DECISION
This case presents the question whether a veteran’s disability claim under 38 U.S.C. § 1151 survives the veteran’s death. We hold that it does not and therefore that the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims properly dismissed this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
I
Carlton F. Seymour enlisted in the United States Army in July 1948. On December 2, 1950, he was wounded in the right thigh by North Korean machine gun fire. On December 12, 1952, Mr. Seymour was awarded an 80 percent combined disability rating as a result of this wound. Mr. Seymour became disabled and unable to work in 1979, and he was awarded a 90 percent combined disability rating in 1981.
In August 1984, Mr. Seymour underwent surgery at a VA hospital to relieve pain in his right toes. During routine blood work associated with this surgery, the laboratory reported an elevated platelet count. Between 1984 and 1989, VA physicians did not diagnose or treat Mr. Seymour for this condition. In 1989, Mr. Seymour’s blood condition was diagnosed as myeloproliferative disorder, a disease involving excess production of certain kinds of blood cells (platelets, in Mr. Seymour’s case).
In May 1990, Mr. Seymour initiated a claim for disability under 38 U.S.C. § 1151 for failure to diagnose, treat, and warn him of myeloproliferative disorder. He argued that but for the failure of VA physicians to timely diagnose or treat him for the myelo-proliferative disorder, he would not have developed, or he would have developed with lesser severity, a myocardial infarction, hearing loss, and his myeloprolifera-tive disorder.
Mr. Seymour’s pursuit of his section 1151 claim proved to be a decade-long endeavor that ended only with his death. Although the circuitous course of these proceedings has little bearing on the outcome of this case, we nevertheless briefly outline them here. The VA Regional Office denied Mr. Seymour’s claim on August 17, 1990. Mr. Seymour appealed to the Board of Veterans’ Appeals (“Board”). The Board instituted a stay on all section 1151 claims from February 1992, through January 1995, during which this court and the Supreme Court upheld the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims’ ruling that section 1151 included no requirement of governmental negligence, despite a sixty-year-old agency regulation to the contrary.
See Gardner v. Brown,
Mr. Seymour died on July 16, 1999, during the pendency of his appeal to the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims. Constance A. Seymour, Mr. Seymour’s surviving spouse, moved to be substituted as the party appellant. The Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, citing
Landicho v. Brown,
II
The question of whether a veteran’s disability claim under 38 U.S.C. § 1151 survives the veteran’s death is a question of statutory interpretation, over which this court has jurisdiction under 38 U.S.C. § 7292(c). We review without deference the statutory interpretation of the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims.
See Richard v. West,
Section 1151 is found in chapter 11 of Title 38 of the United States Code, which provides disability benefits for qualifying veterans and death benefits for qualifying survivors. This court has not previously addressed whether a disability claim under 38 U.S.C. § 1151 survives the death of a veteran. However, it has previously determined that disability claims under other provisions of chapter 11 do not survive a veteran’s death.
See Richard v. West,
In our previous decisions holding that disability claims do not survive a veteran’s death, we explained that under chapter ll’s statutory scheme, disability compensation is generally payable only to veterans, while death benefits are payable to survivors.
See Richard,
Ill
We turn now to section 1151 itself. Mrs. Seymour argues that the principles of Richard, Haines, and Zevalkink are not applicable to claims arising under section 1151. We begin our analysis with the language of the statute. Section 1151 provides, in relevant part:
Where any veteran shall have suffered an injury, or an aggravation of an injury, as the result of hospitalization, medical or surgical treatment, ... and such injury or aggravation results in additional *1380 disability to or the death of such veteran, disability or death compensation under this chapter and dependency and indemnity compensation under chapter 13 of this title shall be awarded in the same manner as if such disability, aggravation, or death were service connected.
38 U.S.C. § 1151 (1994). 1
The plain language of section 1151 forecloses Mrs. Seymour’s claim that Mr. Seymour’s action survives his death. While the appellant urges that “claims under section 1151 are not based on service connection ... [and should not] be precluded,” Congress has specifically provided that disability compensation under section 1151 is “awarded in the same manner as if such disability ... were service connected.” Service-connected disability compensation is awarded under section 1110, and we have previously determined that a veteran’s claim under section 1110 is extinguished by the death of the veteran.
See Richard,
In contrast to a veteran’s disability claim, a death benefit claim under section 1151 is not extinguished by a veteran’s death. Sections 1310 (for post-1956 deaths) and 1141 (for pre-1957 deaths) make clear that a death benefit claim for a service-connected death is never a claim by the veteran, but rather a claim by the survivors. Thus, there is no anomaly in recognizing the continued existence of the death benefit claim under section 1151 while extinguishing the veteran’s disability claim.
In an attempt to distinguish claims under section 1151 from other claims under chapter 11, the appellant asserts that section 1151 is historically linked to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). In a suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act, Mr. Seymour’s pending action would not have lapsed at his death, and Mrs. Seymour would have been substituted in his place.
See Richards v. United States,
We find nothing in the language or history of section 1151 which links it to the Federal Tort Claims Act in such a manner as to allow a veteran’s disability claim to survive the veteran’s death. As an initial matter, section 1151 dates back to 1924,
see Gardner v. Brown,
Finally, the appellant points out that the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit appears to have adopted a different construction of the predecessor version of section 1151 in
Devany v. United States,
IV
We thus find no basis for distinguishing this case from Richards, and we conclude that Mrs. Seymour has no right to be substituted for Mr. Seymour in this action. This determination does not imply that Mrs. Seymour has no basis to seek compensation on her own behalf. Mrs. Seymour is entitled to pursue her previously-filed claim for accrued benefits under section 5121, and she may also seek dependency and indemnity compensation under chapter 13.
As we noted in
Richard,
the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims “does not decide cases that do not present an actual case or controversy.”
Richard,
COSTS
No costs.
Notes
. In 1996, Congress amended § 1151 to specify that, except in circumstances not relevant here, compensation would be awarded only if the proximate cause of the disability or death was departmental negligence or an event not reasonably foreseeable. See 38 U.S.C .A. § 1151(a) (West Supp.2000). The Board did not apply this amendment retroactively to Mr. Seymour’s claim. The government apparently agrees that this amendment should not have retroactive effect, and the amendment does not in any event affect the outcome of this case.