Carlos Gonzalez v. Able Huerta

GONZALEZ, Plaintiff- Carlos

Appellant, HUERTA, Defendant-Appellee. Able 15-20212

No. Appeals, States Court United Fifth Circuit. June Kita, Dallas, TX,

Matthew J. for Plain- tiff-Appellant. Gilbert,

Christоpher Blewer Rebecca Weimer, Bailey Thompson Horton, & L.L.P., Houston, TX, for Defendant-Ap- pellee. CLEMENT, GRAVES,

Before and COSTA, Judges. Circuit CLEMENT, EDITH BROWN Circuit Judge: appeals

Carlos Gonzalez the district summary judgment court’s in fa- vor of school district officer Abel question presented Huerta.1 The is wheth- court in granting er district erred qualified immunity. Huerta Because we law, find no violation of we AFFIRM.

I. Tuesday, July approxi-

On afternoon, mately pm in the 4:30 Carlos gold-cоlored sports Gonzalez drove his util- (SUV) ity vehicle to Bendwood Elementa- wife, ry pick up School his employee. accompanied by Gonzalez was thirteen-year-old daughter, his who rode in the back seat. Gonzalez backed into a parking space in the school lot waited employee for his wife. Another noticed his vehicle, suspicious, deemed it and contact- police, ed thе school district who dis- complaint 1. The lists "Able” Huerta as the of the defendant's first name. defendant, spelling but "Abel” is the correct any material fact and the investigate. dispute ine as to Huerta to Officer patched route, received additional a matter judgment entitled to en movant is While history of vehicle regarding Furthermore, information R. Civ. P. 56. of law.” Fed. location, although the same burglaries at decision may affirm the district court’s “we prior these connected no evidence record, by the any ground supported gold to a SUV. incidents judg- not the basis for the even if it was school, Parish Sch. v. Mo- matched ment.” Terrebonne Bd. arrived at the Huerta (5th de- dispatcher’s vehicle to the Cir. Corp., bil 310 F.3d 878 Oil the driver’s side. scription, approached and 2002). his produce Gonzalez to Huerta then asked grant quali a of “We also review justifi- asked for a Gonzalez identification. ‍‌‌‌​​​​​​​​​‌​‌​‌​​‌​‌​‌‌​‌​‌​​​‌​​​‌‌‌‌​‌​​​‌​​‍Arcuri, v. immunity Bishop de novo.” fied request. repeated Huerta cation for (5th Cir.2012). “A public 460 674 F.3d again and asked for request, Gonzalez immunity qualified to official is entitled Huerta stated that he would justification. a (1) plaintiff unless the demonstrates justification pro- after a Gonzalez plaintiffs violated the con the defendant produced identification. Gonzalez

vided his (2) the defendant’s stitutional and calling and stated that he was phone a cell objectively unreasonable actions were hung up without attorney, but he his law at the time light of anyone. hand- to Huerta then speaking Gonzalez, Epps, removed him from the Porter v. 659 F.3d cuffed of the violation.” vehicle, (5th Cir.2011). placed and him in the back of the 440, 445 car, thir- holding him there for over patrol eventually ap- minutes. Gonzalez’s wife

ty III. and once Huerta confirmed Gonza- peared, appeal, argues only Gonzalez On school, at the identity purpose and his lez’s suspicion lacked reasonable to that Huerta him. he released him, violating his constitutional detain against §a claim filed 1983 to free from unreasonable right detention, ar- alleging illegal false and seizures.2 The district court searches rest, and excessive force violation investigative determined that Huerta’s de qual- Huerta asserted Fourth Amendment. by suspi supported tention was reasonable summary immunity and moved for ified cion, law, apply “a of to which we question granted the The district court judgment. City de novo review.” Goodson v. Cor of motion, finding investigative that Huerta’s (5th Christi, pus 202 F.3d 737 Cir. by supported detention of Gonzalez was 2000). suspicion sup “Reasonable must be suspicion and that Huerta was facts, ported by particular and articulable qualified immunity. to entitled which, together taken with rational infer facts, reasonably ences from those warrant

