Carmela Mares v. Conagra Poultry Company, Inc.

tаken, (5) being drug was such for which KELLY, Circuit and Before TACHA the use from effects any expected side CONWAY, Judge.† District Judges, and (6) length of time the drug, such Jr., Judge. KELLY, Circuit PAUL drug or taking the to expected ployee any (7) attend- medication, the name and Carmela Plaintiff-Appellant, prescrib- different ing physician if action, re- which was (Mares), filed this also authorized The form ing physician. court, requesting district federal to moved infor- to release physician damages actual, punitive and compensatory concerning use of to ConAgra mаtion Defendant-Appellee, against The form medication. (ConAgra) for disclosed Company, Inc. Poultry re- to be and was “confidential” employment marked terminating her wrongfully key, lock and file cabinet under in a tained out a form to fill refusal following her supporting ConA- according affidavit to an sev- pled usage. Mares drug dealing with Another motion. summary judgment gra’s theories, including invasion eral alternate ConAgra indicated by submitted affidavit for recover privacy, to as- was “to of the form purpose court district discharge.1 The wrongful results drug test accuracy of sure mo- summary judgment ConAgra’s granted distress, privacy and of emotional Conway, United States John E. Honorable †The Mexico, by rights the U.S. Consti- secured of New violation Judge the District District sitting designation. tution. provides complaint amended second 1. Mares’ FOR RELIEF CLAIM FIFTH part: pertinent ACTION OF THE NATURE that Plaintiff insistence Defendant's Colorado law action under is an This of confidential sign release a consent to resulting damages punitive compensatory and subse- and her privileged information discharge wrongful Plain- from Defendant’s com- failure to to her quent due termination public policy, of violation as a result tiff rights. of Plaintiffs ply conduct, is an invasion infliction outrageous and intentional (1986). 2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 opportunity provide employees here, nonmoving party Mares, Where, will result.” explain positive test trial, proof at “Rule drug burden object bear the that she did who stated nonmoving se, 56(e) requires ... testing per refused [then] beyond pleadings drug party go test. When form or to submit refusal, ‘depositions, to reconsider her own affidavits she dеclined interrogatories, admissions terminated. answers showing file,’ ‘specific facts designate on ” Discussion genuine issue for trial.’ that there is a 324, (quoting Fed. at 2553 Id. at 106 S.Ct. grant of sum from the appeals 56(e)). a movant establishes If R.Civ.P. novo review is de mary judgment. Our of law judgment as a matter entitlement to legal used standard apply we the same uncontroverted, operative facts con- given evaluating the sum by the district court evidence, documentary sum- in the tained motion, namely Fed. mary judgment Anderson, lie. judgment will See Int'l, mary 56(c). Appliеd Genetics R.Civ.P. 251, 106 at 2511. There at S.Ct. 477 U.S. Sec., Inc., F.2d 912 Inc. v. First Affiliated implied require- express or simply is “no 1238, (10th Cir.1990). Summary judg 1241 moving party in Rule 56 ment genuine if is no appropriate “there ment is affidavits or other its motion with support fact and ... as to material issue opponent’s negating similar materials judgment as a to a moving party is entitled 323, Celotex, at 106 U.S. S.Ct. claim.” 477 56(c). We matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. at 2553. any inferences and draw view evidence party op light in a most favorable proof of attend- Concerning quantum party summary judgment, but posing it is the same as summary judgment, ant to identify evidence sufficient must in the directed verdict required for a of the case to a require submission would 250, Anderson, 106 U.S. at S.Ct. 477 case. Liberty Lobby, jury. Anderson in- are convinced at 2511. “[W]e 2505, 242, 249-52, 2510- S.Ct. 477 U.S. ruling on a motion for quiry involved a (1986); 12, Adickes v. S.H. L.Ed.2d 202 a directed ver- summary judgment or for 157, 144, Co., 90 S.Ct. 398 U.S. Kress & implicates the substantive necessarily dict (1970); 1598, 1608, Hall v. 26 L.Ed.2d proof that evidentiary standard (10th 1106, Bellmon, Cir. F.2d merits.” Id. at trial on the apply at the 1991). Thus, in the normal 252, at 106 S.Ct. 2512. ask, on the judge must based civil proof, a mov- Concerning the burden considering has the who and after record pоrtions only point to those need ant ju- proof, “whether reasonable burden of a an absence demonstrate record which preponderance could find rors given the material fact genuine issue of plaintiff is entitled to evidence Corp. v. Celotex substantive law. relevant 322-23, 317, verdict.” Id.2 106 S.Ct. Catrett, 477 U.S. form at issue consti- misunderstanding proving that the medical apparent 2. The dissent's workplace, im- and critical an invasion “has an tutes burdens obvious these pact highly Brown v. offensive intrusion specifically, on its assеssment this record." 