46 Minn. 220 | Minn. | 1891
This action is for the recovery of damages for the alleged negligence of the defendant in operating two locomotives drawing a regular passenger train on the defendant’s road, and by which .the plaintiff’s intestate was struck as he was crossing the track. The negligence alleged consisted in running the train over a highway crossing, where the accident occurred, at a dangerous rate of speed, —30 miles an hour, — without giving any signal of its approach by bell or whistle, and by allowing the track to be obscured from the view of persons approaching the crossing by warehouses erected beside the track. It will be unnecessary to devote much attention to the issue as to the defendant’s negligence in running the train at a dangerous rate of speed, and in omitting to give proper signals of its approach. The evidence tended to show negligence in these particulars ; but it also, as we think, showed so clearly a case of contributory negligence on the part of the deceased that the verdict cannot be sustained. To this point attention is more particularly directed.
The accident occurred on the evening of the 4th day of January, 1887, at a point on the main track of the railroad where it is crossed by a public street called “First Avenue, ” in the village of Beaver Creek. At this point the railroad line is from the north-east to the southwest, but may for convenience be hereafter spoken of as being an easterly and westerly line. The street, approaching the railroad from the east, turns, and runs north across the railroad. There is a sidewalk on the southerly and westerly side of the street extending across the railroad to the corner of the depot platform. The depot, is just north of the main track, and on the west side of the street. South of the main track, and seven feet distant from it, as appears by the testimony of the only witness who measured the distance, is a side track, parallel with the main track, and extending easterly from the depot some 600 feet or more. On the south side of the side track, and easterly from the crossing, were several warehouses and coal-sheds, the most westerly of which was about 100 feet east from the depot, according to the plat before us, showing the situation, and according to the testimony of one witness, who appears to have known the fact,
It seems to us to be so self-evident that Carney did not exercise the ordinary care which the law requires of one in his situation, — that of using his own senses of sight and hearing as a means of protection from a known danger, — that we would not be justified in sustaining this verdict. He was familiar with the locality, and knew to what extent the view to the eastward was obstructed. He knew that a train from that direction was to be expected at this time. He was walking, and his movements wholly under his own control. There was nothing in the situation to distract his attention,-or to excuse a failure on his part to observe, if he could do so, before crossing the track, whether the train might not be so near at hand as to make it unsafe to cross. The fact that the train was accustomed to come up to the station a-t a slow rate of speed would not excuse him from the duty of attention at such a place. While it is true that the care which one ought.to exercise may be measured to some extent by the danger to be apprehended, that does not justify one in needlessly placing himself in the track of such dangerous machinery, without watchfulness suitable to such a situation, relying implicitly upon the probability that a train will not approach at a rapid rate of speed. While it might be deemed probable, from what was customary, that trains would come up to the depot slowly, one could not be certain that this would always be so. The conditions connected with the operation of railroad trains are necessarily so varying that one could not, with reason, unnecessarily risk his life upon such a probability, by neglecting so simple and natural a precaution as the exercise of his own senses of sight and hearing. As every one must be supposed to know, manifold circumstances may arise which may result in a locomotive or train passing or approaching a railway station rapidly.
Upon the conclusively established facts of this case it must be concluded either that Carney attempted to cross the track when he knew that a train was to be expected, and without either looking or listening for its approach, or else that, knowing the train to be coming, he
Order reversed.