II. Michelletti, an intrusion.” United States summary .review a of “We (5th Cir.1994). It “re 13 F.3d novo, viewing all evidence judgment de quires merely unparticular- more than an nonmoving to most favorable hunch, considerably but less than ized infer party drawing all reasonable proof wrongdoing by preponderance party’s in that favor.” Kariuki ences Gonzalez, the evidence.” United States v. Cir.2013). (5th Tarango, 709 F.3d (5th Cir.1999). “The 190 F.3d Summary judgment appropriate where of the reasonable genu- application shows that there is no “the movant Thus, claims. we false arrest or excessive force do not consider his the consideration of requires stop person.” standard the decision to United Silva, (5th circumstances.” United States v. 957 F.2d Cir.1992) added). Neufeld-Neufeld, (emphasis Here, States v. any sus- (5th Cir.2003). picions by Huerta should have been alleviated before he decided to detain Gon- Viewing the evidence in the First, zalez. Gonzalez did not attempt Gonzalez, light most favorable to we have away drive or flee the scene as the officer serious doubts as whether Huerta had a approached. Compare Wardlow, Illinois v. reasonable basis to detain him.3 Huerta’s piece first of information was the bare (2000) L.Ed.2d 570 (holding suspect’s report “suspicious” of a vehicle in the unprovoked flight upon noticing police sup- piece lot. Huerta’s second ported Second, suspicion). “a history information was recent Huerta a thirteen-year-old girl saw calmly burglaries of at motor vehicles the same vehicle; in sitting third, the baсk of the location.” But Huerta any did not receive doing Gonzalez was little more than sitting connecting “suspicious” information the ve public in his car in a lot. any alleged hicle to of the burglaries. Finally, points Rather, Huerta encountered the basic sce phone suspicious call as a activity. But reportedly suspicious nario of a person Gonzalez explicitly criminal stated that he activity an area where wanted had oc attorney, to contact his apparent- curred in who was past the scenario that does —a ly sum, support the unavailable to receive call. In particu conclusion that a the lar no real inference of criminal engaged activity individual is criminal con can be Texas, 47, 52, duct. See v. drawn from Brown 443 U.S. the of these facts and (1979) 2637, 99 S.Ct. 61 (police L.Ed.2d 357 circumstanсes. stop suspect of a for “look[ing] suspicious” But even if we assume that in a “neighborhood frequented by drug Huerta violated Gonzalez’s constitutional justified by users” was not reasonable sus rights by him detaining without reasonable picion). Nor is there indication that it suspicion, say we cannot that this deten

would be legally unusual for a car to be objectively tion was unreasonable in parked in a school lot on a week clearly of established law.4 Gonzalez ar day afternoon as employees are gues clearly the law is leaving day. for the Compare Flores v. that a officer’s demand for identifi Palacios, 391, (5th City 381 F.3d 402-03 of cation constitutes a seizure under the Cir.2004) (holding parked that car on the Fourth Amendment and must be based on wrong two-way side of a street in violation suspicion. But general this supported suspi Texаs law claim—that a seizure under the Fourth cion). Amendment must be based on reasonable Furthermore, “reasonable suspi precisely type the of “general —is [present] cion must be ... at proposition” Supreme the time Court has investigative rights While an detention must be Huerta violated Gonzalez’s initial suspicion, stop request. based on reasonable an and identification arrest— explicit, whether deor facto in the form of an excessively long Terry detention —must be may proceed directly 4. We to the second probable based on cause. See United States prong qualified immunity v. analysis with- Zavala, 562, (5th Cir.2008). 579 explicitly ruling out on the first. See Pearson v. Callahan, 808, Because Gonzalez has not raised the issue of 555 U.S. S.Ct. 129 (2009). appeal, only arrest on we consider whether 172 L.Ed.2d 565 858 an individ- al-Kidd, police ‍‌‌‌​​​​​​​​​‌​‌​‌​​‌​‌​‌‌​‌​‌​​​‌​​​‌‌‌‌​‌​​​‌​​‍may not detain v. 563 U.S.

