CAROLYN COFFMAN, ET AL. v. ARMSTRONG INTERNATIONAL, INC., ET AL.
No. E2017-01985-SC-R11-CV
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE AT KNOXVILLE
May 19, 2020 Session; January 4, 2021
ROGER A. PAGE, JUSTICE
Appeal by Permission from the Court of Appeals; Circuit Court for Knox County; No. 2-485-14 William T. Ailor, Judge
ROGER A. PAGE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which JEFFREY S. BIVINS, C.J., CORNELIA A. CLARK, and HOLLY KIRBY, JJ., joined. SHARON G. LEE, J. filed a separate dissenting opinion.
Michael J. King, John W. Elder, and Lindsey M. Collins, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellants, Clark Reliance Corporation, Jerguson Gage and Valve Division, Dezurik, Inc., and Flowserve Corporation, f/k/a The Duriron Company, Inc.
James A. Beakes, III, and B. Hartman Knight, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Armstrong International, Inc.
James E. Wagner, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Ingersoll-Rand Company.
Jessalyn H. Zeigler, Sarah B. Miller, and Scott D. Gallisdorfer, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellants, Neles-Jamesbury, Inc. and Metso Automation USA, Inc.
Joshua A. Wolfe, Knoxville, Tennessee, Alan S. Zelkowitz and Scott D. Stephenson, Pro Hac Vice, Chicago, Illinois, for the appellant, The William Powell Company.
Hugh B. Bright, Jr. and C. Gavin Shepherd, Knoxville, Tennessee, and Steven G. Carlson, Pro Hac Vice, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, for the appellant, Fisher Controls, International, LLC.
H. Douglas Nichol, Knoxville, Tennessee, Donald Capparella, Nashville, Tennessee, Charles Edward Valles, Jr., Pro Hac Vice, Flower Mound, Texas, for the appellees, Carolyn Coffman, Individually and for the benefit of the next of kin of Donald Coffman, deceased.
John Morris Kizer, Knoxville, Tennessee, and Mark A. Behrens, Pro Hac Vice, Washington, DC, for Amici Curiae American Property Casualty Insurance Association, American Tort Reform Association, Tennessee Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, Coalition for Litigation Justice, Inc., National Association of Manufacturers, and NFIB Small Business Legal Center.
OPINION
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This products liability case was originally filed by Donald Coffman, who was diagnosed with mesothelioma, and his wife, Carolyn Coffman (“Appellees“).3 Mr. Coffman worked at the Tennessee Eastman chemical plant (“Tennessee Eastman“) between the years of 1968 and 1997. During his career as an equipment mechanic at Tennessee Eastman, Mr. Coffman repaired and replaced equipment that included pumps, valves, steam traps, gaskets and piping while working around packing and insulation. According to Appellees, many of these products contained asbestos. Mr. Coffman spent most of his time working in and around “Building 55,” in which acid from other divisions was distilled, reclaimed, and refined. The piping system at Tennessee Eastman carried highly corrosive steam and acids that required the equipment to be repaired daily and sometimes replaced entirely.
After Mr. Coffman developed mesothelioma, Appellees filed suit alleging that Mr. Coffman‘s exposure to asbestos at his workplace caused him to develop cancer. Specifically, Appellees alleged that Mr. Coffman was exposed to asbestos while working at Tennessee Eastman in three ways: by breathing in dust created by asbestos-containing insulation; by breathing in dust created by the removal of asbestos-containing gaskets; and by breathing in dust created by the removal of asbestos-containing packing. The original complaint included claims for negligence, strict liability, gross negligence, and negligence per se, against nearly thirty defendants. These defendants included an independent contractor whose insulators removed and installed asbestos-containing insulation at Tennessee Eastman, a manufacturer of asbestos-containing packing used by Tennessee Eastman, and several industrial equipment manufacturers, including DeZurik, Inc.;
Flowserve Corporation f/k/a The Duriron Company, Inc.; Clark Reliance Company, Jerguson Gage and Valve Division; Armstrong International, Inc.; Crane Company; Fisher Controls International, LLC; Ingersoll-Rand Company5; Neles-Jamesbury, Inc., Metso
Appellees alleged causes of action against the Equipment Defendants under the Tennessee Products Liability Act of 1978,
Each Equipment Defendant moved for summary judgment and asserted that they were entitled to summary judgment on claims related to asbestos exposure arising from