851, (10th Educ., n. 27 892 ‍‌‌​​‌‌​‌‌‌​‌​​‌‌​​‌​‌​‌​​‌​‌​​​​‌​‌‌​​​​​​​​‌​‌​‍F.2d upon Board seclusion. — U.S.-, vacated, 1989), 112 S.Ct. Cir. in the alternative The dissent contends (1992). dissent contends L.Ed.2d 381 summary judg- ConAgra initial its even if met ConAgra its initial burden never met that showing burden, ConAgra responsibility ment it was entitled arguably justification "the provide further justification “ConAgra's stated requirements” the form con- on more intrusive genuine of material all issues not eliminate cerning illnesses and authorization disclosure of abun- Celotex makes Dissent at 498. As fact.” dantly employee's physician. at Dissent to contact (and did) cleаr, its meet could integrity protect ConAgra’s desire handily by "pointing out to the burden initial testing by drug measures is reasonable such its absence of is an court ... that there district face, importantly, the dissent's but on its more nonmoving party’s support ConAgra’s perceived deficiencies Celotex, on focus proof 106 S.Ct. at 477 U.S. case.” ConAgra was flies in the face bears the burden at all times Celotex— cited, has our has not nor research summary Mares reviewing grant “In disclosed, sug- any authority which would diversity juris- on in a suit based excep- diction, gest of the forum.” would create an apply the law that Colorado we Skidmore, v. Canada Owings & Merrill at will doctrine tion to the request F.2d mere Assurance employer’s based Life Cir.1990). Thus, provides (10th drug Colorado pursuant medical applied. We “re- law to be the substantive testing policy. determina- de novo a district court’s view search and argues Colorado Regina College Salve law.” of state the fact that the decisions seizure — Russell, -, 111 S.Ct. U.S. inclined courts are toward broad (1991). 1221, 113 L.Ed.2d 190 than the protection er search and seizure employ “at will is an Colorado Sеe, e.g., Supreme Court. United States Air Continental See jurisdiction. ment” Hillman, (Colo.App. People v. P.2d 884 821 (Colo. Keenan, 708, 711 731 P.2d lines v. Constitution, gar 1991) (under Colorado Son, Inc. v. & 1987). also Freidman See may collection be bage placed for curbside Stores, 1128, (Colo. 1131 Safeway 712 P.2d expectation subject of a the is, of an in the absence That App.1985). (Colo. 13, granted, cert. Jan. privacy), employ agreement, either employment Oates, (Colo. People v. 1992); P.2d 811 698 em terminate the employee can er or the Constitution, beeper 1985) (under Colorado will. Justice relationship at ployment chemicals consti a drum of placed inside 1, Colo.App. Corp., Aviation 35 Stanley search). Yet, Mares concedes that tutes presumption The 984, (1974). P.2d of the Col and seizure decisions the search relationship is not employment at will of an matter, Court, or for that Supreme orado however, may situa absolute, there be and Court, are of the United States wrongful may discharge be where tions in state applicable the absence not See, e.g., Continen thus actionable. ‍‌‌​​‌‌​‌‌‌​‌​​‌‌​​‌​‌​‌​​‌​‌​​​​‌​‌‌​​​​​​​​‌​‌​‍that It is uncontroverted action. Airlines, (employee 711-12 tal 731 P.2d at private employer. is a proce enforce termination may able to be relies, which Mares case on The latest either on employee manual in an dure Lorenz, Corp. v. 823 P.2d Martin Marietta estoppel promissory or contract bilateral that ad- (Colo.1992),reiterates Colorado Rural v. Interrriountain Cronk theory); doctrine, employment” to the “at will heres (Colo.App.1988) Cooр., P.2d Elec. exception. policy public subject employee’s ex (if discharge resulted case, alleged that he was plaintiff that right or enacted ercising specifically refusing to communicate for terminated does not rule general “at duty, will” to misleading statements false and of this the facts But under apply). upon seclusion form negating sion produce required to not 500, 472-98, at Dissent privacy tort in Colorado” privacy. of invasion claim