rejected. See Ashcroft 2074, 2084, 179 1149 L.Ed.2d identifica- 731, 131 solely refusing ual for S.Ct. (2011). Instead, repeatedly has 52, the Court Brown, tion, see U.S. specific to look at the the need emphasized District and Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial determining qualified of a case when facts Nevada, County, 542 Humboldt Court of (“We repeatedly have immunity. id. 188, 124 159 L.Ed.2d U.S. S.Ct. clearly estab not to courts ... define told dealt neither of those cases high generality. law at a lished level ocсurring proper- on school with incidents that an example, for proposition, general distinction, no small ty. This is or seizure violates search unreasonable routinely reconsidered Supreme Court has help little in de Amendment is of Fourth scope individual constitutional nature of termining whether violative See, e.g., Morse v. setting. in a school established.”) particular conduct Frederick, S.Ct. omitted). (internal the more citations With (2007); Sch. L.Ed.2d 290 Vernonia requires, the Court inquiry specific Acton, Dist. U.S. 47J is either whether there question becomes (1995); Jersey 132 L.Ed.2d New controlling authority ... estab “directly T.L.O., “a illegality of such conduct” or lishing the (1985). Thus, we find that L.Ed.2d 720 authority persuasive cases of consensus on—and Gonzalez Brown—which .relies not reasonable officer could such that a “sufficiently high Hiibel do meet that his actions were law have believed neсessary put “to specificity” level of Columbia, ful,” City v. McClendon that detain reasonable official on notice” (5th Cir.2002) 314, (emphasis 328-29 F.3d an individual for a failure to ing added) (quoting Layne, Wilson v. U.S. “is defini 1692, property identification on school 143 L.Ed.2d 818 119 S.Ct. (1999)).5 City v. Sul tively unlawful.” Vincent (5th Cir.2015), F.3d phur, 805 Here, appears it that Huerta’s decision — denied, U.S. —, 136 S.Ct. cert. based, at least to detain Gonzalez was (2016).7Accordingly, we 194 L.Ed.2d 607 re- belief that Gonzalez was part, on his actions were do not find that Huerta’s identify pursuant quired to himself of a “objectively unreasonable § of the Texas Education Code.6 37.105 rule law.” Id. Huerta clearly have established prior Supreme Court cases And while clearly governing peatedly told courts not to es- argues that the law define 5. The dissent high generality, at a level of tablished law investigative '‘well-settled” and detentions is question doing so avoids the сrucial specificity since al-Kidd concerns are not thus the reasonably the official acted in the whether recently implicated. But the Ninth Circuit particular circumstance that he or she immunity protected faced.” qualified an of held that - Rickard, -, (quoting v. U.S. Terry "despite violated ficer who had Plumhoff 2012, 2023, 188 L.Ed.2d 1056 given many shape that have to the con cases (2014))). suspicion requirement tours of the reasonаble Dillard, Terry.” 818 F.3d Thomas 37.105 of the Texas Education Code (2016). 6. Section recognized "Supreme It may required of that be "[identification states demanding plaintiff Court’s standard” for property.” any person on [school] clearly law establish a violation of establishing required law the unlawful case Indeed, to Gonzalez that stop particular the officers stated of the and frisk in the ness case, got job we’ve is a little bit different.... which in Thomas involved "our context of the here, a little approach ... so we have to reports dispute. at 887-88 kids of a domestic Id. Supreme bit different.” (explaining that the Court has "re- qualified immunity. majority entitled to essentially is therefore acknowledges AFFIRMED. that Huerta did not have a reasonable Gonzalez, basis to detain but then deter-