products that they did not themselves make, sell, or distribute. As is pertinent to this appeal, the trial court determined that the Equipment Defendants affirmatively negated any duty to warn of asbestos with respect to Appellees’ claims arising from the post-sale integration of asbestos-containing insulation, flange gaskets, replacement internal gaskets, and replacement packing that were manufactured and sold by others. Further, the trial court found the duty to warn to be an essential element of Appellee‘s negligence and strict liability claims under the Tennessee Products Liability Act (the “TPLA“). Therefore, following multiple hearings, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Equipment Defendants with respect to failure-to-warn claims for products made and sold by others. The trial court certified these orders as final pursuant to
Appellees filed separate notices of appeal against twelve defendants regarding the trial court‘s dismissal of their claims. The Court of Appeals consolidated the
The Equipment Defendants have appealed this holding. It bears repeating that the Equipment Defendants concede that this ground for summary judgment is applicable only to Appellees’ claims arising from the post-sale integration of asbestos-containing insulation, flange gaskets, replacement internal gaskets, and packing materials that were manufactured and sold by others. This opinion, therefore, does not address any liability of
the Equipment Defendants for Mr. Coffman‘s exposure to asbestos-containing products that were included with the Equipment Defendants’ products at the time of sale.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review
This appeal originates from the trial court‘s grant of a motion for summary judgment and the Court of Appeals’ partial reversal of the trial court‘s order. We review the grant of a motion for summary judgment de novo with no presumption of correctness. Bain v. Wells, 936 S.W.2d 618, 622 (Tenn. 1997). Under
More specifically, the issue presented for review concerns statutory construction, which presents a question of law, and we likewise review such questions de novo with no presumption of correctness. State v. Dycus, 456 S.W.3d 918, 924 (Tenn. 2015) (citing State v. Springer, 406 S.W.3d 526, 532-33 (Tenn. 2013); State v. Marshall, 319 S.W.3d 558, 561 (Tenn. 2010); State v. Wilson, 132 S.W.3d 340, 341 (Tenn. 2004)); Carter v. Bell, 279 S.W.3d 560, 564 (Tenn. 2009).
law is not displaced by a legislative enactment, except to the extent required by the statute itself.‘” Wlodarz v. State, 361 S.W.3d 490, 496 (Tenn. 2012) (quoting Houghton v. Aramark Educ. Res., Inc., 90 S.W.3d 676, 679 (Tenn. 2002)), abrogated on other grounds by, Frazier v. State, 495 S.W.3d 246 (Tenn. 2016).
“When statutory language is clear and unambiguous, we must apply its plain meaning in its normal and accepted use, without a forced interpretation that would extend the meaning of the language . . . .” Carter, 279 S.W.3d at 564; Eastman Chem. Co. v. Johnson, 151 S.W.3d 503, 507 (Tenn. 2004). A statute is ambiguous when “the parties derive different interpretations from the statutory language.” Howard, 504 S.W.3d at 270 (quoting Owens, 908 S.W.2d at 926).
However, this proposition does not mean that an ambiguity exists merely because the parties proffer different interpretations of a statute. A party cannot create an ambiguity by presenting a nonsensical or clearly erroneous interpretation of a statute. In other words, both interpretations must be reasonable in order for an ambiguity to exist.
Frazier, 558 S.W.3d at 152 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Powers v. State, 343 S.W.3d 36, 50 n.20 (Tenn. 2011)).
If a statute is ambiguous, the Court “‘may reference the broader statutory scheme, the history of the legislation, or other sources’ to determine the statute‘s meaning.” Id. (quoting Sherman, 266 S.W.3d at 401). The Court must “endeavor to resolve any possible conflict between statutes to provide for a harmonious operation of the laws.” Id. at 153 (citing Lovlace v. Copley, 418 S.W.3d 1, 20 (Tenn. 2013)). “[W]here a conflict is presented between two statutes, a more specific statutory provision takes precedence over a more general provision.” Id. (quoting Graham v. Caples, 325 S.W.3d 578, 582 (Tenn. 2010)); Arnwine v. Union Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 120 S.W.3d 804, 809 (Tenn. 2003). Moreover, “[w]hen one statute contains a given provision, the omission of the same provision from a similar statute is significant to show that a different intention existed.” Frazier, 558 S.W.3d at 153 (quoting State v. Lewis, 958 S.W.2d 736, 739 (Tenn. 1997)).