Mares’s above, dissent, As noted off the mark. form is far According the mediсal case; ConAgra proving should burden of to be sufficient withstand should disprove it. And while to forced that we not be legal the fact dissent The criticizes ment. interesting, see are we this case issues in explain type of evidence what "do[ ] Supreme Court’s Colorado need to add form. no produce” in addition to the possibly could advisory opinion by seeking strategy workload decisions We leave such Dissent at 3. (and should) be resolved on federal they the case can attorneys and are confident due care summary judgment principles, with all neither refutes task. The form up to the any opinion on the state to disclaim that the taken privacy justification it establish nor does stated Moreover, that ConA- we think highly issues. sought be offensive information prompt resolu- in a gra interest objection has a substantial person had no a reasonable drug testing who "One this forum. case (like Mares), prerequisites tion of the essential summary judgment purposes principal the Restate- proving her case factually unsup- dispose of isolate rule is to ment. defenses, it and we think ported claims “in- justification, that we final dissent’s way allows it to interpreted in a producing should sum- correctly the burden shift[ ] Celotex, at purpose.” 477 U.S. accomplish this and "effec- to Mares” mary omitted). (footnote 323-24, S.Ct. at 2553 availability intru- tively foreclose!] seemingly straightforward, is termed private em- while government of his on behalf “substantially intrusive” and by Mares as held ployer. The Colorado in a placing listening device “similar to wrongful discharge un- bedroom.” exception to the рublic policy der the cognizable in what is that Mares overstates will doctrine We believe recognized by the Su- being requested. As to withstand order (not Court, allegation preme some absent wrong- on a claim a directed verdict gleaned present) here employee’s discharge on an ful based information form be- from a medication act, illegal perform refusal published, any invasion ing disseminated or establish, in addition to employee must v. Rail- insignificant. Skinner is at best Cronk, outlined the elements Ass’n, 602, 626, Exec. way Labor U.S. or constructive employer had actual 1402, 7,n. 103 L.Ed.2d 639 109 S.Ct. knowledge refusal to Roe, (1989) (citing 429 U.S. Whalen on the em- perform the was act based (1977)). 51 L.Ed.2d 97 S.Ct. the act ployee’s reasonable belief a Fourth Amend- While Skinner involved employer unlawful. directed claim, regard- conclusion Court’s Lorenz, above, at 102. As noted 823 P.2d “medical form inva- ing the nature of the being that she was Mares never contended any telling. In the absence sion” is illegal and stresses perform act asked anything other than suggesting evidence drug complaining not аbout the that she is confidentiality of the informa- fact, testing. In she would have submitted hold as a matter of law requested, we Thus, tests, the form. drug but for is suggested intrusion that entirely on the form objection focuses her cant.3 complete. asked to she was public the absence of We ConAgra’s re Mares contends that for preclude an action disclosure does not medication information consti quest for upon seclusion under 652B intrusion § recog privacy, a tort an invasion of tutes (Second) Id. Torts. Restatement Rugg McCarty, v. nized in Colorado. See deciding, Assuming, without comment a. (1970); P.2d 173 Colo. recognize such a tort would Corp., 691 P.2d v. Premier Indus. Wells law, privacy part of its invasion of (Colo.App.1984); Restatement prove Mares had the burden (Second) 652A(2). Torts § Mares con a substantial interference form constituted Supreme Court has that the Colorado tends seclusion, “highly one which is with her for the inva its own elements established person” and “to offensive to a adopt not privacy and would sion of strongly man the reasonable Aplt. Reply Restatemеnt See approach. object.” Id. & comment d. Mares 652B § Mares, According to Brief at 12. ConAgra of- carry her burden. did not McCarty, she should prevail on her Rugg v. requiring legitimate for reasons fered privacy claim because Con- form, invasion pro- complete the such as ployees to (1) request for medical information Agra’s positives tecting employees from false (2) unreasonable, cause extreme drug will integrity its test- maintaining the and humil anguish, embarrassment “the Although mental Mares contends that ing. (3) oppressive con by ConAgra constitutes is insuf- proffered explanation iation and Mares’ Aplt. Brief at 13 a need for ficient to demonstrate duct and intimidation.. information,” McCarty, P.2d at 755- the burden (citing Rugg v. private medical forward with sum- ConAgra, on Mares to come 56). sought by was The information (1st Cir.1986); United. Conagra publi- Corp., F.2d 352 never I.B.M. It is uncontroverted concerning Westinghouse Corp., Mares and did F.2d 570 Elec. cized information States requested Cir.1980); Barrington, medical information. (3rd Borough disclose not Doe v. Thus, by disclo- cited Mares which involve cases (D.NJ.1990); F.Supp. v. New Cronan by private third medical information sure of (D.Mass. England Telephone, Cases 1 IER applicability. cited parties Cases have no 1986). category include Bratt within this (not appeal raised mere state- The central issue this mary judgment employ- not related to the Colorado at-will counsel) refuting justification, ments of complaint, appellant ment doctrine. her assertion ‍‌‌​​‌‌​‌‌‌​‌​​‌‌​​‌​‌​‌​​‌​‌​​​​‌​‌‌​​​​​​​​‌​‌​‍that thereby supporting Mares’ relief, Carmela Mares six claims for prior to request for medical including public a claim “violаtion of for an in- drug testing unreasonable and separate policy” and a claim “invasion Celotex, 477 U.S. on seclusion. See trusion privacy.” violation-of-public-policy The 2552. Mares cannot 106 S.Ct. at essentially wrongful dis- claim asserts summary judgment merely by char- avoid charge allegedly meets Colorado’s “oppres- ConAgra’s request as acterizing public policy exception to the doctrine of at- it is sive conduct intimidation” employment.1 separate will In a “unreason- a condition relief, Mares asserts cause of action for legitimate need for there is no able because priva- the common law illnesses and med- employer to know the cy.2 granted The district court defendant’s employees.” Aplt. Brief ications of its See summary judgment motion on all of Mares’ at 13. claims. Although argues a need to bal- . appeal, only On contends sug- parties, ance