95 Mo. 353 | Mo. | 1888
This is an action of ejectment withpetition in the ordinary form. The plaintiffs (with the exception of Cottey, who is a purchaser from one of the heirs) and defendants, are all children of one Alexander Carney,' deceased, who died in 1879. Plaintiffs claim five-eighths of the land in controversy as heirs of said Carney, whilst the defendants, Isaac and George S. Carney, who are in possession, claim the entire tract under the oral agreement, alleged in the answer to have been made with their said father in 1865 or 1866, by the terms of which they were to pay the interest and debt on the land, take care of their father and mother, who were then old, as^ long as they lived, which they alleged has been done by them, and in consideration thereof they were to have the land in dispute as their own.
The answer, in addition to the said oral agreement, sets up the statute of limitations, which, however, cuts no figure in the case. The plea of the attempted execution of a will by said Alexander Carney, devising the lands in question to defendant Isaac, in furtherance of said verbal agreement, is also immaterial, even if well pleaded, and need not be noticed further in this connection. ■ The pleadings are of unusual length, and a further statement of them, we think, is unnecessary to a proper determination of the questions involved in this appeal, which is taken by plaintiffs from the judgment in the cause had and obtained in favor of defendants.
I. The position of plaintiffs, which was asserted at the trial in several ways and is now urged here, that the verbal agreement set up in the answer and relied on by defendants, is within the statute of frauds and perjuries, is, we think, under the facts, untenable. It appears
The evidence, as preserved in the bill of exceptions, is, perhaps, in some respects, not altogether as full and satisfactory as it might be, but in view of the fact that
II. The point is made in this court that George S. Carney, one of the defendants, who testified for defendants as to said oral contract, was incompetent for the reason that his father, who was the other party to said contract in issue and on trial, was dead. But it is urged in reply, on defendant’s behalf, that said objection to his competency as a witness, even if well taken, was not made at the trial, and is urged here for the first time, and,1 therefore, under repeated rulings of this court,' cannot now be considered. We have made a careful examination of the record in this behalf and find it to be as follows: When said George S. Carney was offered as a witness no objection to his competency as such was made. After he was cross-examined, “plaintiffs objected to all evidencé in relation to a verbal contract concerning said farm as irrelevant, incompetent, and immaterial.” The same objection was also made to the
III. Some question is made here as to the testimony of the witnesses Strange and Baltz, as to the declarations of Alexander Carney, ip. substance that they had heard him say that he was not able to pay out, and that the farm belonged to the boys, Sam and Isaac. In and of themselves these statements may be, as plaintiffs contend, “loose and disjointed,” and insufficient to satisfactorily establish any definite or certain contract, or any of its terms. Loose declarations of persons, since dead, are to be received with great caution and testimony as to oral admissions of parties since dead, must be clear, strong, and unequivocal, if relied on, but statements, such as are under consideration, are, we think, relevant and competent, and may well be received in connection with other testimony in the cause.
The remaining question is as to the propriety of the court’s action in excluding the “records and papers” of the administration of the estate of said Alex. Carney in the probate court of Knox county, and refusing plaintiffs’ offer to “prove by said records and papers”
This leads to an affirmance of the, judgment, and it is accordingly so ordered,