delivered the opinion of the court:
This is а negligence action brought by plaintiff, Keith Carlson, in the circuit court of Bureau County. After trial by jury judgment was entеred on the verdict in favor of defendant, Donald Hudson.
Plaintiff Carlson was injured in a fall from a tree while cutting a limb with a chain saw. Plaintiff was on a ladder supplied by defendant Hudson. The tree was located on land rented by defendant and the plaintiff was cutting the limb at the defendant’s request Plaintiff’s theory is that defendant breached a duty owed to plaintiff by not warning plaintiff that the ladder which defendant provided had the bottom rung wired, wаs split and cracked on one side and was nailed together. The circumstances here indicatе a possible breach of duty but we cannot say as a matter of law the jury had to find the plaintiffs injury was the rеsult of defendant’s negligence. Implicit in plaintiffs own theory of the case are the questions of whether the defect in the ladder was patent or latent, whether in view of the condition any warning was required, аnd finally, whether it was the condition of the ladder which caused the plaintiff’s injury.
The main issue on appeal concerns the admissibility of testimony by defendant’s expert, a tree trimmer. Plaintiff’s first argument is that the testimony was inаdmissible because ft was based only on conjecture, and not on facts which were in evidence. Such argument is contrary to the record because it shows the defendant’s expert’s testimony was based оn his examination of defendant’s exhibits numbers one, two and three and that he identified from these exhibits an incomplete chain saw cut. It cannot therefore be said that defendant’s expert’s testimony was basеd solely on conjecture.
Plaintiffs next argument is based on the proposition that an expert cannot testify as to an occurrence where there are credible eyewitnesses to that oсcurrence. As we noted earlier, it is plaintiff’s theory that the cause of his injury was defendant’s failure to wаrn him of the defective ladder even though in plaintiff’s own testimony the relationship between the ladder and the fall is a matter of inference and not observation. The so-called occurrence witnеsses arrived at the scene moments after the incident took place. The plaintiff himself did not see all that happened and his testimony, as well as that of his own expert, indicates that no one aсtually saw what happened.
The main issue on appeal derives from the proposition that аn expert cannot testify as to matters of common knowledge. Plaintiff, relying on Ficht v. Niedert Motor Service, Inc.,
While we recognize the rule that the testimony of an expert is inapрropriate when it relates to matters of common knowledge, we are unable to say that the expert’s testimony falls within that category in the context of this case. Even if such were the case, the trend of decisions is that an expert may testify as to matters of common knowledge where the expеrt’s testimony would be helpful to the jury. In Stanley v. Board of Education,
In the case at bar the testimony of the expert may be considered helpful in determining what was the сause of plaintiffs injury. The subject matter, i.e., the procedure for cutting a limb from a tree, including the use of a ladder in such activity, is of such a nature that an expert’s testimony could be helpful and appropriate in determining whether the cause of the plaintiffs injury was the defective ladder, as claimed by рlaintiff, or another cause, as claimed by defendant.
For the foregoing reasons, we find no error in the judgment of the circuit court of Bureau County and the judgment is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
SCOTT, P. J., and ALLOY, J., concur.