GRAVES, Judge, dissenting: Circuit mines that the law is not clearly estab- disagree. lishеd. I I disagree majority’s with the conclusion that there no violation of was estab- matter, As an initial I would explicitly I lished law. Because would reverse the that, conclude under summary judgment illegal circumstances, Huerta lacked reasonable detention claim and remand to the district suspicion and, thus, to detain Gonzalez vio- court I proceedings, respectful- for further lated his constitutional rights. Huerta re- ly dissent. only ceived a bare report originated from an party -that unknown third of a argues “suspi- Huerta violated his cious” vehicle the school right constitutional to be free from unrea- lot and information ‍‌‌‌​​​​​​​​​‌​‌​‌​​‌​‌​‌‌​‌​‌​​​‌​​​‌‌‌‌​‌​​​‌​​‍of a recent history sonable searches and seizures he of automo- when burglaries bile handcuffed and him the same location. detained for failure to Huer- ta did not receive provide identificаtion. information con- necting either “suspicious” Gonzalez or the “Temporary, warrantless detentions of vehicle to that majori- information. As the individuals constitute seizures for Fourth states, ty by scenario encountered purposes justi- Amendment and must be Huerta was akin to that in Brown v. Tex- by fied suspicion illegal as, activity taking place.” has or is United L.Ed.2d 357 justify and did not Rodriguez, States v. 740-41 stop. for a As the (5th Cir.2009); Ohio, Terry majority concludes, further based on the 1, 30-31, 20 L.Ed.2d 889. totality of the facts and circumstances in “[rjeasonable states, majority As the sus- case, any suspicions this by picion must supported by particular should have ap- been alleviated when he facts, which, and togeth- articulable taken proached the vehicle. er with rational inferences from those However, facts, reasonably fairly after a thorough warrant an intrusion.” Michelletti, 838, analysis outlining how United States v. Huerta violated (5th Cir.1994). 840 It constitutional without “requires more than hunch, suspicion, majority an the- merely unparticularized then but determines that considerably very than the law it relies proof wrongdo- less of ing by upon clearly a is not I preponderance of the established.1 can- evidence.” Further, Gonzalez, 668, agree. not I disagree United States v. 190 with F.3d (5th Cir.1999). attempt application qualified immunity 671 “The of to make the the analysis suspicion requires fact-specific standard the so that it would clearly Thus, consideration of the of the circum- never be established. I stances.” United States v. would conclude that Huerta’s detention Neufeld-Neu- (5th Cir.2003). feld, 338 F.3d 378 objectively of Gonzalez was unreason- that, ther, majority 1. The notwithstanding majority is correct under Pearson essen- Callahan, 223, 227, tially prong, merely rulеd on the first Pearson "may proceed 172 565 L.Ed.2d it that, deciding two-step proce- said while the prong qualified the immunity second sequence usually "appropriate” dure in and However, analysis.” holding the Pearson does "beneficial,” it is not "inflexible” or “manda- majority’s include language not additional the 227, 236, tory.” Id. at 129 S.Ct. 808. explicitly ruling “without on the first.” Fur- that indi concedes al-Kidd “[b]ecause law. clearly established of able the issuance suspicion supported the vidualized disagree I with concluding, In so warrant; and arrest of the material-witness of Gonzalez’s majority’s characterization would have reject- that his arrest proposition” does not assert “general claim as a alleged the unconstitutional absent Court. been Supreme the by ed warrant; we find no pretextual use the clearly established the law is Although at violation.” Id. Fourth Amendment Amend the Fourth that a seizure under to whether the regard 131 S.Ct. 2074. With suspi on reasonable based ment must be established, the Court con was law merely make cion, does judicial opinion single that “not cluded Instead, asserts that a he claim. general render an ob pretext could had held for identification demand police officer’s to a pursuant arrest jectively reasonable must be a seizure and such constitutes unconstitutional” and material witness suspicion based on on reasonable based cited cases had been that other stated Fur law of Brown.2 clearly established in our discussion “rejected as irrelevant acknowledges that the ther, even Huerta any constitutional viola whether there was well-settled. law here is applicable 741-42, 131 S.Ct. 2074. at all.” Id. tion proposi a narrow majоrity on The relies Here, an issue deciding dealing are not we from of context tion taken out Ashcroft arrest, ap for an probable with cause al-Kidd, rejected as irrele plicable cases cannot (2011). mate quoted The L.Ed.2d vant, has made no conces and Gonzalez majority actually begins by the rial cited or reasonableness. sions Appeals also found “The Court of with: definitively has Supremе Court in the lurking law clearly established may not detain an that a officer the Fourth ‘history purposes and broad ” solely for suspicious individual he deems Here, Gonzalez does not Id. Amendment.’ identification, even un- refusing law clearly established claim that neighborhood and in a der a state statute history “broad only from the stems users, reason- by drug without frequented In Amendment.” the Fourth purposes of Brown, 443 U.S. at 51- suspicion. able law, аs applicable case cites stead Gonzalez Ann., 2637; Tex. Penal Code al-Kidd, Further, majority. does 8, § Hiibel v. Sixth Tit. also 38.02. See require ‍‌‌‌​​​​​​​​​‌​‌​‌​​‌​‌​‌‌​‌​‌​​​‌​​​‌‌‌‌​‌​​​‌​​‍do not clearly also said: “We Court Nev., Cty., Humboldt Jud. Dist. Ct. existing prece directly point, but a case L.Ed.2d U.S. S.Ct. statutory or placed must have dent 171.123(3). (2004); NRS question beyond debate.” Id. constitutional S.Ct. Supreme Court the fact the Despite that in al-Kidd that do specifically “[w]e said “pre- in was whether The issue аl-Kidd directly point,” a case on the require not objectively reasonable could render an text property majority concludes war- to material-witness pursuant arrest a and there must be a somehow different the detention rant unconstitutional” al-Kidd, directly point. on concluded case suspects. The Court terrorism circumstances, Hill, which relevant includ- United States 2. Gonzalez also cites drug activity (5th Cir.2014), and Hill's ed an area known where this court for F.3d 1029 hasty car when girlfriend’s from the suppress exit a should concluded that motion arrived, Hill, amount to articulable did not granted a have been where seizure which reasonable officer could apartment facts from sitting in a car in an who had been lot, engaged suspect being in criminal ac- Hill of unreasonable and complex was tivity. Id. at 1031. Terry. Specificаlly, court said this violated majority reveals, U.S. at 131 S.Ct. 2074. The the majority’s analysis the record cites, Huerta, as does section 37.105 of the support does not the existence of reason- Texas Education Code. Section 37.105 suspicion. able says: Both Huerta and the district court at- of trustees of a board school dis- tempted to distinguish Brown on the basis representative trict or its authorized specific Huerta had more information may a person refuse to allow without Brown, than the officer in not because legitimate business to enter on property Brown did not occur a school parking under may eject the board’s control and However, lot. the record does not establish any person undesirable from proper- that Huerta had more-information than the ty on the person’s peace- refusal to leave officer in Brown and the case law does not ably on request. may Identification be support majority’s conclusion that the required any person on property. law is not established. However, § Texas Educ. Code 37.105.3 reasons, For I these would reverse the says section 37.105 nothing about au- summary judgment on illegal thority to detain an individual who does Accordingly, detention claim. I respectfully immediately provide identification dissent. demand, upon says only but rather that a

