Aрpellant Silvester Carolina, Jr., was convicted by a jury of trafficking in cocaine and possession оf marijuana with intent to distribute.
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He appeals, arguing the trial court erred by admitting the cocaine into evidence because the lab technician who tested the
At trial, defendant stipulated to the qualifications of Lori Reeves, a forensic chemist with the state crime lab, who was then qualified as an expert in the field of forensic chemistry. Reeves testified concerning the testing of the substance subsequently introduced at trial as State’s Exhibit 6. She testified that a sample of the substance was first weighed to get a total net weight and then three tests were performed, two of them, the gas chromatography-mass spectrometry and thin layer chromatography, for qualitative analysis to determine the nature of the substance and the other, the high performance liquid chromatography test, for quantitative analysis to determine the purity of the substance. The qualitative tests were positive for cocaine and the quantitative test indicated it was 60.3 percent pure. Reeves further testified that although she could not remember if she performed the tests or if they were performed by Patti Moore, a crime lab technician, she reviewed the tests and the data to make the determination concerning whether the substance was positive for cocaine and to determine the purity. She also testified concerning сhecks and balances designed to ensure that the testing is done according to procedure, including the fact that she runs controls after the tests are conducted before any of the information can be released to the file. Additionally, Reeves testified that she reviews all data and that the lab technician is only trained to do the “process” and cannot make the determination concеrning whether a tested substance is positive for cocaine.
On appeal, Carolina argues that this testimony was inadmissible hearsay and violated his Sixth Amendment confrontation rights because he did not have thе opportunity to cross-examine the lab technician who may have actually performed the tests. However, this Court recently rejected this argument in
Dunn v. State,
Although
Dunn
was decided before the recent United States Supreme Court case of
Melendez-Diaz v.
Massachusetts, _ U. S. _ (129 SC 2527, 174 LE2d 314) (2009), that case does not require us to alter our analysis of this issue. In
Melendez-Diaz,
the United States Supreme Court determined that the sworn certificates (affidavits) of state crime laboratory analysts admitted into evidenсe to prove material seized by police was contraband were “testimonial” in nature and thus dеfendant’s Sixth Amendment confrontation clause rights were violated when the analysts who wrote the reports did not testify in person at trial. First, we note that our precedent is in accord with the holding in
Melendez-Diaz
because our state Supreme Court has previously declared a statutory procedure similar to that
at issue in
Melendez-Diaz
unсonstitutional and in violation of an accused’s confrontation rights.
Miller v. State,
In sum, we reject Carolina’s contention that the testimony at issue here was inadmissible hearsay that ran afоul of his rights under the confrontation clause. This appeal thus affords no basis for reversal of his conviction for trafficking in cocaine.
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
Carolina does not challenge his conviction for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute.