*1 CARNES V. ST. PAUL UNION STOCKYARDS delivered himto with tbe stock. There,were provisions further not necessary to mention.
The operator was helping finance the organization.
He
merely a money lender. He was not working merely
wages.
He was not a copartner. He
participate
was to
in profits
as
result
his investment, and eventually they
were
evidenced,,
by corporate stock. He invested with a view of making
profit,
the “operator’s agreement” was the
quite
contract.
as
much
an investment
contract
those
involved in State v. Gopher Tire
& Rubber Co. 146 Minn.
177 N.
W. 937, and State v.
Evans,
Minn.
191 N.
W.
A.
425, 27
L. R.
the two
leading' cases,
or the so-called “units” involved in State v. Summerland, 150 Minn.
266,
overruling the demurrer is affirmed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings.
Order affirmed. HARRY E. CARNES v. ST. PAUL UNION STOCKYARDS
COMPANY.1 24,870.
No.
October
person
At common law
prevented
_
who is
obtaining
from
employment by
wrongful
may
interference of another
damages
recover
from the
intermeddler —Malice in sense
spite
of ill-will or
is not essential.
1. At common
one
prevented
who has been
securing
em-
ployment reason of and malicious interference
another
recover
wrongdoer.
from the
principle
This
applicable to such
prevents
interference
if it
the formation of a con-
tract, as well as to interference
with
contractual
relations.
1 Reported in
205 N. W.
more than or excuse. tion *2 recovery prima plaintiff facie for made case action when
Error to dismiss damages at common law. plaintiff showing from Upon that defendant had excluded a 2. Paul, owns, stockyards refused which it and had public at South St. employ him as permit commission men who did business there employ- salesman, yard he had been unable to secure such and that a interference, prima plaintiff made a reason of defendant’s ment recovery at common and it was for the facie case showing by plaintiff grant for a motion dismissal. The error to justify production or ex- defendant of evidence to necessitated the plaintiff complained. of which cuse the conduct Cyc. Torts, pp. 511. See 1. Torts, Cyc. p. 540.
2. See pp. 71; note in 62 1. See L. R. A. 714. R. L.C. 3 R. C. L. 419; Supp. Supp. p. p. 5 R. C. L. in the for county
Action district court Dakota to restrain inter- plaintiff’s ference with employment and for damages. The case tried who Schultz, J., before dismissed the action. Plaintiff appealed from order denying his for motion a new trial. Re- versed.
Patrick appellant. J. for Ryan, L. Grannis J.
D. and A. Roclme, respondent. C.
Lees, In June, James E. Gibbons and Jessie C. Carnes, doing business under name of & Gibbons Carnes, buying were and selling live stock on a commission basis at defendant’® stockyards. Jessie C. Carnes is wife. Plaintiff alleges that he was employed & by Gibbons Carnes as a salesman, while defendant aleges really member of the firm active management of business. the.
CARNES Y. ST. PAUL UNION STOCKYARDS were, partner Gibbous and bis of the members South St. Paul Live Stock Exchange until June 6, when were they suspended for 30 membership days fined The exchange $500. is an organization separate and distinct from defendant. It is composed of commission men who do business at the South St. Paul stock- yards, but in the membership Exchange a condition of the right to deal in live stock the yards.
Under a contract with defendant, & Gibbons per- Carnes were mitted to do business the yards, subject to rules regulations prescribed by the defendant, subject right defendant’s cancel 'the contract on 30 days’ notice. On June 12, defendant notified plaintiff that he and the members of the firm would there- after be excluded from yards. Subsequently this action was brought to enjoin defendant from excluding plaintiff from' yards and to recover damages for preventing him from securing employ- ment therein aas salesman.
The answer alleged that firm of Gibbons Carnes was a *3 market as agency, defined in the Federal & Packers Stockyards Act of August 15, 1921, and registered had with the Secretary Agri- culture in compliance with the act; that firm suspended the was by the Live Stock Exchange for misconduct in business trans- actions with shippers of live stock; that this was the reason for excluding plaintiff from the yards; that it was defendant’s intention to continue to exclude him therefrom; when that, Gibbons & Carnes for applied and obtained permission to operate in the yards, the fact that they had been guilty of business irregularities and mis- conduct was unknown to defendant and defendant had no knowledge thereof until after théy suspended were by the Live Stock Exchange.
The case was by tried the court with a jury. In the course of the trial stipulated that defendant refused to enter into contracts permitting commission men to do business at its yards if they gave employment plaintiff to yard a salesman. When plaintiff rested, defendant moved for a dismissal, the motion was granted, a new trial denied, plaintiff and appealed. has MINNESOTA com- at one action as this denominates plaintiff brief reply
In Ms the with wrongful interference on defendant’s founded mon business do men who by commission plaintiff employment that this dispute counsel do Defendant’s yards. defendant’s have referred parties for both counsel action, the nature' of the oral their and their briefs Stockyards Act to the Packers arguments. Congress. policy of the insofar as it discloses pertinent act
The supervision under the men commission stockyards and places pre- given power who is Agriculture, Secretary control of desist 'and cease to issue practices, and unfair- vent discrimination thereof. compel obedience the courts to apply orders which abuses had been that Congress believed there Manifestly practices curb unfair authority to and that correction, needed However, governmental agency. some upon conferred should be wrong- that, if defendant conclusion necessitate the tMs does not himto open yards, only from its course fully excluded Agriculture redress, for Secretary apply was to addi- abridgment that not an of but declares it is expressly act injured by to one con- law remedies available tion to the common inquiry then is the act. whether duct condemned in; coupled answer, with the admissions defendant’s evidence, prima wrong a facie case of at common law. actionable hold with unanimity courts substantial stranger interference a re- malicious with contract parties lations causes one of to breach others, between wMch injured is a contract, tort, party may recover dam- ages v. St. Paul Stockyards therefor. Bacon Union 161 Minn. Co. 201 N. principle W. is a case in wMch applied. this citing It was there numerous held, of this court, decisions *4 complaint similar to in the one the case at bar stated a cause of action.
It is a legal principle general application that one has who prevented been from securing employment by wrong- reason of the 461 STOCKYARDS UNION PAUL V. ST. CARNES from damages recover another interference malicious ful and 587. p. Torts, 2 Cooley, wrongdoer. Minn. Co. 100 Ry. N. v. Joyce G. mentioned was principle is discussed 756, (N. S.) A.R. 8 L. N. W. 975, 110 225, A. 9 L. R. 165, 65 Atl. 729, 78 N. J. Law, Hatters, v. United Brennan St. Charles v. Graham 698; Ann. Cas. 9 727, Am. St. 118 (N. S.) 254, 366; 49 Am. St. 416, 27 L. R. A. 16 806, So. 47 La. R. Co. St. 26 W. 111, 80 Tex. S. & Pearson, Norman Winfree, Delz v. S. W. 162, 48 Ky. Co. 105 & N. R. L. Hundley v. 755; and Am. St. Am. St. 298. A. 63 L. R. damages for recover brought action was Joyce In case the preventing wrongfully injuries and personal rule, general referring to the After obtaining employment. said: court persuasive insisted with judges and courts have “Some eminent pre- purpose for the wrongful such interference argument that * * * equally of contracts actionable. venting the formation though this we question court, never come precise has before Minn. Building analogous Council, case Trades Gray had an * * * respects it held, boycott, We there existed between actually immaterial whether contract relations person boycotted his it was unlawful customers; equally prevent obtaining contract, him from he could customers with whom existing interrupt relations, as to and such the law other states.”
These followed by observations were the statement that because provisions of the blacklisting R. L. statute, section 5097, (section G. inquire S. 1923), unnecessary whether common does or law does not a remedy against afford an intermeddler in cases he where does not interfere with prevents contract relations, only their formation.
The Joyce case clearly indicates the court was inclined to adopt the wrongful view that a interference with formation of a contract was no less actionable than a interference with
462 an no contract, we bave found well-considered case in contrary wbicb tbe view was adopted.
In Berry v. 188 Donovan, Mass. 353, 74 N. E. 5 L. R. A. 603, (N. S.) 108 Am. St. 3 Ann. 499, 899, Cas. tbe said: 738, court right dispose “Tbe of one’s labor be will, and to bave tbe benefit of one’s lawful is contract, incident tbe freedom of tbe * * * n individual. Sucb a right can lawfully be interfered with only one who is acting in tbe equal exercise of superior an or right wbicb comes conflict with the other. An intentional inter- ference with sucb a without right, lawful justification, is malicious even if it is from good motives and express without malice.” being tbe law that a man who employment has and is dis- charged by bis employer solely by reason of wrongful tbe interfer- ence another, sustains an injury for wbicb tbe intermeddler liable, follows logically that a man who is prevented from ob- taining employment by tbe wrongful interference may of another also damages recover from tbe intermeddler. There is no substan- tial difference between tbe loss employment and the inability to secure employment when each is caused by tbe interfer- of a ence third for in person, either case tbe person injured pre- vented from enjoying tbe fruits of bis labor.
Tbe term “malice,” as used in the class of cases means mentioned, nothing than more tbe intentional doing of a wrongful act without justification legal or excuse, or otherwise stated the wilful violation of a right. known Whether a wrongdoer’s motive in interfering is to benefit himself, or to gratify his spite by working mischief to another, is immaterial, malice in the sense of ill-will spite or being essential. Numerous cases thus defining malice are collected in 15 R. C. L. pp. 56 and 57. generally courts
Tbe hold that a man’s occupation or means of gaining a livelihood is bis property, and that for every injury there- to wbicb is suffered reason of tbe wrongful or malicious act of another, action will lie.
Tbe doctrine that an act, wbicb is legal when done without malice, cannot become legally wrong if it is done maliciously or without 463 UNION STOCKYARDS
CARNES V. ST. PAUL an unlawful use for there is not cause, absolute, reasonable 206 Ala. Millonas, legal Fidelity U. S. G. Co. right. a 119 N. 107 Minn. Buck, R. 520. Tuttle v. 29 A. L. So. Am. Cas. St. Ann. (N. S.) 599, 22 L. R. A. 946,W. point are collected doctrine. Other cases
seems to favor this L. p. R. C. at *6 question in the that vital case have reached conclusion We for the acts justification or excuse at bar is whether there was charged. with defendant is which attempted justi-
The courts have not formulate a rule which to justification be but have said determined, fication or lack of -in the issue fact for the general largely jury, is. one of being standard reasonable conduct under all the circumstances of N. Griffin, the case. Huskie v. 75 H. 74 27 R. A. 345, 595, Atl. L. S.) 139
(N. 718; Berry supra. Am. St. v. 966, Donovan, The of the argument support substance of defendant’s counsel of the contention that justified defendant was in all is that it did this: Defendant has interest in the character of South St. Paul commission men and their employes.. unscrup- If unreliable or permitted ulous men are to enter its yards represent buyers or sellers of live its business-will stock, suffer, shippers because judge reputation defendant of the commission men and their em- ployes it admits whom to the yards, which defendant controls and owns fee. commission men and their employes are mere privilege hence the licensees, yards may using be withdrawn them, any which defendant cause deems sufficient. argument is and supported forceful by the citation of numerous which have authorities, we examined. Godbout v. St. Depot Paul Union Co. 79 Minn. 81 188, N. W. 835, L. R. 532, A. upon one of the cases which defendant greatly clearly relies, it is not for it controlling, dealt with a state facts substantially presented different from those here. give
We think counsel fail to weight sufficient to the fact that we are not here concerned with a private business of-a nature.