the interests of granting summary district court erred in fact gests genuine issue of material respect with an invasion of concerning whether exists apрeal claim. She occurred, has not come forward grant summary judgment on her the undis- to controvert wrongful discharge in claim for violation forth Con- puted facts as set material issue raised on public policy. narrow Consequent- Agra’s motion and affidavits. whether, appeal is when inferences Only nothing to “balance.” ly, there appellant in favor of Carmela drawn matters are disputes material factual about Mares, presented by par- both the evidence judgment determi- summary a relevant to any genuine issue as to presents ties Anderson, 477 U.S. nation. priva- of material fact so that the invasion dispute fact in at 2510. No material S.Ct. jury. to a cy should be issue submitted of brought to the attention having been addressing specific the appellate court or the either the district appeal, majority the issue raised on court, the district court judgment carry has failed to concludes that Mares certify to and motion AFFIRMED I dis- summary judgment burden. her to the Colorado Su- question of state law deciding— I assume without agree. When preme is DENIED. Court would majority as does —that for the “intru- cause of action dissenting: TACHA, Judge, Circuit of the invasion upon seclusion” form sion in Restatement guidance little or no described majority, with The 652B, agree (Second) I cannot Colorado, Torts decides an § from the courts addi- must forward with that Mares come law and question of Colorado important evidence, medi- addition theory of tort recov- tional implicitly forecloses a required to com- that she cations form was ery yet to be addressed entry of sum- Therefore, prevent plete, in order respectful- I Court of Colorado. “ circuit, mary judgment. In our ‘[t]he ly dissent. relief, relief, "Invasion entitled 2. Mares’ fifth claim complaint's enti- claim for 1. The second Policy," alleges Privacy,” states that that tled "Violation of Public dis- acting herein Defendant as [i]n sign a that Plaintiff Defendant’s insistence just cause and in charged Plaintiff without and of confidential to the release consent public policies of the violation of fundamental subsequent her privileged and Colorado, following respects, State comply due to failure termination divulge among Plaintiff to requiring others rights. Plaintiffs patient doctor information covered privilege of her continued as a condition 13-90-107(d). of C.R.S. ployment in violation of informa- for release authorization and of show- the burden moving party carries regard- physician employee’s that it is doubt reasonable ing beyond a ” of medications. Hicks v. use summary judgment.’ ing the entitled to (10th Therefore, that 942 F.2d if I assume Watonga, even City of Amoco Oil Cir.1991) Ewing judgment burden (quoting summary met its initial Cir.1987)). (10th 823 F.2d of medi- the disclosure resрect itsmet bur- “moving party has When the I cannot conclude requirement, cations nonmoving den, shifts the burden sufficiently justified all ConAgra has issue genuine there is a party to show so form the medications requirements Indus., Inc. v. fact.” Bacchus of material as a matter ato as to be entitled (10th Indus., 939 F.2d Arvin of law. met its initial Cir.1991). ConAgra never majori- agree with Finally, I cannot it entitled showing that was burden the absence ty’s determination “[i]n of law. a matter judgment as anything other suggesting any evidence stating an affidavit ConAgra submitted in- confidentiality of the than form the medications purpose as a matter requested, ... formation drug test accuracy to ensure the suggested intrusion ... positive explain employees to allow Because this is Maj. op. at 496. cant.” presented no Although Mares results. test majority affirms diversity Mares explanation, to rebut evidence mat- “as a summary judgment grant of ConAgra’s agree I contends—and —that law,” its decision necessarily bases it ter of eliminate all does not justification stated this case Colo- the forum—in on the law of The ma- fact. issuеs of material genuine from clear that It is rado. far produce evi- Mares jority mandates conclude of Colorado ConAgra’s justification to refute dence state, support, a failed than more consist of rebuttal privacy.3 for invasion of action cause op. at Maj. of counsel.” statements “mere priva- inquiry in an invasion crucial The explain what majority does person finds is what a cy claim pro- could possibly type of evidence form deciding that the By objectionable. Indeed, unlikеly that it is duce. to create evidence is not itself sufficient than the other present could the form was to whether genuine issue already produced— powerful effectively unreasonable, fore- majority the form itself. medications the upon availability intrusion of the closes submitting the af- ConAgra, by Perhaps privacy of form of the invasion seclusion for re- legitimate fidavit, reasons offered tort in Colorado. employ- of medications questing a list evidence, Mares additional produce To However, taking. ConA- currently ees is intru- itself only that the form can assert at- not even did proffered evidence gra’s person. to a reasonable sive offensive arguably more intru- tempt justify the argu- legal necessarily are assertions ConAgra on Such by imposed requirements sive supply addi- simply cannot ments. namely, disclosure the medications form— constitutes on what tional factual illnesses of the the nature of (the a. intru- Id. 652B cmt. § occurs. majority intrusion concludes paragraph the In one privacy any- of suggesting upon form of invasion any evidence sion seclusion absence "li]n of confidentiality given any publicity depend upon thing other "does not than of invaded,” as a matter requested, we hold but "con- is person whose interest information suggested is intrusion law that the of cant," solely an intentional interference sists of then, added); (emphasis Maj. op. at 496 seclusion”). If the or solitude his interest in majority “recog- paragraph, next in the recognize Supreme Colorado were of Court public disclosure of the absence nize[s] does not in privacy described of invasion the form upon preclude action intrusion an 652B, look that the court would I § "confidentiality” doubt (Sec- of the 652B Restatement § under seclusion ond) as a acquired 652B, Clearly, § Id. under Torts." signifi- is of whether an intrusion determinant person’s private publication of a publicity or cant. significant to whether is relevant affairs