B. Tennessee Products Liability Act
We granted this appeal to address whether “the Equipment Defendants had a duty to warn of the dangers associated with the post-sale integration of asbestos-containing materials manufactured and sold by others.” Whether there is a duty to warn of the dangers associated with the post-sale integration of asbestos-containing parts that are manufactured
and sold by others is an issue of first impression in
The answer to whether the Equipment Defendants had a duty to warn as alleged is found in the plain language of the Tennessee Products Liability Act. In 1978, the Tennessee Legislature enacted the TPLA, which provides an extensive statutory framework for all claims arising from injuries alleged to have been caused by products. See
“Product liability action” for purposes of this chapter includes all actions brought for or on account of personal injury, death or property damage caused by or resulting from the manufacture, construction, design, formula, preparation, assembly, testing, service, warning, instruction, marketing, packaging or labeling of any product. “Product liability action” includes, but is not limited to, all actions based upon the following theories: strict liability in tort; negligence; breach of warranty, express or implied; breach of or failure to discharge a duty to warn or instruct, whether negligent or innocent; misrepresentation, concealment, or nondisclosure, whether negligent or innocent; or under any other substantive legal theory in tort or contract whatsoever[.]
Appellees alleged injuries to Mr. Coffman as a result of work-related exposure to asbestos. However, none of the Equipment Defendants’ products at issue contained asbestos when they were under the Equipment Defendants’ control. The Equipment Defendants assert that they cannot be held liable for end-products containing asbestos that they themselves did not manufacture or sell. We agree that the best reading of the TPLA does not create a duty or liability for defendants for the post-sale incorporation of products containing asbestos because these products were incorporated into that equipment after it left their control. This Court has stated that “[t]he key operative provision of the Act is
Tennessee case law further supports a conclusion that a manufacturer‘s duty to a consumer is measured at the time the product leaves its control. In Goode v. Tamko Asphalt Products, Inc., 783 S.W.2d 184, 187 (Tenn. 1989), this Court held that there is no duty to warn if a product is not defective or unreasonably dangerous at the time it left the defendant‘s control:
There is no disagreement with the proposition that this case is controlled by the Tennessee Products Liability Act of 1978. Plaintiff‘s theory of recovery in this case is that defendants were guilty of a negligent breach of duty to warn of the non-apparent danger associated with the use of their roofing products. A failure to discharge a duty to warn, whether negligent or innocent, is expressly included in the definition of a products liability action in
[Tennessee Code Annotated Section] 29-28-102(6) .[Tennessee Code Annotated Section] 29-28-105(a) provides that to impose liability on a manufacturer it must be shown that the product was in a defective condition, or an unreasonably dangerous condition, at the time it left the manufacturer‘s control. In this case there is no contention that the products were in a defective condition. Thus, the issue is whether the defendant‘s roofing products were in an unreasonably dangerous condition at the time the products left the control of each manufacturer. It follows that if the products were unreasonably dangerous, defendants had a duty to put an appropriate
warning on the labels, but if the products were not unreasonably dangerous, the law imposes no duty to warn.
(Emphasis added); see also Whaley, 900 S.W.2d at 299 (“In order to prevail in a products liability action, a plaintiff must prove that the product in question was either defective or unreasonably dangerous, as those concepts are defined in the Act, at the time it left the control of the manufacturer or seller.“). Therefore, we hold that the language of the TPLA and accompanying case law places a duty to warn on a manufacturer or seller to warn about the condition of the product only if it was defective or unreasonably dangerous at the time the manufacturer transfers control of the product.
Appellees assert that the Equipment Defendants ignore certain language within the TPLA, including that a product is in a “defective condition” under the TPLA when it is in a condition that “renders it unsafe for normal or anticipatable handling and consumption.”
dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics, or that the product because of its dangerous condition would not be put on the market by a reasonably prudent manufacturer or seller, assuming that the manufacturer or seller knew of its dangerous condition.
Appellees further point to the language of the TPLA that states “[i]f a product is not unreasonably dangerous at the time it leaves the control of the manufacturer or seller but was made unreasonably dangerous by subsequent unforeseeable alteration, change, improper maintenance or abnormal use, the manufacturer or seller is not liable.”
