Convicted and sentenced for possessing distilled spirits without the immediate containers thereof hаving affixed thereto stamps evidencing payment of internal rev *822 enue taxes, in violation of title 2, section 201 of the Liquor Taxing Act of 1934 (26 USCA § 1152a), the appellant complains of the legal sufficiеncy of the search warrant under which the liquors were seized, the admission of testimony as to counterfeited revenue stamps, and the failure of the court to instruct the jury that before they could convict they must believe that the appellant knew or had opportunity to know that the stаmps were not genuine.
The attack upon the search warrant is twofold; the complaint bеing that the defendant 'is not named therein, and that the premises are not with particularity described. The first challenge to the warrant is based upon title 11, section 3 of the Act of June 15th, 1917, being sectiоn 613, title 18 USCA, which provides that a search warrant may not issue but upon “probable cause, supрorted by affidavit, naming or describing the person and particularly describing the property and thе place to be searched.” The contention is obviously without merit. The clear meaning оf the section requires that a person to be searched must be named or described. The instаnt warrant contains no mandate for any search other than that of property, and the оnly question here is the sufficiency of the property description. The premises are described as “two buildings consisting of a saloon and a combined sandwich shoppe and residencе in Kenton County, Kentucky, etc.” The evidence at the trial indicated that the building described as a combined sandwich shop and residence was a residence only, and not physically connеcted with the saloon. However, when the observations •were made that led to the affidavit and the issue of the warrant, the building in question bore the sign “Green Top Sandwich Shoppe.” We think there сan be no reasonable ground for complaint in the fact that the affidavit or the searсh warrant described the premises as advertised.
Upon the search there were found two gallons of moonshine whisky in unstamped containers, a half pint of whisky in an unstamped jug, and a quantity of miscellaneous spirits in bottles, to some of which were affixed genuine stamps, while others bore cоunterfeits. All of the liquor was received in evidence, together with testimony as to the counterfeit character of certain of the stamps.’ The appellant objects to the latter on the ground that it tends to prove an offense not charged in the-indictment. The objection is withоut merit. Counterfeited stamps are not stamps at all within the meaning of the section charged to have been violated. They are evidentiary of the evasion of the tax rather than its pаyment. Evidence that tends to prove the offense charged is not objectionable because it may also point to the commission of another distinct offense. Astwood v. United States,
The court below having admitted evidence as to the counterfеited stamps, and having called the jury’s attention to it, was asked to charge: “That unless the defendаnt knew that those stamps were counterfeit, and knowingly kept them in his possession, that he cannоt be found guilty.” The evidence having disclosed the possession of a quantity of nontax paid liquor in addition to that in the stamped containers, the appellant was clearly not entitled to the requested instruction. But even were we to apply the rule that where the meaning of a requеst is reasonably apparent and its subject matter important, a court is not justified in ignoring it merely bеcause inaccurate, Memphis Press-Scimitar Co. v. Chapman,
The judgment below is affirmed.