499 required harassment not be peated intrusion. should or offensive unreasonable an minds in the context because an em- ample room for reasonable There “by wielding power ‘pink the medi- regarding ployer, to differ whether ” form, required by a condition of slip,’ anguish as can mak- cations cause extreme upon Mares’ solitude employment, intruded ing single demand and con- unreasonable highly way in that “would be seclusion or ditioning employment on the fulfillment Re- person.” offensive that demand. (Second) 652B. Once Torts §

statement ConAgra also that Mares fails contends form, the medications Mares introduced upon to state a claim for the “intrusion genuine issue of material created a she form of tort of invasion seclusion” the is- majority removes Today, fact. (Second) privacy described Restatement province jury and be- from the sue ConAgra argues Torts 652B. § of even Absent the ultimate factfinder. comes if of Colorado Court of Colo- from the Court indication tort, form of the were this issue as a that we should decide rado allege has failed to an intrusion be law, I condone this usur- cannot matter release cause she refused to consent function. pation jury’s Tombrello v. private information. See appeal ade- parties’ arguments 541, (N.D.Ala. F.Supp. Corp., 763 545 USX important, unanswered quately frame the Co., 1991); Tel. Spencer v. General by presented questions of Colorado ‍‌‌​​‌‌​‌‌‌​‌​​‌‌​​‌​‌​‌​​‌​‌​​​​‌​‌‌​​​​​​​​‌​‌​‍(M.D.Pa.1982); 896, F.Supp. Greten employ- contends that this case. Mares 331, F.Supp. v. Ford Motor cord as a condition required, ee who (D.Kan.1982); v. Nabors Alas Luedtke employer the her ployment, to disclose to 1123, Inc., 768 P.2d Drilling, ka she takes illnesses which of her nature 1989); (Alaska Jennings v. Minco Technol and to authorize drugs or medications (Tex. Labs, Inc., 765 S.W.2d ogy re- physician her of information release out, However, points App.1989). as Mares drugs states a of those to her use lated recognized “highly courts have other under Colora- for invasion person questions demands personal or contention, support for do law. As regarded authority may be intru 173 Colo. Rugg McCarty, Mares cites integrity psychological solitude sion on (1970), in the Su- 476 P.2d privacy.” W. hence an recognized the preme of Colorado Keeton, Torts & Keeton on Page Prosser debt- of invasion Phillips (Supp.1988); at 121 § contends that context. She or/creditor Servs., Smalley Maintenance set forth standard a claim states (Ala.1983) (“acquisition of So.2d in this ConAgra’s actions Rugg requi not a plaintiff information from result “foreseeably probably case [would] action”); cause of element of a 652B site § embarrassment,-humil- anguish, in extreme McClellan, F.2d McSurely v. see also suffering injury to a iation, or mental Cir.1985). (D.C. 88, 113 sensibilities, ordinary person possessed circumstances.” or the same similar Supreme Court of Colorado Although the at 755. Id. оft-recog- four are noted that there priva- of invasion of forms of the tort nized hand, contends the other ConAgra, on upon physical soli- cy, including “intrusion of Colorado Court tude,” 197 Colo. People v. Home Ins. employment con- Rugg not extend (1979), n. 2 P.2d rec- contends that ConAgra further text. formally recognized that court has privacy tort ognition of the scope. I or defined its form of the tort repeated on a creditor’s was based Rugg Court of Colora- conclude in that case. the debtor harassment opportunity to be case, do should afforded present ConAgra argues upon ConAgra has intruded whether decide she was re- has not and, so, whether if private concerns the Mares’ to fill out hounded or harassed peatedly such an determine whether jury should responds that re- form. medications powers Therefore, to exercise those of Colorado Court “highly offensive.” is intrusion states. reserved following questions to certify the I would of Colorado: Supreme Court incorrectly shifts majority Because the produсing the burden of of Colorado law of the State 1. Does decides—with- to Mares and ment priva- tort of invasion the cases of the out indication in Restate- described cy the form al- (1977), Supreme of Colorado—that 652B (Second) Torts § case was in this leged intrusion forth below? as set cant, I dissent. physi- intentionally intrudes who One otherwise, or upon the solitude cally or af- private his another