We decline to read Section 29-28-108 in a vacuum as Appellees suggest. “In interpreting statutes, . . . we are required to construe them as a whole, read them in conjunction with their surrounding parts, and view them consistently with the legislative purpose.” Lind v. Beaman Dodge, Inc., 356 S.W.3d 889, 897 (Tenn. 2011) (quoting State v. Turner, 913 S.W.2d 158, 160 (Tenn. 1995)). When viewing the TPLA as a whole, we find it dispositive that the end-products at issue on this appeal were neither made nor sold by the Equipment Defendants. Again, this appeal deals strictly with the Equipment Defendants in situations where there was post-sale integration of asbestos-containing parts manufactured and sold by others. Several provisions of the TPLA state that a manufacturer or seller‘s duty to warn is limited to products actually made or sold by that defendant. For example: “Any action against a manufacturer or seller of a product for injury to person or property caused by its defective or unreasonably dangerous condition must be brought within the [statutory time] period . . . .”
The interpretation used by the Court of Appeals and proposed by the Appellees is inconsistent with the language of the TPLA and this Court‘s holding in Goode. The Court of Appeals in this case acknowledged our holding in Goode, but stated that reliance on this authority “slightly mischaracterizes the issue.” Coffman v. Armstrong Int‘l, Inc., No. E2017-01985-COA-R3-CV, 2019 WL 3287067, *18 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 22, 2019), perm. app. granted, (Tenn. Feb. 20, 2020). Rather, the Court of Appeals relied on the balancing test formulated in Satterfield v. Breeding Insulation Co., 266 S.W.3d 347 (Tenn. 2008), and determined that “[b]ecause foreseeability of harm is central to the Satterfield duty analysis” the construction of the TPLA proposed by the Equipment Defendants (i.e., that they are not liable for products they did not make or sell regardless of the foreseeability of post-sale integration of asbestos-containing parts) is “clearly inconsistent with Tennessee law.” See id. at *19. The intermediate court then went on to apply the Satterfield analysis to the facts of this case. Id. at *19-20. At the conclusion of its analysis, the Court of Appeals determined:
In our view, the degree of foreseeable harm and the gravity of potential harm outweighed the burden that the equipment defendants would have suffered by warning about the post-sale integration of asbestos-containing insulation, flange gaskets, internal replacement gaskets, and replacement packing. Accordingly, the equipment defendants did have a duty to warn about the dangers associated with those later-added products. The trial court erred by granting summary judgment to the equipment defendants on the ground that they negated their alleged duty to warn.
Appellees also assert that the Court of Appeals decision is consistent with the U.S. Supreme Court‘s decision in Air & Liquid Systems Corp. v. DeVries, 139 S. Ct. 986 (2019). That case was discussed in some detail by the Court of Appeals. Coffman, 2019 WL 3287067, at *13-15. The DeVries case, however, is in no way determinative of the outcome in this case because we are bound by the specific language of the TPLA. The U.S. Supreme Court had no legislative enactment to apply regarding its duty analysis, and the majority of the Court, therefore, crafted its own test. By contrast, the TPLA supplies the test we must apply. Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court explicitly relied on the fact that the case arose
from facts within the maritime context, noting “[m]aritime law‘s longstanding solicitude for sailors,” DeVries, 139 S. Ct. at 995,10 which of course does not apply to the facts of this case.
Both Appellees and the Equipment Defendants assert that the majority of jurisdictions dealing with this issue support their respective positions. According to Appellees, “[c]ourts in a clear majority of other jurisdictions have held that a manufacturer may be liable even if it did not manufacture, install, or supply the asbestos material used in, on, or adjacent to its product.” In support of this assertion, Appellees set forth examples of other state and federal court decisions, most of which are from lower courts. See, e.g.,
Berkowitz v. A.C. & S., Inc., 733 N.Y.S.2d 410, 411 (App. Div. 2001) (holding that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether a manufacturer had a duty to warn of the dangers of asbestos that it neither manufactured or installed); Sweredoski v. Alfa Laval, Inc., No. PC-2011-1544, 2013 WL 5778533 (R.I. Super. Ct. Oct. 21, 2013) (stating that “a defendant cannot categorically avoid liability for a plaintiff‘s injuries for the sole reason that those injuries were directly caused by exposure to a third party‘s replacement parts“). The problem is that none of the cases cited by Appellees interpret the language of the TPLA, and Appellees fail to adequately address how these decisions square with the language of our statute. However, there are states, such as Georgia, that have similar statutes to the TPLA and have construed their statutes consistently
III. CONCLUSION
In sum, we hold that, under the language of the TPLA, the Equipment Defendants cannot be held liable for injuries resulting from products they did not make, distribute, or sell. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed in part. We remand to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this
ROGER A. PAGE, JUSTICE