person may ejected. Moreover, it is not

clear that Huerta is either member of the board of trustees school district representative.

or an authorized Nonetheless, assuming that section require 37.105 allowed Huerta to that Gon- identification, provide zalez it would have been unreasonable for Huerta to believe HEGGEMEIER, R. Ronald that he could then detain Gonzalez under Plaintiff-Aрpellant, that same failing section for to immediate- ly apparently agrees do so. Huerta be- COUNTY, TEXAS; CALDWELL Cald- argues cause he that he did not detain County Court; well Commissioners solely failing for iden- Munoz, Individually Alfred and in his tification, but did so because he had a capacity Commissioner; official as Er- suspect reasonable basis to a connection Madrigal, Individually nesto “Neto” between Gonzalez burgla- and recent car capacity his official ries under what he refers to as the “settled as Com- missioner; Roland, Individually Terry Further, law” of Joe and Michelletti. district court decided the capacity case reason- and in his official as Com- But, activity. able of criminal missioner, Defendants-Appellees. Frederick, majority 3. The cites Morse v. appli- with the of students and have no U.S. (2007), 168 L.Ed.2d 290 Additionally, majority’s quote cation here. Acton, and Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. regarding got from Huerta “we've kids” here 132 L.Ed.2d inapplicable. This occurred after school and T.L.O., (1995), Jersey and New pres- there is no evidence that kids were 83 L.Ed.2d 720 daughter, ent than other who was authority proposition for the that the “Su calmly sitting in the backseat of her father’s preme routinely Court has ‍‌‌‌​​​​​​​​​‌​‌​‌​​‌​‌​‌‌​‌​‌​​​‌​​​‌‌‌‌​‌​​​‌​​‍reconsidered the waiting vehicle while for her mother to exit scope of individual constitutional in a work. However, setting.” those cases all deal

Case Details

Case Name: Carlos Gonzalez v. Able Huerta

Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Date Published: Jun 23, 2016

Citation: 826 F.3d 854

Docket Number: 15-20212

Court Abbreviation: 5th Cir.