seclusion of or concerns, liability subject

fairs or privacy, of his other highly offen- would be

if intrusion person. to a reasonable

sive “yes,” Question 1 is answer to

2. If the plaintiff’s about the HARDIMAN, must information Petitioner- Richard actually concerns” “private affairs or Appellant, through intrusion before acquired of action established? the cause Warden; REYNOLDS, Attor- Dan M. Question “yes,” 1 is If the answer 3. Oklahoma, ney of the State General case, this on the facts of based Respondents-Appellees. “intention- a claim for an Mares state 91-6337. No. or other- physical[ ] al[ ] intrusion] wise, or seclusion upon the solitude Appeals, Court of United States private affairs or con- another [her] Circuit. Tenth cerns”? July Questions 1 and 3 If answers facts of “yes,” based on the suffi- alleged “intrusion” is the jury should ciently offensive that intrusion is whether

determine per-

“highly offensive to a

son”? view, procedure the certification my mecha- and ‍‌‌​​‌‌​‌‌‌​‌​​‌‌​​‌​‌​‌​​‌​‌​​​​‌​‌‌​​​​​​​​‌​‌​‍underutilized appropriate important, state purely

nism to allow highest decided

questions to be Although the state involved.

court retain their unquestionably

federal courts of federalism the basic tenets

jurisdiction, system is vitality

suggest that give state federal courts

best served to decide issues opportunity

courts the Because Mares’ state law.

importance to statutory implicate federal rights

or constitutional privacy is based of invasion rights and rem-

states’ determination citizens, I favor to its afforded

edies colleagues on the

turning my

Case Details

Case Name: Carmela Mares v. Conagra Poultry Company, Inc.

Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Date Published: Jul 17, 1992

Citation: 971 F.2d 492

Docket Number: 91-1288

Court Abbreviation: 10th Cir.