121 Mass. 592 | Mass. | 1877
At the time Jackson took his deed of the estate, it was subject to two mortgages. The second mortgage to Hastings he paid, and it was discharged. He also paid, after maturity, the amount due on the first mortgage to the savings bank, and took an assignment thereof from the bank. The legal title under the mortgage was thus in Jackson, as well as the equitable title under his deed. Under ordinary circumstances, a mortgage title thus obtained would be extinguished, if it appears that the title formerly held and the title acquired were coextensive and held in the same right, and no outstanding title in a third person intervened between the right held and the right acquired. Hunt v. Hunt, 14 Pick. 374, 384. Loud v. Lane, 8 Met. 517. Ho such outstanding title is disclosed in this case, nor is there anything to show that Jackson took the assignment as additional security, for the whole title was in him.
But it is unnecessary to consider or decide the case merely on the portion of the record referred to, as we are of opinion that, upon all the facts disclosed in the report, the mortgage to the bank was extinguished by payment of the amount due thereon, although in form it appears to have been assigned to Jackson.
Before the sale of the estate by auction, the plaintiff, who desired to purchase, and had no means of doing so except a mortgage due to her from Jackson, agreed with Jackson that he should purchase and convey it to her upon payment by her of all that he should expend on account of the estate, with interest. The payment of the mortgage due from him was a part of this agreement, as it appears that she afterwards discharged it, and he gave her a receipt for the amount due, in part payment of his advances. The estate was bid off at the auction by one James McCaffrey, a son in law of the plaintiff. A deed was made to McCaffrey, the consideration named being $4950, subject to the two mortgages, and it contained this clause: “ Both •aid mortgages the grantee is to assume and pay, the same being
It is evident, from this statement of the facts, that McCaffrey bid off the property for and in behalf of Jackson, and in pursuance of the agreement previously made with the plaintiff. He paid no money, had no possession, and did no act except to bid at the auction and to execute the deed to Jackson; and his acts were confirmed by Jackson when he paid the consideration money to the grantors, after deducting the amount of the mortgages. The two deeds are to be taken together as parts of one transaction. The stipulation in the first deed, that the grantee should pay the mortgages, was therefore binding upon Jackson, and he was not relieved from his liability to pay them because the deed of McCaffrey to him contained no such provision. If Jackson had received no deed from McCaffrey, he would have still been the equitable owner of the estate bought with his money and by his direction, the title to which stood in the name of his agent or trustee; and if, in that position of the title, the stipulation in the deed for the payment of the two mortgages had been enforced against McCaffrey, Jackson would have been obliged to protect him, for he was acting as his agent. Putnam v. Collamore, 120 Mass. 454.
The form, therefore, of the deed to him cannot change the nature of the transaction. Jackson was bound to pay the mortgages, and the rule applies, that when the money is paid by one whose duty it is by contract, or otherwise, to pay the mortgage, it is a release, though in form it purports to be an assignment. Brown v. Lapham, 3 Cush. 551. Braman v. Dowse, 12 Curh. 227. The subsequent assignment of the mortgage by Jackson could give no title, to the Franklin Insurance Company as agains* the plaintiff.
It is admitted that Jackson was acting as trustee in taking the conveyance under the agreement. The real question to be