Haven, 212 Conn. 147, 155, 561 A.2d 1373 (1989); the plaintiffs maintain that the 1989 amendment changed the time constraint in § 22a-42a (c) from mandatory to directory. The commission counters with the argument that the amendment merely clarified what was already a directory time constraint. It claims that the legislature amended the statute to avoid any confusion that might have existed about the nature of the time requirement, since that requirement had not yet been construed by an appellate court in this state.
Although both interpretations are arguable, we are inclined to adopt the commission’s view that the 1989 amendment clarified what was already a directory time constraint. Unfortunately, the legislative history of the 1989 amendment does not shed any light upon the reasons for its passage. This void, however, does not preclude construction of the 1989 amendment as intended
Finally, we note that the presumption that the 1989 amendment changed the nature of the time limitation is rebutted by the language of the statute before it was amended. The time requirement contains no negative words or express invalidation language. As we stated in Huck v. Inland Wetlands & Watercourses Agency, 203 Conn. 525, 535, 525 A.2d 940 (1987), “[t]he require
The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.
General Statutes (Rev. to 1989) § 22a-42a (e) provided in relevant part: “No later than sixty-five days after the receipt of such application, the inland wetlands agency may hold a public hearing on such application. . . .Action shall be taken on applications within thirty-five days after the completion of a public hearing or in the absence of a public hearing within sixty-five days from the date of receipt of the application.”
At the time of the plaintiffs’ application, § 5.6 (a) of the Berlin inland wetlands and watercourses regulations provided: “All public hearings shall commence not sooner than thirty (30) days nor later than (65) sixty-five
The plaintiffs also named as defendants Clyde Seylner, chairman of the Berlin inland wetlands and watercourses commission, the town of Berlin, Joanne Ward, Berlin town clerk, and Leslie Carothers, commissioner of the department of environmental protection.
Some of the claims raised were that the commission denied the plaintiffs a fair hearing, that the commission’s decision was not supported by the evidence before it, that the commission had predetermined the outcome of the case and that the commission had failed to hold a public hearing within sixty-five days of receipt of the application.
We granted certification to appeal, limited to the following issue: “In the circumstances of this case, have the plaintiffs established their entitlement to automatic approval of their application for a wetlands permit because of the defendant’s failure to act within the time period specified by the relevant statute and regulation?” Caron v. Inland Wetlands & Watercourses Commission, 220 Conn. 906, 593 A.2d 971 (1991).
The Appellate Court determined that the case was governed by the relevant statute and regulation in effect when the plaintiffs filed their application despite subsequent amendments made to each during the pendency of the application. Caron v. Inland Wetlands & Watercourses Commission, 25 Conn. App. 61, 63-64, 592 A.2d 964 (1991). The applicability to this case of the subsequent amendments is not a certified issue before us in this appeal. See Mulrooney v. Wambolt, 215 Conn. 211, 216-17, 575 A.2d 996 (1990); Darak v. Darak, 210 Conn. 462, 467-68, 556 A.2d 145 (1989).
To comply with the statute and the regulation, the commission would have had to hold the hearing on or before January 5, 1989, that is, within sixty-five days after receipt of the application. November 1, 1988, was the date of receipt referred to in General Statutes (Rev. to 1989) § 22a-42a (c), which provided: “The day of receipt of an application shall be the day of the next regularly scheduled meeting of [the] inland wetlands agency, immediately following the day of submission to such inland wetlands agency or its agent of such application, provided such meeting is no earlier than three business days after receipt, or thirty-five days after such submission, whichever is sooner.” Whether the continuance granted at the plaintiffs’ request could be viewed as extending the statutory time period of § 22a-42a (c) is a question not before us in this certified appeal.
General Statutes § 8-3 (g) provides in relevant part: “The decision of the zoning commission shall not be rendered on the site plan application until the inland wetlands agency has submitted a report with its final decision. In making its decision the zoning commission shall give due consideration to the report of the inland wetlands agency. A site plan may be modified or denied only if it fails to comply with requirements already set forth in the zoning or inland wetlands regulations. Approval of a site plan shall be presumed unless a decision to deny or modify it is rendered within the period specified in section 8-7d.”
General Statutes § 8-7d (e) provides: “Notwithstanding the provisions of this section, if an application involves an activity regulated pursuant to sections 22a-36 to 22a-45, inclusive, and the time for a decision by a zoning commission or planning and zoning commission established pursuant to this section would elapse prior to the thirty-fifth day after a decision by the inland wetlands agency, the time period for a decision shall be extended to thirty-five days after the decision of such agency. The provisions of this subsection shall not be construed to apply to any extension consented to by an applicant or petitioner.”
In 1987, General Statutes § 22a-109 (f) was redesignated as § 22a-109 (h) when the legislature added a new subsection to the statute. See Public Acts 1987, No. 87-495.
Consent to extension provisions were also added by the amendment. Public Acts 1977, No. 77-450.
For a thorough discussion of the changes effected by the 1977 act, see Carr v. Woolwich, 7 Conn. App. 684, 688-95, 510 A.2d 1358, cert. denied, 201 Conn. 804, 513 A.2d 698 (1986).
Public Acts 1989, No. 89-356, § 16 provides in relevant part: “The applicant may consent to one or more extensions of the periods specified in this subsection for the holding of the hearing and for action on such application, provided the total extension of any such period shall not be for longer than the original period as specified in this subsection, or may withdraw such application. If the inland wetlands agency fails to act on any application within thirty-five days after the completion of a public hearing or in the absence of a public hearing within sixty-five days from the date of receipt of the application, or within any extension of any such period, the applicant may file such application with the commissioner of environmental protection who shall review and act on such application in accordance with
We may consider subsequent amendments in order to illuminate the legislature’s intent with respect to a prior enactment. AirKaman, Inc. v. Groppo, 221 Conn. 751, 761, 607 A.2d 410 (1992).