must be remembered defendant’s business is affected with a
4§4 public use as a property its is devoted to public interest and that Ct. Sup. 258 U. S. stockyards. Wallace, Stafford v. & Rogers Minn. Rogers, ed. 23 A. L. R. State v. 229; L. Ex. 152 Grisim South Paul Live Stock 1005; 182 N. W. St. business Minn. men who do 188 N. W. The commission & agencies in a are market under Packers public stockyard shippers the benefit of their Stockyards are entitled to Act, duly the firm had services. of Gibbons Carnes been Moreover, to the the firm offered yards, subsequently admitted which give plaintiff employment also admitted. Defendant must have been satisfied with it first reputation character and when admitted him to its and it yards, would see that under the circum stances it should offer explanation change some front for its excluding him permanently therefrom unconditionally. undoubtedly
But protect defendant has lawful interests may properly refuse admit yards to its or one man, commission of his justification if employes, there is or excuse for re- valid fusal. As was said the Joyce case, might defendant insist unworthy persons no should employed upon its and, property, *7 if that was the of basis its action, liability no exists. In other defendant words, merely officious intermeddler in legitimate with no affairs, interest to serve. Such an intermeddler can if rarely, ever, justify or excuse his conduct. standing But one in the position of defendant has rights which it may by assert ex- cluding from its a man property of doubtful reputation, or one who guilty has been of in misconduct his dealings with defendant’s patrons.
What justify would exclusion we do not now attempt to decide. We do say however that, because defendant had legitimate interest protect to in that it is the owner of the stockyards responsible for their efficient management proper use, particularly by local market it agencies, has a liberty of action much wider than that of a third party having no such interest or duty in the premises, a discretion of management not lightly by interfered with the who have judiciary, none of the regulatory and administrative ST. UNION STOCKYARDS
CARNES Y. PAUL assigned by Congress origin, in been legislative which-Fas power, Agriculture. Secretary to the in and the admissions the amended answer con
The evidence plain prevent establish defendant’s active interference to clusively firm as tiff’s a certain commission a salesman employment In cross-examination the de yards. plaintiff, defendant’s the attempted to obtain admissions its justify fendant which would but the clear as the action, showing compel jury was not so find explain there was and no evidence to the justification, it offered defendant. opinion stand took was We are jury might have found from the evidence introduced that defendant’s actions were malicious in legal a. sense and that plaintiff was entitled some amount. A prima facie cause of action was made out, recovery will be if de defeated fendant shows that its acts were justified, proving burden of justification being upon the defendant. Connors Connolly, Conn. 86 Atl. 45 L. (N. S.) R. A. plaintiff
We hold that showing when rested he had made a which necessary produce for defendant to justify evidence to acts of which and that complains, the motion to dismiss should been denied. have
Order reversed. On December 11, 1925, the following opinion was filed: Per Curiam.
The court has considered the contention in respondent’s petition for a rehearing and in its brief, support of the petition, that determining questions presented by this appeal the court dis- regarded Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitu- tion of United States, that the effect of the decision is to deprive respondent right to refuse to enter into contract re- lations with others and of control of its property, process without due of law. *8 -
After due consideration of these constitutional questions, the court adheres to the conclusions stated the original opinion and deprived protection of the not been respondent hasi
bolds above mentioned. provisions by the constitutional afforded denied. a petition rehearing ordered It is therefore K. B. BIRKELAND GAS COMPANY v. OIL NORTHERN
AND ANOTHER.1 24,667. No. April 9, 1925. statutory against appeal time —Relief other mast be filed within of Notice mistakes. appeal provided served within time notice of must be 1. served the court for cause shown If so relieve the statute. failing appeal pay appellant from mistake in to file bond and a appeal prescribed within the time. the fee on appeal Appellant from failure to file relieved bond. showing appellant justify is such as to relief from 2. pay appeal appeal to file the bond and fee in failure time. 23, 1926. October fairness, On motion briefs stricken from its files which court’s own attacked ability judge. honesty trial will on its own motion This court strike from its files and re- fairness, honesty ability which attack the fuse to consider briefs or court, proper the trial since such attacks no sense in a aid de- appeal, professional but serve to lower the termination stand- attorneys indulge required therein of the who ard of officers offending respect appellant court. this As briefs of the are from the files and records of the stricken case.
1 Reported in 203 N. W. N. W. N. W. 380.